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Preface
Trade has skyrocketed over the past two centuries. While in 1820 world trade accounted for
only 20% of world GDP this share almost tripled by 2016 and increased to 56%.1 With trade
having a more important role in the world economy, trade policy became more relevant, too.
Countries have been using taris to regulate trade for a very long time. According to Adam
Smith (1776), “[In France Jean-Baptiste Colbert,] That minister, by the tari of 1667, imposed
very high duties upon a great number of foreign manufactures” (p. 358). In the 17th century
these French taris caused—at least in part—the Franco-Dutch war and resulted in similar
British duties shortly after. The British Corn Laws (Irwin 1989) and the taris applicable in
the colonial system (Hill 1892) are other examples that illustrate the historical importance of
taris in trade policy.
Taris are taxes imposed by a country that make imported goods more expensive relative to
domestic ones, and, as any tax, taris lead to welfare losses. Thus, the question arises: why do
countries set taris in the rst place? There are at least three distinct reasons put forward in
the literature. First, they serve as a source of revenue, as taris are relatively easy to collect.
This argument is especially relevant for countries with weak institutions where governments
might have troubles generating revenue through other sources, e.g., Europe during the 17th
to the 19th century or developing countries nowadays (cf. Keen 2008; Baunsgaard and Keen
2010). Second, terms-of-trade objectives might also play a role, as large countries can improve
their terms-of-trade by imposing taris (Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Lastly, political economy
motives can determine taris; politicians might be inuenced by special interest groups and/or
their constituencies (Grossman and Helpman 1994), which can go in either direction. The
repeal of the Corn Laws in the 19th century is one example when consumer welfare was
prioritized. Protection to British agriculture was torn down lowering grain prices substantially
(Irwin 1989). In contrast, recent U.S. trade policy increases taris to protect industries that
lost from trade. One of Donald Trump’s central campaign pledges was to impose punitive
taris on Chinese goods, a promise he kept when adding an up to 25% tari on most of U.S.
imports from China in 2018/19.
1 These numbers stem from the chart “Globalization over 5 Centuries” at https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/
globalization-over-5-centuries.
PREFACE
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters on trade policy through the lens of tar-
is. Chapter 1 reviews how recent trade policy aects the global tari landscape. To analyze
how countries set taris, I compile a new tari database. Chapter 2 analyzes the necessity
of rules of origin (RoOs), a regulatory detail that entails high costs and that is embodied in
all free trade agreements. To do so, I determine the protability of trade deection using
the new tari data presented in the previous chapter.2 In Chapter 3, I analyze the eect of
nonreciprocal trade preferences on rm-level exports.
Up until the outbreak of World War I, global trade policy was characterized by a network of
bilateral trade treaties which arose without multilateral cooperation. This system was shat-
tered during the World Wars and the inter-war period, when countries turned to protectionism
and international trade broke down. As a return to the “nonsystem” of the late 19th century
was considered highly unlikely, the international community, led by the United States and the
United Kingdom, agreed on the need for a postwar international agreement on trade policy
to reduce trade barriers (Irwin 1995) resulting in the formation of the General Agreement on
Taris and Trade (GATT) in 1947. The most-favored-nation clause is the dening principle of
the GATT and it requires a country to treat all trading partners the same, which internalizes
terms-of-trade motives and is therefore welfare enhancing (Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Since
then, eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have concluded, reducing the average
ad valorem tari on industrial products to below 5% and expanding the multilateral system’s
membership from 23 to 164 countries (cf. Bagwell et al. 2016). Furthermore, in 1995 the World
Trade Organization (WTO) was created.
In Chapter 1, I give a comprehensive overview of the global tari landscape for the period
1988 to 2017. Although taris might be on average low, this is neither true across all countries
nor across all sectors. In fact, even within sectors there is large heterogeneity across products.
Additionally, regional trade agreements (RTAs) make it possible to discriminate between trad-
ing partners. Taris are hence characterized by heterogeneity across various dimensions. I
answer the following questions: What are the persistent patterns in tari protectionism across
countries and sectors? How and by how much did taris change over the past 30 years? What
role did the WTO play? How much and when do preferential taris liberalize trade?
Tari data are not easily available. As Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) state “the grossly
incomplete and inaccurate information on policy barriers available to researchers is a scandal and
a puzzle” (p. 693). The main problem with the data is missing information and misreporting
in the ocial data, in particular for developing countries. Further, preferential RTAs allow for
discrimination in terms of the imposed tari across trading partners making the data problems
2 Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Gabriel Felbermayr and Erdal Yalcin and has been published in the
Journal of International Economics 2019 (2019) 121, 103248.
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more severe for this type of tari. With the current data situation, it is impossible to give
informed answers on the landscape of taris. Chapter 1 presents a new global tari database
covering taris at the six-digit product level for 197 importing countries and their trading
partners for 30 years, namely 1988 to 2017. I simultaneously deal with the two major issues,
missing data and misreporting, almost doubling the number of available taris from 2.9 to 5.7
billion. The improvement is particularly relevant for least developed countries and developing
countries: for least developed countries the share of missing data equals 56%, for developing
countries it is 42%.
With this new data at hand, I document important new facts about taris around the world.
First, I show that most of the recent decrease in taris is actually due to developing countries
unilaterally lowering tari-levels, independently of multilateral agreements under the WTO.
Second, I nd two customary practices that apply to all countries when they set taris: taris
are often multiples of ve or equal zero and countries tend to set the same tari for entire tari
headings (HS4-digit) instead on setting taris on a product-by-product basis. The reasons for
this observation might be attempts to facilitate the customs process and to diminish the risk
of fraud. Third, RTAs liberalize trade substantially. Within most RTAs, more than 90% of all
trade is duty-free. For RTAs between high income countries this number is extremely asym-
metric: while industrial products can essentially be traded for free, only 70% of all agricultural
products are exempt from taris. In most cases, tari cuts are implemented immediately when
the RTA becomes eective. On average, only 25% of all tari lines are phased-in over a 10-year
period, in developing countries it takes on average a bit longer.
The main contribution of this chapter is twofold: First, it presents a new database that deals
simultaneously with the two major issues of existing tari data, missing data and misreport-
ing. To the best of my knowledge no other comparable database exists. Second, I am the rst
to document important new facts about taris around the world that substantially improve
our understanding of how countries set taris.
After the initial successes of the GATT/WTO, multilateral negotiations have come to a stand-
still. Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1995, no signicant new multilateral
agreement could be reached due to the high number of members and their diverse interests.
Consequently, countries turned to regionalism to further liberalize trade. According to the
WTO, in 1988 only 21 RTAs were in force. As of March 2020, this number increased to 304.
RTAs are reciprocal preferential trade agreements between two or more partners. They take
the form of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs). In contrast, nonrecipro-
cal trade arrangements are unilateral. Typically, high income countries grant to developing
countries duty-free market access for specic products chosen by the the importing country.
Traditionally, trade economists are skeptical of RTAs because of their preferential nature.
FTAs grant advantages to some trade partners but withhold them from others. In that way,
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they lead to harmful trade diversion. Amongst regional trade agreements, customs unions
(CUs) are usually preferred over FTAs, because the former create as much trade as the latter
but typically divert trade less (Krueger 1997). Rules of origin (RoOs), that are required only in
FTAs, are one of the channels through which FTAs can generate additional welfare costs, as
they can increase trade diversion vis-à-vis third countries (Conconi et al. 2018; Krishna and
Krueger 1995; Krishna 2006).
While CUs have a common external tari, this is not the case with FTAs. For this reason,
in contrast to CUs, FTAs require RoOs that dene under which conditions a good is said to
originate from a member country of the FTA so that it can benet from a preferential tari.
Compliance with these rules is costly. First, they cause red tape that reduces the gains from an
FTA for the signatory parties. The compliance costs associated with meeting RoOs require-
ments range from 3-15% of nal product prices depending on the method used to measure the
restrictiveness of RoOs (Carrère and Melo 2006; Anson et al. 2005; Estevadeordal 2000; Cadot
et al. 2006). Second, exporters might need to adjust their global supply chains to meet RoOs
requirements that yields distorted trade patterns and investment ows with third countries
(Krishna and Krueger 1995; Krishna 2006). Conconi et al. (2018) show that in the absence
of RoOs, Mexican imports of intermediates from third countries relative to NAFTA partners
would have been 45% higher. Why are RoOs still an inherent part of any FTA given these high
costs? According to advocates of RoOs, without them each imported commodity would enter
the FTA through the country with the lowest tari. RoOs prohibit this arbitrage activity, often
referred to as trade deection.
To determine the necessity of RoOs, Chapter 2 investigates if trade deection is realistic
empirically. We show the analytical conditions under which trade deection is protable.
The protability of trade deection correlates positively with the dierence in external taris
between the FTA member countries and negatively with additionally arising transportation
costs due to transshipment. This insight guides the empirical analysis. To evaluate the prof-
itability of trade deection, we use the tari database presented in Chapter 1 and compile a
new dataset on product level transportation costs. We can show that for most country pairs
in FTAs, trade deection is unprotable. The reason for this is that taris are generally low,
countries in a common FTA tend to have similar external tari levels, and when tari levels
dier, deection is protable at most for one country in the pair.
To the best of our knowledge, this fact has been overlooked so far although it is essential for
the debate on RoOs: it makes clear that the existence of hundreds of pages of text on RoOs in
modern FTAs is indicative of rent seeking rather than necessary due to the inherent logic of
a trade agreement. The result suggests a fundamental re-thinking of the use of RoOs in trade
agreements. One could substantially relax the requirements to prove the origin of goods in
many trade agreements without risking any trade deection.
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Besides FTAs and CUs, there is one more exception that allows countries to deviate from the
dening principle of the GATT/WTO, i.e. no discrimination across trading partners—the so-
called most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. The GATT/WTO agreements contain special and
dierential treatment for developing countries. Nonreciprocal trade arrangements are one
cornerstone of the special and dierential treatment of developing countries. Under these
arrangements high income countries grant developing countries preferential market access
conditional on them implementing reforms like complying with international labor standards
or enforcement of intellectual property rights. The main idea of these trade arrangements
is to use trade for aid: lower trade costs shall increase trade helping to alleviate poverty in
developing countries and to create jobs.
So far, it is still unclear if the nonreciprocal trade preferences have in fact a trade promoting
eect and if so, along which margins they operate. The literature nds conicting evidence
depending on the specic trade arrangement, the level of aggregation, and the period of ob-
servation. Furthermore, it is dicult to nd causal eects because the products that become
eligible for preferences might be chosen endogenously. Lastly, so far, no evidence exists on
how receiving nonreciprocal preferences aect rms’ export-performance.
To ll this gap, in Chapter 3 I analyze how the expansion of the Andean Trade Preference
Act in 2002—a program that improves access to the American market for rms from Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru— aected Peruvian rm-level exports to the United States. From
2002 onwards, 600 additional products became eligible for nonreciprocal preferences. I com-
pare these with the products that have already received preferences before. To deal with
endogeneity, I use nonreciprocal preferences the United States granted to sub-Saharan coun-
tries under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), as an instrument for the set
of eligible products in the Peruvian context. Then, I make use of the disaggregated nature of
the export data to compare the export growth of the same rm to the same destination across
products, i.e. a triple dierence-in-dierences approach. I compare exports of products eligi-
ble for preferences with those that are not within the same rm-destination combination. One
objective of nonreciprocal arrangements is to generate positive spillover eects: by facilitat-
ing trade to the donor country rms can learn important skills that they can then use to also
serve other markets. I explicitly account for third country eects to identify such spillover
eects.
I nd that rms increase exports of eligible products to the United States relative to ineligible
products on average by 25%. However, this increase goes in line with a strong trade diversion
eect, i.e., a shift of exports away from third countries towards the United States, resulting in
a net increase of 5%. Most interestingly, the results on the intensive margin are almost entirely
driven by exporters that rearrange export destinations after facing ercer competition in the
European Union due to the eastern enlargement. The extensive margin is not driven by this
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event. While an increase in the probability of exporting eligible products relative to ineligible
products can be observed for the United States, nonreciprocal preferences do not aect the
probability of exporting to third countries. I can also show that rms with a sourcing structure
that is compliant with the RoOs of the Andean Trade Preference Act did not benet more from
the nonreciprocal preferences. This nding suggests that Peruvian exporters did not have to
change their global value chains to benet from the preferential market access.
These ndings contribute to the literature of nonreciprocal trade arrangements on rms’ ex-
port behavior. The empirical method—a combination of an instrumental variable and a triple
dierence-in-dierences approach—makes it possible to isolate the causal eect of nonrecip-
rocal preferences, so far something that has not been done. Furthermore, I show that compe-
tition eects might be important for the eectiveness of nonreciprocal preferences, which has
been overlooked so far. Lastly, nobody has focused the analysis on the eects of the Andean
Trade and Preference Act.
6
Chapter 1
30 Years of Trade Policy: Evidence from
5.7 Billion Taris
1.1 Introduction
Taris are ubiquitous in international trade research. As Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016) stress,
the main focus in recent academic work, both theoretical and empirical/quantitative, lies on
trade costs. Therefore, one could think that tari data were easily available for all country
pairs and products, at least for recent years. However, this is not the case. As Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2004) state “the grossly incomplete and inaccurate information on policy barriers
available to researchers is a scandal and a puzzle” (p. 693); fteen years later the situation is not
substantially better. The main problem with the data is missing information, in particular for
developing countries. Moreover, misreporting in the ocial data makes it hard for researchers
to use it for analyses. Further, the recent wave of trade liberalization makes the tari landscape
messier than ever: preferential regional trade agreements (RTAs) allow for discrimination in
terms of the imposed tari across trading partners. This additional dimension exacerbates the
above mentioned problems for this type of taris.
This paper presents a new global tari database that makes a signicant step towards giving
a comprehensive overview of the tari landscape. It covers taris at the six-digit product level
for 197 importing countries and their trading partners for a period of 30 years, namely 1988
to 2017. It simultaneously deals with the two major issues, missing data and misreporting. By
doing so, the coverage almost doubles yielding a dataset of 5.7 billion taris. The improve-
ment is particularly relevant for least developed countries and developing countries: for least
developed countries the share of missing data equals 56%, for developing countries it is 42%.
To reach this progress, I rst complement the information present in the World Bank’s World
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), the only source for global historical taris, with additional
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data from national sources for the European Union and the United States and carefully im-
pute the missing data using the following algorithm: rather than replacing missing taris
by linearly interpolating observations, I set the missing tari equal to the nearest preceding
observation.
For preferential taris the extent of corrupted data is even more pronounced than for MFN
taris; some countries do not report any preferential taris for certain years, while reporting
MFN taris, others only report them for certain preferential schemes but not for all RTAs that
are in place, and others report preferential taris although no RTA is in place. To address
these issues I rst cross-validate the presence of an RTA with external databases and add
detailed phasing-in schedules for 149 free trade agreements. Then, I impute using the same
algorithm described above and simultaneously account for the phasing-in regime applied in
the remaining RTAs. This alleviates the problems related to the additional trading partner
dimension and the timing of the phasing-in of preferential taris.
With this novel dataset at hand, I will answer the following questions: What are the per-
sistent patterns in tari protectionism across countries and sectors? How and by how much
did taris change over the past 30 years? What role did the World Trade Organization (WTO)
play? How much and when do preferential taris liberalize trade?
To analyze whether there are persistent patterns across countries and sectors I use applied
MFN taris for 2017, the most recent year available in my data. I nd that applied MFN taris
are distinct across countries with tari levels and water in the taris correlating negatively
with income. Across sectors, dierences are large, too, with agricultural and textile products
being protected much more. Sectors for which global value chains play a signicant role or
that produce primarily intermediate goods have lower levels of protection. Interestingly, the
sectoral patterns are similar across countries once accounted for level-eects. Furthermore, I
report two customary practices that apply to all countries: taris are often multiples of ve or
equal zero and countries tend to set the same tari for entire tari headings (HS4-digit) instead
on a product-by-product basis potentially to facilitate the customs process and diminishing
the risk of fraud.
Compared to 1988, the average applied MFN tari almost halved in 2017 and equals 8.5%—the
steepest decrease can be observed from 1994 to 2005. This period is characterized by many
important changes in global trade policy, potentially important for the downward trend in
taris: rst, the Uruguay Round, the last concluded round of multilateral trade negotiations
within the framework of the WTO, is known for its major achievements with respect to tari
liberalizations. However, I show that most of the decrease in applied MFN taris is due to
African and Asian developing countries that were not bound by the tari cuts negotiated in
the Uruguay Round; instead, they lowered taris unilaterally. Most countries follow a specic
rule when reducing taris, i.e. they reduce taris by cutting extremely high taris the most
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and already low taris the least. Although one can see a clear pattern within countries, across
countries—even within the same income group—heterogeneity is large, indicating among oth-
ers dierences in political ideology, preferences, and production structures.
Second, nearly 40 countries have joined the WTO since its foundation in 1995. The data show
that compared to the General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT), these new members
made much larger concessions inter alia with respect to taris than the old members. The
rampant increase in the number of RTAs is the third trend in modern trade policy. While in
1988 only 21 RTAs were in force, according to the WTO by 2017 this number skyrocketed to
296. I show that most of these RTAs liberalized trade substantially: within most RTAs, more
than 90% of all trade is duty-free. For RTAs between high income countries this number is
extremely asymmetric: while industrial products can essentially be traded for free, only 70%
of all agricultural products are exempt from taris. In most cases, tari cuts are implemented
immediately when the RTA becomes eective. On average, only 25% of all tari lines are
phased-in over a 10-year period, in developing countries it takes on average a bit longer. The
sectoral distribution of the prevalence of phased-in taris correlates strongly with the pattern
of tari protectionism reported for applied MFN taris. Lastly, I briey review nonreciprocal
arrangements, i.e. only one country oers preferential access.
Taris, and in particular changes in taris, have been subject to extensive empirical analy-
sis, for example Pavcnik (2002), Caliendo et al. (2018), Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), and
Treer (2004). The policy changes analyzed in the literature can be grouped into three types
of trade liberalizations: preferential RTAs, multilateral trade liberalizations due to the WTO,
and episodes of unilateral tari reductions by developing countries opening up for trade. For
this body of research high quality tari data is essential for identication, which typically re-
lies on variation in taris across products within sectors. However, the scope of these papers
does not lie on the trade policy itself, hence, learning about taris and changes thereof is just
a byproduct of this research. Furthermore, these studies focus on a single country and do not
aim at comparing tari policies across countries.
In contrast, the gravity literature has had a strong focus on trade policy and its eects on
trade (Baier et al. 2014; Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Yotov et al. 2016). This strand of the lit-
erature does not exploit the product-level variation in taris and tends to use much more
aggregated data, i.e. country pair or sector (HS2 digits)-country pair level data. For taris,
data from WITS is used. As outlined above, the data suers from severe measurement error
yielding downward-biased eects of taris on trade. Furthermore, the systematic measure-
ment error—it is much bigger for developing than for high-income countries—compromises
the external validity of these results: the estimated average treatment eect is in fact mostly
driven by high-income countries and we know relatively little about the eects of taris in
9
1.1. INTRODUCTION
developing countries. If the eects are, in fact, heterogeneous cleaner tari data could help
uncover them.
Due to the lack of data, the existing literature on the landscape of taris is limited. The focus
is either on one particular year or on specic sectors, and the analyses are mostly done for high
income countries (Balassa 1965; R. E. Baldwin 1984; Bown and Irwin 2017; Irwin 2020; Bureau
et al. 2019; Caliendo et al. 2015). In a recent contribution, Bown and Crowley (2016) are the rst
to give a comprehensive cross-country and cross-sectoral overview of taris in 58 countries
for 1993 to 2013. However, “for reasons of data quality, [we] do not attempt to be comprehensive.
Instead, [we] focus on a sample of [58]1 economies” (p.10). The set of countries was not chosen
randomly: they include the Group of 20 economies (including all 28 members of the European
Union) plus an additional set of developing countries each with a 2013 population of over 40
million.
Using these data, Bown and Crowley (2016) survey also policies beyond import taris like
temporary trade barriers of antidumping, countervailing duties, safeguards, quantitative re-
strictions import quotas, import licensing or trade facilitation. While the scope of my paper
is restricted only to import taris, the new data that I constructed widens dramatically the
cross-sectional and over-time coverage of taris and presents new facts about trade policy,
especially for developing countries.2
The main contribution of this paper is twofold: rst, it presents a novel database that deals
simultaneously with the two major issues of existing tari data, missing data and misreport-
ing. To the best of my knowledge no other comparable database exists. The result is a unique
database that increases the coverage substantially by almost doubling the number of avail-
able taris from 2.9 to 5.7 billion observations. Second, I am the rst to document important
new facts about taris around the world that substantially improve our understanding of how
countries set taris.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I rst review the recent trends in trade
policy that have changed the tari landscape since 1988. Section 1.3 starts by listing the
dierent ocial sources for tari data and illustrating their shortcomings and problems. Then,
I elaborate on how I overcome all of these issues to construct my new tari database and
compare my data to other existing data sources. Section 1.4 uses the new database to give an
overview of the landscape of taris. First, I focus on bound and applied MFN taris in 2017,
the most recent year covered. Second, I explore intertemporal patterns in applied MFN taris,
lastly, preferential taris are reviewed. Section 1.5 concludes.
1 30 plus 28 EU members that they aggregate up.
2 Taris imposed by activating Article XXI of the WTO (“national security reasons”) are not included in the
database. An example for these types of taris are the ones the United States imposed against China, the
European Union, Canada, and other trade partner during the presidency of Donald Trump.
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1.2 Trade Policy Shaping the Tari Landscape since 1988
Over the past 30 years at least three global developments in trade policy have shaped the
tari landscape: rst, the Uruguay Round, the last concluded round of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations within the framework of the WTO, led to signicant tari cuts in participating
countries. Second, since the foundation of the WTO, 37 members joined the WTO. This en-
tailed changes in taris for these countries. Third, with the standstill of multilateral trade
negotiations since the Uruguay Round, regional trade agreements (RTAs) in all their forms,
i.e. free trade agreements (FTAs), customs unions (CUs), partial scope agreements (PSAs), and
nonreciprocal trade arrangements, are proliferating. As all of these trends are incorporated
in the new tari database, I now discuss them briey.
The Uruguay Round was the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted
within the framework of the GATT. It covered many dierent topics, for example some as-
pects of services and intellectual property rights, which had not been included before and
culminated in the creation of the WTO itself. Furthermore, it was the rst time that tari
negotiations included agriculture and textiles, sectors that so far had been considered to be
too sensitive to reach an agreement. 123 countries were included in the negotiations, many
of them developing countries. Therefore, the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations
is considered to be “the largest trade negotiation ever” (WTO).3
As in any multilateral trade negotiation, the participating countries negotiated bound MFN
taris, instead of applied MFN taris. When importing goods, all negotiating parties agree
not to exceed the level of the bound MFN taris or bound taris resulting from the negotiation
process between the WTO members. In order to comply with the main principle of the WTO,
namely no discrimination among WTO members,4 the bound taris have to be applied to all
imports from any other WTO member state, i.e. there is no partner dimension. Imposing a
tari that is higher than the bound tari is a violation of WTO law and can be contested in
court. The bound taris are the maximum taris that can be levied but typically countries
actually apply much lower taris —the so-called applied MFN taris. Again, by WTO law,
these taris do not have a partner dimension. The dierence between the bound and the
applied MFN tari is called water in the tari (or simply water).
Every participant of the Uruguay Round was required to provide a schedule of concessions
concerning trade in goods—a rst in the history of multilateral trade negotiations. While for
developed countries the Uruguay Round resulted in lower levels of bound taris for both in-
dustrial as well as agricultural products, for many developing and least developed members




1.2. TRADE POLICY SHAPING THE TARIFF LANDSCAPE SINCE 1988
the concessions took the form of ceiling bindings instead of changes in tari levels. Beginning
in the early 1990’s, many developing countries (i.e. Brazil and India) reduced taris unilater-
ally. However, the relatively low applied taris were not legally bound by the WTO’s frame-
work, instead it was up to the respective country to keep the levels low (Bagwell et al. 2016).
To reduce the resulting tari uncertainty, one of the main objectives of the developed coun-
tries, vis-à-vis the developing countries, was to secure an increase in the number of bound
taris, ideally covering all tari lines (Hoda 2001).
The main results of the Uruguay Round in terms of changes in taris can be summarized
as follows: for industrial products both developing countries as well as developed countries
planned to reduce taris over the course of ve years. For agricultural products the negotiat-
ing parties agreed that all boarder measures other than ordinary customs duties are required
to be “taried” and had to be converted into tari equivalents (Hoda 2001). Additionally, de-
veloped countries agreed to cut taris within six years and developing countries within ten
years.5 Lastly, over all products, the binding coverage, the share of bound taris of all tari
lines, was increased, signicantly lowering the risk of unexpected increases in taris.
To sum up, while the implementation of the agreed tari cuts took place between 1995 and
2005, the binding coverage and the tarication eorts were put into eect immediately. As the
results of the negotiations refer to bound MFN taris, the question arises to what extent the
Uruguay Round contributes to the large reduction in applied MFN taris that can be observed
in the data. I address this question in section 1.4.
Since the founding of the WTO, 37 new members joined. Typically, the new members have to
reduce taris as a requirement for membership. Prominent examples of relatively new WTO
members are China joining in 2001 and Russia in 2012. Compared to the GATT, members
of the WTO demand much larger concessions of new members, for example much greater
reductions in bound taris than it was the case under GATT (Hoda 2001). As I show in section
1.4, this has important implications for the observed heterogeneity across countries.
Preferential taris are the one major exception to the core principle of non-discrimination
of the WTO. By denition, any RTA violates the non-discrimination clause as only the sign-
ing parties enjoy more favorable market-access conditions but all other trading partners are
5 Hoda (2001) denes the covered products as follows: “ The product coverage is given in terms of the Chapters,
Codes and Headings of the Harmonized System in Annex I to the Agreement on Agriculture. These are HS Chapters
1 to 24 less sh and sh products, HS Codes 2905.43 (mannitol), HS Code 2905.44 (sorbitol), HS Heading 33.01
(essential oils), HS Headings 35.01 to 35.05 (albuminoidal substances, modied starches, glues), HS Code 3809.10
(nished agents), HS Code 3823.60 (sorbitol n.e.p.),16 HS Headings 41.01 to 41.03 (hides and skins), HS Heading
43.01 (raw furskins), HS Headings 50.01 to 50.03 (raw silk and silk waste), HS Headings 51.01 to 51.03 (wool and
animal hair), HS Headings 52.01 to 52.03 (raw cotton, waste and cotton carded or combed), HS Heading 53.01
(raw ax) and HS Heading 53.02 (raw hemp). While the coverage of agriculture [...] is given in the Agreement
of Agriculture, there is no such list for non-agricultural products [...]. All products not covered by the list of
agriculture items in Annex I are deemed to be non-agricultural products.”
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excluded. These exemptions are only allowed in two contexts: rst, when the RTA elimi-
nates taris on substantially all trade (GATT, Article XXIV: 8) between the signing parties.
Second, developing and LDCs enjoy a special status: when entering a Partial Scope Agree-
ment (PSA), two or more developing countries can oer each other preferential access without
extending the preferences to high-income countries. Also, WTO members can grant develop-
ing countries tari preferences without having to extend the same treatment to high-income
countries (nonreciprocal trade arrangements). Thus, whenever trade is seen as a mean to
help developing countries thrive, the preferences can be discriminatory without meeting the
substantially-all-trade criterion.
Especially the number of FTAs and CUs have increased signicantly over the 30 years cov-
ered by the data presented in this paper. Both FTAs and CUs involve two or more countries,
are reciprocal and comprehensive, i.e. all signing partners commit to substantially lower trade
barriers for almost all goods. There is one major dierence between FTAs and CUs. While
signatory countries within an FTA maintain autonomy over their trade policy, a CU requires
them to agree upon an external tari. Prominent examples for FTAs are the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), formerly known as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), Canada-EU or EU-Japan. The European Union (EU), Mercosur, and the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) are examples of CUs.
1.3 New Global Tari Database
Ideally, researchers as well as policy makers would like to know the tari that is applied be-
tween any importing and exporting country for any product in any year. The respective tari
should equal the preferential tari whenever preferential treatment is applicable (bilateral
RTA like an FTA and CU or nonreciprocal arrangements for developing countries) and the
MFN tari otherwise, i.e. the eectively applied tari. Moreover, it should not be contingent
on positive trade. Thus, one would like to have product-level bilateral data on the eectively
applied tari. In theory, the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) provides
exactly this data.
WITS is the key source for global panel tari data that is publicly available.6 It pools data
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade Analysis Information
System (TRAINS) and the WTO, namely the Integrated Data Base (IDB) and Consolidated
Tari Schedules (CTS). Since 2010 most of the raw data used in TRAINS come from the Inter-
national Trade Center (ITC).7 The data include information for almost 200 countries on the
6 WITS can be accessed here: https://wits.worldbank.org/.
7 See the WITS homepage for more information on the data providers: https://wits.worldbank.org/dataprovid
ers.html.
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6-digit product level of the common HS system with some of the data dating back to 1988.8
Information about preferential and MFN taris are derived from both TRAINS as well as the
IDB, while the CTS is the only provider of data concerning bound taris.
In reality, unfortunately, WITS entails many aws making it very hard to use for research.
When WITS-users try to download a global dataset of taris they receive several thousand
les that have to be edited and combined. Unfortunately, besides the technical hassle, the data
display many other shortcomings. In this section I elaborate on the current data situation, its
problems and how the new tari database xes these. Further, I give details on the dierent
steps that were necessary to improve the original data. I also briey introduce other existing
tari databases and compare them to the one presented here.
The main goal of the my database is to provide information on a global scale covering as
many years as possible. Concerning many countries, especially low and middle income coun-
tries, WITS is the only source for information on taris. Therefore, WITS is also the starting
point for the new data I put together. The major improvements that I implement are twofold:
rst I combine all the existing information from WITS such that it is readily usable for re-
search. Second, the new tari database is the rst that deals—among other improvements—
simultaneously with the two major issues, missing data and misreporting. The number of
observations almost doubles to 5.7 billion, the biggest improvement in coverage is made for
least developed countries and developing countries. The tari database contains bilateral tar-
is (MFN and preferential taris) at the 6-digit level for 197 countries for 30 years (1988-2017).
Missing Data Missing data is the biggest issue in the standard sources providing tari data.
Most countries do not report taris every year. As Figure A3 shows, in 1988 only 11% of all
countries reported at least one type of tari, MFN or preferential; this percentage remains at
a very low level until 1994. Since then, it has increased steadily.9 Since 2006, the number of
reporting countries is relatively high and ranges between 81% and 90%. Low-income coun-
tries report less frequently than high-income countries. It is important to keep in mind that
an identical share of reporting countries, for example 81% in 2006 and 2007, does not auto-
matically imply the very same set of reporting countries in both years. The exact shares of
reporting and more details can be found in the Appendix (Figure A3).10
8 For a few countries taris are even available at the tari line. These can be accessed when downloading the
data for single countries instead of using the bulk download option.
9 The percentage is based on 197 reporting countries, that could report at least one type of tari (MFN or
preferential tari) for at least one year between 1988 and 2017.
10 Two events have signicantly improved the availability of tari data: rst, in 1996 , for the rst time, taris
became available not only through TRAINS but also through the WTO’s IDB improving the reporting pattern
substantially: the share of reporting countries increased from a mere 31% to 48%. Second, in the late 1990s the
suggestion was made to make the access to the IDB database conditional on reporting taris to incentivize
compliance of not-reporting countries. Although this measure was never fully implemented, it lead to an
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How should we interpret these numbers? Although the number of reporting countries is
quite high in more recent years, at least three important aspects are disguised: rst, any anal-
ysis using the time dimension is hard to perform because full panel data i.e. information
on taris for each year is unavailable for most countries (cf. Figure A3 (b)). The EU-1211
and Japan are the only countries that report taris for all years, all other countries provide
less data. Second, the set of countries that report only sporadically is not random but rather
consists mostly of developing countries. Even within developing countries the reporting im-
proves with income. As taris tend to be systematically dierent between developing and
developed countries, the non-random pattern of missing data could bias the results of any
empirical analysis. For non-WTO members it is extremely dicult to nd reliable tari data
as they report sporadically.
Furthermore, the problem is more pronounced for preferential taris; some countries do
not report any preferential taris for certain years, but report MFN taris. Other countries
only report preferential taris for certain preferential schemes but not for all RTAs that are
in place. Especially with respect to LDCs the number of years in which preferential taris
are reported amounts to less than half of the years the total number of years of the respective
preferential scheme is in force. However, also the “good reporters” such as the EU, Japan,
the United States or Brazil do not consistently report preferential taris. Furthermore, many
countries report only certain preferential taris but not all that are in a given year in place.
Again, this pattern is far from random, making it dicult to carry out any empirical analysis
(for more details see Figure A3 in the Appendix).
In the database, I tackle this issue in two steps: rst, I include additional information from
other sources than WITS, namely from national authorities12 and the WTO’s RTA Database.
Second, I develop an algorithm to impute the missing data: rather than replacing missing
MFN taris by linearly interpolating observations, I set the missing MFN tari equal to the
nearest preceding observation. This procedure accounts for the WTO logic of notication, i.e.
that countries only report policy changes. If there is no preceding observation, missing MFN
taris are set equal to the nearest succeeding observation.
Interpolating preferential taris is signicantly harder than MFN taris because FTAs are
often phased-in. I account for this in two ways: rst, I add the exact phasing-in schedules
for 149 trade agreements, i.e. the taris for all tari lines that have been agreed on in the
improvement in the reporting share which increased to 74% in 2001 (see Hoda (2001) and the WTO Document
G/MA/IDB/3 for details).
11 The EU–12 are the members of the European Union that joined prior to 1995, i.e. Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Portugal and Spain.
12 Thanks to Forero-Rojas et al. (2018) from the World Banks’ research division I have access to tari data for
both MFN and preferential taris, for the United States and the European Union directly provided by national
authorities. The years 1996 to 2016 are included.
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respective RTA. This information can be found in the WTO’s RTA Database.13 Second, I have
detailed information on more than 500 RTAs and their phasing-in regimes.14 Using this in-
formation, I employ the same interpolation technique described for the MFN taris while
carefully taking into account potential phasing-in. Appendix A.1 explains the interpolation
process and all other data cleaning steps in more detail.
Mistakes in theOriginal Data As mentioned above, WITS is not responsible for collecting
the tari data but is merely the platform through which the data is made available to the
general public; the original data stems from several international organizations (UNCTAD,
ITC and WTO). One concern with the current, decentralized arrangement is whether it creates
the right incentive structure to implement corrections; e.g., when users discover data problems
in historical data. Typically the World Bank (WITS) is not in a position to correct the publicly
provided data because it does not receive the data at rst hand (Bown and Crowley 2016).
Thus, the data that can be downloaded through WITS entails mistakes, especially with regard
to preferential taris.
While many countries do not report nearly enough taris, some seem to report too many: for
some countries WITS documents a preferential tari although there is no corresponding RTA.
For example Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa report preferential taris signicantly
lower than the MFN tari with the EU before any RTA was in force. Further, there are also
cases when countries report a preferential tari when in fact it is an MFN tari, i.e. no RTA is
in place and the allegedly preferential tari is the exact same as the MFN tari. Concerning
the rst type of misreporting, the problem becomes clear immediately, but also the latter is
troublesome—imagine a research question for which the level of the preferential tari does
not matter but only whether preferential access exists. More generally speaking, in a “perfect”
tari database, a search query for preferential taris should not yield data on MFN taris.15
To eliminate this kind of misreporting, cross-validating the preferential taris with the ex-
istence of an RTA is an essential step. I incorporate preferential taris only if the list of agree-
ments indicates that preferential market access is granted. The list of RTAs combines various
sources on RTAs and nonreciprocal arrangements, see Appendix A.1 for details. Otherwise, I
assume that the MFN tari is applicable.
Irregularities in the Original Data Not only do many countries report taris only spo-
radically. Additionally, often only MFN or preferential taris are reported. To cause even
more confusion, some countries merely report some preferential taris, i.e. only the unilat-
13 rtais.wto.org/
14 The data is provided by the Design of Trade Agreements Database (DESTA) (Dür et al. 2014).
15 The exact shares of misreporting can be found in Figure A4 in the Appendix.
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eral schemes or only certain FTAs. Such irregularities occur in TRAINS and in IDB. While in
TRAINS these types of missing observations are in fact missing, this is not true for IDB.
One tari type available through IDB, which is called “the eectively applied tari or AHS”,
has a rather odd feature: whenever a preferential scheme is missing, instead of being iden-
tied as a missing observation, the scheme is replaced with the corresponding MFN tari.
Thus, using the so-called eectively applied tari provided by the IDB would lead to huge
measurement error. Figure A2 in the Appendix illustrates this fact based on the example of
Mexico. Therefore, I will refrain from using this data altogether for the preferential taris and
instead entirely rely on TRAINS.
Smaller Challenges Some countries are eligible for multiple preferential tari schemes,
e.g. the U.S. oers unilateral tari preferences to Afghanistan through the GSP and the GSP+
program. This is why TRAINS reports multiple preferential taris for certain country pairs.
Whenever that is the case I assume that exporters choose the lowest tari.
The Harmonized System (HS) is used as the classication for dening tari lines. It came
into being in 1988 and has slowly been adopted by an increasing number of countries since
then. National tari lines follow the HS classication and are typically dened at a more dis-
aggregated level, which can be as disaggregated as 8-, 10- or even 12-digits. However, product
classications across countries are only harmonized up to a level of 6-digits; beyond that every
country has its own product classication in order to dierentiate national product varieties.
As the aim of this paper to provide data that can be used for cross-country comparison, all
taris are aggregated to the 6-digit level by averaging across the tari lines.16 At the 6-digit
level roughly 5,000 products exist.
Over the years the HS system has undergone several changes. These changes are called
revisions and entered into force in 1996, 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017. When reporting tari
data, not all countries use the adequate HS-revision, especially developing countries adopt
the revisions with a substantial delay. For example, many countries report taris using the
revision HS-1996 or even HS-1988/92 after 2002. Therefore, before doing any cross-country
analyses, the revisions need to be matched. In the database, I convert all 6-digit product-
codes into the rst available nomenclature, namely HS-1988/92. Besides making cross-country
and intertemporal comparisons possible, a single nomenclature needs to serve as a basis to
correctly interpolate missing data. Otherwise, the algorithm described above would only ll
missing information within one revision but not for all years available.
16 The simple mean is also incorporated in WITS: when using the bulk download function in WITS, taris are
only available for products at the 6-digit level. Whenever taris have been reported at a ner level, WITS
calculates the simple mean.
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WITS covers a large number of countries: besides all WTO members, also some non-WTO
members are in the database. However, many of the non-WTO countries do not report taris
on a regular basis, but only for very few years (compare Figure A3, Panel (b)). Further, it is
unclear whether a so-called MFN tari of a non-WTO country is in fact that: an MFN tari
not discriminating across trading partners. Vice-versa, there is also a great deal of uncertainty
about how WTO members treat non-WTO members, and whether it is safe to assume that the
reported MFN tari is also the eectively applied tari for non-WTO members. Although it
is informing to know more about the taris of non-WTO members, the data should be used
with caution. In my main analysis, I exclude all countries that had not joined the WTO by
2017.
Regardless of the type of tari—bound, MFN or preferential—a tari can take two forms.
Ad valorem taris are the most common ones. Here the customs duty is calculated as a per-
centage of the value of the product (for example 8%). 1.22 USD/kg or 1.22 USD/kg + 8% are
examples for non-ad valorem taris. It is possible to convert non-ad valorem taris into ad
valorem equivalents (AVEs) by dividing the non-ad valorem element of the tari by the value
of the product per unit.17 I refrain from calculating AVEs, because reliable unit values are not
available for the set of countries and years covered in the sample. Thus, the only AVEs in
the data are from TRAINS, which contains AVEs-estimations, and from countries that report
AVEs directly to the institutions collecting data. More details on how AVEs are calculated and
included in TRAINS, IDB, and the new database can be found in the Appendix A.2.
The potentially missing AVEs are a relatively minor issue, as the vast majority of taris is
already ad valorem.18 Switzerland is a key exception, as its taris are exclusively non-ad val-
orem. I proxy Swiss taris with the average taris of all other EFTA members.19 For bound
taris a particular challenge arises: the raw data reports missing observations for any non-
ad valorem tari because the data provider—the WTO’s CTS database—does not calculate
AVEs.20 Why does this matter? Non-ad valorem taris are particularly common for agricul-
tural products among high income countries. Therefore, it is unfeasible to compare bound
17 It is rather dicult to converse technical taris and tari rate quotas, see Bouët et al. (2008) for a more detailed
discussion.
18 In 2017 only 14 countries reported more than 5% of tari lines to be non-ad valorem (WTO 2018). The 14
countries (ordered by their shares) with non-ad valorem taris for at least 5% of their tari lines are Switzerland
(75%) , Thailand (10%), Belarus (9%), Kyrgyz Republic (9%), Russia (9%), Armenia (9%), United States of America
(8%), Zimbabwe (8%), Kazakhstan(8%), Colombia (7%), Lebanese Republic (6%), Norway (6%), Ecuador (6%), and
European Union (5%).
19 I also account for the changes in EFTA i.e. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom left EFTA to join the European Union.
20 When downloading the tari lines using the country-by-country function of WITS, the non-ad valorem tari
is given of the CTS database. For the European Union, for example, the bound tari for the tari line 01 02
90 05 equals 10.2 + 93.1 Euro/100 kg/net. As no tari equivalent is given, using the bulkdownload function will
yield a missing bound tari for this particular tari line.
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taris for agricultural products across countries. Even matching bound taris of the same
importer with applied MFN or preferential taris imposes major diculties.
Sample Coverage The new database provides the eectively applied taris for 197 im-
porters and their 196 trading partners. The data covers the years 1988 to 2017 and on average
taris are available for 4,960 products. Table A3 in the Appendix lists all countries in the
sample, information on WTO/GATT membership, the number of products, the share of im-
puted observations for all years and the total number of observations. The algorithm used
for imputing missing taris works best when taris are available before and after a missing
observation. Some developing countries start reporting relatively late in the sample period
potentially deteriorating the quality of the taris for the years prior. Thus, the later countries
start reporting, the higher the probability that the reported taris in the rst years of the
sample are biased. To get a better understanding of the extent of the potential bias, Table A3
reports the rst available year. Adding up all observations for the whole duration of 30 years,
the sample consists of 5.7 billion observations.
Comparison to Other Existing Sources While there are a few databases available that
inform about taris for specic countries, years or products, as for example the Agricultural
Market Access Database (see Bouët et al. (2008) for a summary on alternative databases), very
few databases provide information comparable to the data presented in this paper with respect
to country and time coverage as well as level of disaggregation.
Covering the same set of countries, the ITC’s Market Access Map (MAcMap) is an established
source for tari data.21 It incorporates bound, applied MFN and preferential taris from 1996
onwards for 197 countries, and oers AVE-conversions for the more recent years. MAcMap
provides raw data, thus, unless countries report perfectly, similar problems as in WITS can
be expected, i.e. missing observations and mistakes in the original data, especially for pref-
erential taris. As mentioned above, since 2010 TRAINS has supplied WITS with data on
taris collected by the ITC. Hence, for the more recent years, the raw data used for the new
database presented in this paper is identical to MAcMap. However, a major disadvantage is
that MAcMap is only available for subscribers.
CEPII’s MAcMap-HS6 enhances the ITC’s MAcMap by rst, converting all HS6-products
into one nomenclature to make intertemporal and cross-country comparisons possible. Sec-
ond, there is a special focus on the calculation of AVEs. Without doubt, CEPII’s MAcMap-HS6
is the best source for non-ad valorem taris and in particular the AVEs of tari rate quotas.
Bouët et al. (2008) describe the exact methods used to convert all ve forms of non-ad val-
orem taris to AVEs. The data only cover three years (2001, 2004, and 2007), and are publicly
21 Available at https://www.macmap.org/.
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ITC’s MAcMap 1996-today no no no no
CEPII’s MAcMap-HS6 2001, 04, 07 no no yes no
Caliendo et al. (2015) 1984-2011 yes partially no no
New Tari Database 1988-2017 yes yes no yes
Note: The table compares the new tari database with other existing databases that are comparable in country
coverage.
available through CEPII’s website.22 Similar to the ITC, the problems of missing observations
and potential mistakes in the raw data are not addressed.
Caliendo et al. (2015) have constructed a similar database to the one presented here. How-
ever, their dataset diers with respect to covered years (1984–2011) and in terms of the degree
of precision of the preferential taris. Additionally to the taris provided by WITS, they add
data from three other sources: manually collected tari schedules published by the Interna-
tional Customs Taris Bureau, U.S. tari schedules from the US International Trade Commis-
sion, and U.S. tari schedules derived from detailed U.S. tari revenue and trade data provided
by the Center for International Data at UC Davis. The imputation algorithm used in the two
databases is very similar most likely resulting in very similar MFN taris. To account for
phasing-in of preferential taris Caliendo et al. (2015) include information on approximately
100 FTAs and their phasing-in regimes, i.e. whether most tari lines are cut immediately or if
phasing-in is common. In my database, I implement a considerable improvement by includ-
ing detailed phasing-in schedules on the tari line level for 149 FTAs. For the agreements, for
which this information is not available, similar to Caliendo et al. (2015) the information on
the phasing-in regime is used to construct missing preferential taris.
Table 1.1 summarizes the three other existing sources with a comparable country coverage
and compares them to the new tari database. To the best of my knowledge, the data presented
here are the rst dealing simultaneously with the missing taris, accounting explicitly for
the phasing-in schedules of RTAs, and cross-validating information to minimize error in the
original data. The main contribution of the new tari database is twofold: rst, the coverage
in terms of number of countries and years available is unique. Second, the level of precision
of the preferential taris is much higher than in other existing databases.
22 The available years correspond with the releases of the GTAP database which CEPII’s data on taris. The data
can be downloaded at http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=12.
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1.4 Three Decades of Taris across the World
The tari data have a country pair, product and time dimension, resulting in 5.7 billion ob-
servations. To make things tractable, for much of the analysis in the remainder of this paper,
I will aggregate taris over products, sectors, countries, or all of the above. Following Bown
and Crowley (2016), I only show simple average taris. The alternative trade-weighted aver-
age can suer from a downward bias due to products with high taris receiving low weights
because of small import volumes.23
For most bilateral relationships the MFN tari is applied, while preferential taris are rela-
tively rare. Changes in the simple average are therefore almost exclusively driven by changes
in the MFN tari. Only changes in preferential taris involving many bilateral links, like the
EU enlargement in 2004, visibly alter the simple average. To make the exposition as clear as
possible, I dierentiate between the two types of taris in the remainder of this paper. In the
following section, I focus on the MFN taris tijk,t = tik,t for all countries j not subject to pref-
erential taris. Afterwards, I elaborate on the preferential taris denoted as the ad valorem
tari t∗ijk,t imposed by country i against imports from country j of product k in year t. In the
analysis, all countries that did not join the WTO by 2017 are excluded. Moreover, Switzerland
is excluded as all of its taris are imputed, resulting in a sample size of 162 countries.
1.4.1 Status Quo: MFNs across Countries and Sectors in 2017
In this section, I analyze cross-country and cross-sectional variation for 2017, the most re-
cent year of available data to help to establish whether there are persistent patterns in tari
protectionism along these dimensions.
Heterogeneity in Tari Protectionism Table 1.2 summarizes the average applied MFN
and bound tari overall and across dierent types of products. The average applied MFN
tari equals 8.54% across all products and countries. Countries protect agricultural products
much more than industrial ones. More specically, the average applied tari for agricultural
products is more than double of the MFN tari for industrial products (15.76% and 7.37%,
respectively). Agricultural products are dened as products of Section I to IV of the HS-
nomenclature, the remaining ones are industrial products. The same patterns can be observed
for bound taris. However, the amount of water in the taris is for agricultural products
23 In a series of papers, Anderson and Neary (1992, 1994, 2007, 2003) propose a dierent and theoretically-
grounded way of aggregating up taris, namely the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI). It answers the
following question: what is the uniform tari that if imposed on home imports instead of the existing structure
of protection would leave aggregate imports at their current levels? One major drawback of the empirical im-
plementation of the OTRI is that one needs country-specic product-level import-demand elasticities, which
are note readily available. This is the main reason why I abstain from using the measure.
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almost twice as much as for industrial products, leaving room for tari increases that are in
full compliance with WTO law.24
Table 1.2: Average Applied MFN and Bound Tari (2017, in %)
Applied MFN Bound
all ind. agri. all ind. agri.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Types 8.54 7.37 15.76 25.81 22.38 44.98
Intermediate Products 7.54 6.29 15.73 25.23 21.74 45.43
Final Products 13.74 13.06 15.89 30.77 26.06 44.36
Note: The table shows the average applied MFN and bound tari for the year 2017
across dierent product groups. End-use categories taken from the BEC.
Products can be further dierentiated by the end-use, i.e. intermediate inputs and nal goods
(for consumption). To group products, I follow the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC)
classication. Intermediate goods have a much lower tari than nal goods, a phenomenon
known as tari escalation. This is entirely driven by industrial products, as for agricultural
products virtually no tari escalation can be observed. When it comes to agricultural prod-
ucts, LDCs and low- and middle-income (LoM) countries protect intermediates of the sector
prepared foodstu much more than nal goods, osetting the tari escalation that is in fact
prominent among the remaining agricultural products.
To analyze dierences in taris across countries, I regress the applied MFN tari tik on
dummy variables IG that distinguish countries i by income groupsG, i.e. LDCs, LoM countries





G + uik, with IG = 1∀i ∈ G. (1.1)
24 Keep in mind that the bound taris with non-ad valorem taris are downwards-biased. Thus, these numbers




















Table 1.3: Heterogeneity in Taris across Income Groups
MFN Water P Same within No. Unique t
all ind. agri. B&C all all t5 ∈ N t = 0 HS4 HS2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
LDCs 6.63∗∗∗ 7.66∗∗∗ 0.22 5.12∗∗∗ 37.46∗∗∗ 40.24∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.00 -519.18∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.32) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (45.53)
LoM Africa 6.33∗∗∗ 6.83∗∗∗ 3.22∗∗∗ 7.97∗∗∗ 20.81∗∗∗ 20.89∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.01 -456.44∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.05) (0.85) (0.51) (0.16) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (50.39)
LoM Americas 4.18∗∗∗ 4.95∗∗∗ -0.59∗ 5.58∗∗∗ 32.68∗∗∗ 31.30∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -432.70∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.33) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (47.90)
LoM Asia 2.78∗∗∗ 3.38∗∗∗ -0.97∗ 4.58∗∗∗ 17.15∗∗∗ 21.96∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -411.13∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.51) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (52.74)
LoM Europe 0.15∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ -6.42∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 13.93∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -363.33∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.31) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (63.08)
WTO after 1995 -16.33∗∗∗
(0.07)
HICs (Ref. Group) 5.04∗∗∗ 3.30∗∗∗ 15.87∗∗∗ 5.35∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 4.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 566.67∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.01) (0.27) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (45.19)
Observations 808,069 695,695 112,374 275,784 569,621 569,621 808,069 808,069 808,069 808,069 162
Note: The table shows the regression output of yik =
∑6
G=1 βGI
G + uik . The dependent variable yik equals the applied MFN tari (column (1) to (4)), the bound
MFN tari (column (5) to (6)), the probability that the MFN tari is a multiple of ve (column (7)), equals zero (column (8)), is the same within HS-4 digit products
(column(9)), is the same within HS-2 digit industries (column (10)) and the number of unique taris for each country (column(11)). Columns (2) and (6) uses the
countries dened in Bown and Crowley (2016). Robust standard errors in parentheses. In column (9) errors are clustered by importer-HS4-product, in column (10)
by importer-HS2-product. ***/**/* indicate signicance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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The country grouping is based on Table A3. HICs are the reference group in these types
of regressions—the coecients of the remaining income groups equal the dierence between
HICs and the respective income group. As column (1) of Table 1.3 shows, the dierences across
countries are stark: while HICs have an average applied MFN tari of only 5%, it equals 11.6%
for LDCs, and ranges between 5.1% and 11.3% for LoM countries, respectively. Thus, taris
correlate negatively with income, i.e. HICs set lower taris than LoM countries, which in turn,
set lower taris than LDCs. Even within the group of LoM countries, a clear ordering can be
observed. This pattern is more pronounced for industrial products; for agricultural products,
taris are universally high and do not dier much across income groups. European LoM
countries apply the lowest taris to agricultural products. Within income groups agricultural
products are much more protected than industrial products.
So far, the reported results conrm the results reported by Bown and Crowley (2016) when
extending the set of countries from 58 to 162. A priori, similar results are not necessarily ex-
pected as the additional countries are systematically dierent—the Bown and Crowley (2016)
(B&C) sample covers mostly large and economically important countries.25 Column (4) esti-
mates Equation 1.1 again for the B&C-sample. Similar to the results depicted in column (1),
taris correlate negatively with income. As expected, the largest changes in coecients can
be observed for income groups that are underrepresented in the B&C-sample—LDCs and LoM
countries.
Next, I analyze how water in the taris diers across income by regressing the dierence
between the bound and the applied MFN tari of 2017 on the six income group dummies.
As column (5) shows, the amount of water in the taris correlates negatively with income,
too. While HICs have virtually no water, LDCs can increase applied taris by 39.1%-points
without violating WTO law. The picture for LoM countries is a bit more nuanced: compared
to the reference group as well as in absolute terms, water is high for countries in Africa, the
Americas and Asia, but low for European LoM countries; applied taris do not match these
large discrepancies. None of the European LoM countries are founding members of the WTO.
Compared to GATT, members of the WTO have demanded much larger concessions of new
members, inter alia, reductions in bound taris to much lower levels (Hoda 2001). In column
(6) I control for date of accession by including a dummy variable that equals one if the country
joined the WTO after 1995 and zero otherwise. The coecient is negative, large and aects
mostly the results for European LoM countries conrming that new WTO members have, in
fact, been treated dierently than old ones with respect to the levels of bound taris.
25 The set of countries comprises the Group of Twenty (G20) and an additional set of developing countries each
with 2013 population of over 40 million.
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How do countries set taris? Some Customary Practices In theory, taris can take
on any non-negative level. As I show next, in practice there are some persistent patterns in
the levels of taris. Column (7) of Table 1.3 shows the results of regressing the probability of





on the income group
dummies.
For HICs multiples of ve other than zero are a rare event, while for all other groups the
opposite is true: LDCs set with a probability of 74% MFN taris that equal a multiple of ve,
for African, Latin-American and Asian the probability equals roughly 54% and for European
LoM countries 34%, respectively. The probability of a zero tari, on the other hand, correlates
positively with income, as column (8) indicates.
Columns (9) and (10) of Table 1.3 examines the probability of occurrence of the same MFN
tari within all tari headings (HS4-digits, column 10) and within all tari chapters (HS2-
digits) (column 11). In these types of regressions, the dependent variable equals one if the tari
is the same within the respective product group. Otherwise the dependent variable equals
zero. With an average probability of 46% HICs have the same tari within a tari heading. For
LDCs and LoM countries this probability is 5 to 19%-points higher. Hence, instead of applying
product-specic taris, many countries set the same tari for entire tari headings (HS4).
This does not hold true anymore for tari chapters (HS2). The positive coecient for HICs in
column (11) is mostly driven by the three free ports Macao, Hong Kong and Singapore.26 The
results of the country-level analysis can be found in the Appendix (Figure A6).
There are at least two potential explanations why countries might prefer setting the same
tari for entire tari headings (HS4). First, the probability that a multi-product exporter sells
similar products, i.e. all belonging to the same tari heading, is high. Therefore, same taris
for all products within HS4 heading might expedite the customs process if exporters as well as
customs ocers checking the shipment do not have to do so for every single product. Second,
fraud by misclassication of imports from higher-tari categories to lower-tari ones might be
signicantly easier when defrauding exporters have to only re-classify from one HS6-product
to another; HS6-products might exhibit a higher degree of similarity than across HS4-digits
making cheating easier. Thus, avoiding tari evasion might be an objective of the government
when setting taris. It might be an explanation why we observe such a high share of similar
taris especially in lesser developed countries where corruption and less ecient handling of
customs matter are more common, making the loss of tari revenues more likely.27
26 Macao and Hong Kong have zero taris for all products, Singapore is essentially a free port, too, with no taris
on more than 99% of all HS6-products.
27 The dierences in the share of same taris within HS4-digit across countries can actually explain the dierent
ndings in the literature on the evasion of import taris. While Fisman and Wei (2004) nd evidence for
misclassication in the context of Hong Kong and China, Javorcik and Narciso (2008) cannot conrm these
results for trade between Germany and ten Eastern European transition countries. The dierences in the share
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Both, the fact that countries have a preference for certain tari levels, i.e. multiples of ve
and zero, as well as the fact that countries often set the same tari for entire tari headings,
yield to a relatively low number of unique taris. For HICs it equals on average 567, which
is compared to a total number of 5,018 HS6-products relatively low. Further, it decreases
signicantly with income resulting in on average only 48 unique tari levels in LDCs (compare
column (11)). Even the country with the largest number of unique taris, Liechtenstein, only
has 1,710 unique levels; the European Union has the second highest number of unique taris
(670), the United States place third (662), and China only has 360 unique levels. A third of all
countries have at most 50 unique levels of taris. For many of the LDCs and LoM countries
the three most frequently used unique MFN taris constitute 80% or more of all 5,018 HS6-
products (compare Figure A7 in the Appendix for details on the country-level analysis).
Sectoral Heterogeneity Next, I investigate the sectoral dierences in applied MFN taris.
Figure 1.1 shows the average and the 95%-condence intervals for the dierent income groups
across 21 sectors. The purpose of this gure is to analyze whether countries protect similar
sectors once level-eects are accounted for. To do so, I demean all MFN taris with the in-
come group average MFN tari. To account for the stark dierences between agricultural and
industrial products, I demean separately for the two. Section 1 to 4 are agricultural products
and the remaining sections 5 to 21 represent industrial products.
Indeed, the sectoral pattern is similar across income groups; while across sections and within
the same income group the dierences are distinct and often signicant, within the same
section the dierences between income groups are often very small. For most sectors, the
condence intervals are very narrow, indicating little variation within income group across
countries. For vegetable products, fats and oils taris are lower than the income group average
for agricultural products, and taris are the highest for food, beverages and tobacco.28
The MFN taris for mineral products, chemicals, and machinery are the lowest relative to
the average of all industrial products across all income groups. The taris for plastics, paper,
and base metals are also lower than the average group tari. The sections with the highest
taris are textile, footwear, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, leather goods. The taris on
arms, miscellaneous manufactured articles and art are mixed across income groups.
Summing up, on the one hand applied MFN taris are distinct across countries with tari
levels and water in the taris correlating negatively with income. On the other hand I report
of same taris within HS4-digit industries might be the reason for the discrepancies. In fact, for the year 2003,
one year before Poland joined the European Union and two years after China acceded the WTO, the share of
same taris within HS4-digit industries equals 64% for Poland, but only 26% for China.
28 Many countries have high taris on section 4 products for social reasons. For example, as an Islamic country,
in which alcohol consumption is restricted, Egypt levies prohibitively high taris ranging between 1200 and
3000% for alcoholic beverages to make imported alcohol more expensive.
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Note: The graph shows the mean and the corresponding 95% condence interval across sectors by
income groups. The country specic averages are subtracted from the original MFN tari. Table A4
in the Appendix gives a full description of the sections.
two customary practices that apply to all countries: taris are often multiples of ve or zero
and countries tend to set the same tari for entire tari headings (HS4-digit) instead on a
product-by-product basis potentially to facilitate the customs process and diminishing the
risk of fraud. Taris vary signicantly across sectors but are similar across income groups
once level-eects are accounted for.
1.4.2 Most Favored Nation Taris over Time
Over the past 30 years, the average applied MFN tari was globally on a clear downward trend
(cf. Figure 1.2). Compared to 1988, the level almost halved and equaled 8.5% in 2017 — the
steepest decrease can be observed from 1994 to 2005. The reduction is not due to compositional
changes of the sample, neither with respect to countries nor products, as the algorithm used
to ll the missing data fully balances the panel.29 In this section, I will investigate this trend
of decreasing applied MFN taris. First, I will show cross-country variation in the changes
29 Nevertheless, for many countries only few data are available in the earlier year, i.e. up until the mid 1990’s.
In these cases, information from subsequent years is used to impute missing MFN taris, yielding potentially
biased MFN taris. Assuming a decreasing time trend in taris, the bias leads to underestimated MFN taris
(lower than the real value).
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of taris. Second, the implications of the Uruguay Round for applied MFN taris is analyzed.
Lastly, I will shed some light on how countries cut taris.









1988 1994 2005 2017
 
Note: The gure shows the average applied MFN tari over time using the new tari database.
Heterogeneity across Countries in Changes in applied MFN Taris Although the av-
erage applied MFN tari decreased signicantly over the past 30 years, there is large hetero-
geneity in the timing as well as with regard to the amount of the reduction across countries.
Column (1) of Table 1.4 regresses the dierence between the MFN tari in 2017 and 1988
on the income group dummies for industrial products.30 HICs reduced taris on average by
4.39%-points, the change for LoM countries in Europe is not signicantly dierent from this
coecient, for LoM countries in the Americas the reduction in taris is slightly smaller than
for HICs. LoM countries in Africa and Asia implemented the largest tari liberalizations; they
reduced taris in the period 1988 to 2017 by 12.54%-points and 11.32%-points, respectively.
LDCs reduced on average taris by 5.67%-points. In HICs, African and Asian LoM countries,
most of these cuts happened in the period 1994 to 2005 (compare columns (2) to (4)). Thus,
the large reductions between 1994 and 2005 are mostly driven by African and Asian LoM
countries.
30 Keep in mind that for countries that did not report taris for the year 1988, this tari corresponds to the rst
available year of data, which can be found in Table A3.
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For agricultural products, roughly the same pattern can be observed (compare Table A5 in
the Appendix), i.e. most of the tari cuts since 1988 took place in LoM countries in Africa and
Asia. With regard to HICs, many of the taris are AVEs, which are a function of world prices.
When world prices decrease, the AVEs increase and vice-versa. As prices for agricultural
goods have increased since 2005, the seemingly apparent reduction in taris for HICs, from
2005 to 2017, might be entirely unrelated to changes in trade policy.31 The tarication eorts
in the Uruguay Round and the resulting high non-ad valorem taris might help explain the
positive coecient for HICs for the period from 1994 to 2005.
Even within income groups, there is a lot of heterogeneity across countries: some decrease
taris later, some keep taris stable throughout the period, and some even increase taris.
Details for the country-level analysis can be found in Figure A9. Three observations stand out:
rst, almost all large tari cuts, i.e. the cuts of more than 5%-points, took place in the period
from 1994 to 2005. Second, increases in taris are often the result of newly formed customs
unions and members adapting to the new, higher common external tari. This pattern can be
observed for many countries joining the European Union but also for members of Mercosur
or the African customs unions. Third, very high taris, i.e. more than 15%-points, are rare in
2017. One notable exception is the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa with an
average external MFN tari of 18% points.
The Role of Multilateral Trade Agreements The large reductions in the aggregate be-
tween 1994 and 2005 are mostly driven by African and Asian LoM countries. However, also
HICs substantially reduced taris in this period. This time period coincides with the phasing-
in years of the Uruguay Round. As mentioned above, countries negotiated bound, not applied,
MFN taris. Thus, the question arises to what extent the Uruguay Round contributed to the
large reduction in applied taris that can be observed in the data. To answer this question,
let B indicate a binding bound tari resulting from the negotiations of the Uruguay Round.
More precisely, B = 1 if t̃ik ≤ tbeforeik , and zero otherwise with t̃ik denoting the bound tari
and tbeforeik the applied MFN tari in 1994, one year prior to the implementation of the tari
cuts negotiated in the Uruguay Round.
Column (5) of Table 1.4 reports P (B) for the six income groups; the sample is restricted to
countries that joined the WTO before 1995. When it comes to HICs, the bound tari undercuts
the applied tari level of 1994 in 77% of all industrial products. This indicates that most of
the reductions in applied MFN taris between 1994 and 2005 can be attributed to the multilat-
eral trade negotiations. With respect to the remaining income groups, the probability ranges
between 5 and 22%-points. Thus, the negotiated bound taris in the Uruguay Round did not
force LoM countries and LDCs to liberalize, instead the large cuts that can be observed, espe-
31 http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/
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Table 1.4: Change in MFN Taris across Income Groups (Industrial Products)
∆T 10 = t1 − t0 B = 1 if t̃ik < t
before
ik
∆T 1788 ∆T 1705 ∆T 0594 ∆T 9488 P(B) P(B) ∆T 1788 |B = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LDCs -1.28∗∗∗ -1.23∗∗∗ -0.07∗ 0.03 -0.72∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -4.31∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14)
LoM Africa -8.15∗∗∗ -2.02∗∗∗ -7.07∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -8.96∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.19)
LoM Americas 0.80∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.74∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -2.31∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.12)
LoM Asia -6.93∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -5.08∗∗∗ -1.32∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -5.78∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17)
LoM Europe 0.06 -1.41∗∗∗ -0.02 1.48∗∗∗ 0.00 0.09∗∗∗ 0.12
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (.) (0.00) (0.14)
HICs (Ref. Group) -4.39∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗ -2.90∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12)
Observations 695,129 695,129 695,129 695,129 537,621 157,508 473,042
joined WTO < 1995 > 1995 all
Note: The table shows the regression output of yik =
∑6
G=1 βGI
G + uik . In columns (1) to (4) the dependent
variable yik equals the absolute change in the MFN tari ∆T 10 for dierent time intervals. In column (5) and (6)
the dependent variable is the probability of having a binding bound tari P(B), in column (7) it is the change in
MFN taris between 1988 and 2017 for products with a binding bound tari. See the main text for the denition
of B. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate signicance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
cially for African and Asian LoM countries, are entirely due to unilateral tari liberalizations,
i.e. increases in tari water.32
As mentioned above, countries that joined the WTO after 1995 faced strict reductions in
bound taris resulting from multilateral negotiations. Next, I will check if the negotiated
bound taris were binding for new WTO members. B is dened as before with the slight
modication that tbeforeik now equals the tari one year prior to the WTO accession. For ex-
ample for China, that joined the WTO in 2001, B = 1 if t̃ik < t2000ik . Column (6) shows, that
for new WTO members the probability of a binding bound tari is higher than for countries
that joined the WTO prior to 1995. This is true for all income groups except HICs. Asian LoM
countries display particularly diverging probabilities: while for countries joining the WTO
before 1995, the probability of a binding bound tari equals only 19% it is 48% for new WTO
members.
Lastly, I check how the pattern across income groups in ∆T 1788 changes when excluding
products that are subject to a binding bound tari, i.e. ∆T 1788 |B = 0. Small dierences from
the full sample (see column (1)) would indicate that products with a binding tari play a minor
32 For agricultural products the results are qualitatively the same. Due to large measurement error in the bound
taris (see Section 1.3 for details) of agricultural products it is hard to correctly quantify the coecients.
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role in the global reduction of applied MFN taris since 1988. The results are mixed: for HICs,
the coecient is much smaller. The dierences for the remaining income groups are less
pronounced conrming the results of the analysis of P (B): when it comes to HICs and new
WTO members, the binding commitments made in multilateral trade negotiations also matter
for applied MFN taris. For LDCs and LoM countries that joined the WTO before 1995, on the
other hand, this cannot be said. This is due to the fact that for the latter group of countries
the focus during the Uruguay Round was to increase the coverage of bound taris instead
of enforcing lower bound taris. As the globally decreasing applied MFN taris are mostly
driven by LoM countries, one has to be careful to not overestimate the role of multilateral
trade negotiations in the general downwards trend of the past 30 years.
Patterns of Reduction Countries can reduce taris in many dierent ways. Assuming that
changes in taris are governed by the objective of increasing welfare, the literature puts for-
ward two types of tari reforms (for example Neary (1998)). Countries can either implement
a uniform radial reduction (reduce all taris by the same proportion) or a concertina reform
(reduce the highest tari rates). The concertina reform compresses the tari structure—lower
and more uniform taris are the result of reducing the extremely high taris the most and
making only small cuts to the already low taris. In case of a radial reform, the tari struc-
ture remains the same. In multilateral tari negotiations both reforms are applied, albeit the
concertina reform has become more popular in recent years (Hoda 2001).33 According to Amiti
(2005) the concertina reform was also a guiding principle for the tari reforms in developing
countries in the 1970s and 1980s.
Having these two concepts in mind, I check if the countries in the sample follow either one
of the two. To do so, I st calculate country-specic deciles of the initial taris in 1988 denoted
by Dci with c = 1, 2, ..., 10 across all products k. The deciles Dci vary among the countries.
Countries with few unique taris have less than ten deciles. Then, ten dummy variables Ici ,
that equal one if Dc−1i ≤ tik,0 ≤ Dci and zero otherwise are dened, and are used to explain
the changes in applied MFN taris, y = ∑10c=1 βcIci + uik. y either equals the absolute change
in taris ∆tik ≡ tik,2017 − tik,1988 or to the relative change ∆tik ≡ tik,2017−tik,1988tik,1988 . The focus
of the analysis lies on industrial products and on countries that reduced taris on average.
Regressing on dummy variables does not impose any functional form and is therefore the
most exible approach.
33 While in the Kennedy Round (1964-67) the general agreement was to simply cut taris by 50%, in the
Tokyo Round (1973-79) negotiating parties agreed on much more sophisticated formulae (Hoda 2001).
One example is the Swiss formula, which was accepted eventually, and was implemented by most high
income countries participating in the Tokyo Round. It is dened as follows: Z = AXA+X ,with A =
coecient (14, 15, 16), X = initial rate of duty, Z = resulting rate of duty. All of these formulae can be traced
back to the concertina reform as they compress the tari structure, i.e. lower and more uniform taris by
cutting the extremely high taris the most, and the already low taris the least.
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The type of tari reform—radial or concertina—can be identied by combining the β coe-
cients for the relative and absolute changes: When a country follows the concertina reform,
the β coecients for the absolute change as well as the coecient for the relative change will
increase in size with the initial tari level. Thus, connecting the respective coecients for the
absolute and relative changes would result in two downward-sloping curves. In this case, the
tari structure is compressed, i.e. it changes with respect to the initial year. When the tari
reductions are carried out using a radial reform, on the other hand, the coecients for the
absolute changes in the level of the initial tari increase again, the coecients for the relative
changes remain constant. The tari structure remains the same, there is only a level-eect,
i.e. all taris are reduced by a certain percentage.
The results of estimating y = ∑10c=1 βcIci + uik are displayed in Figures A10 to A15. The β
coecients for the absolute changes are highlighted in red, the coecients for the relative re-
duction are marked in blue. The deciles Dci are displayed on the x-axis. Most importantly, the
analysis shows that there is large heterogeneity across countries even within the same income
group. Both types of reforms can be found in various countries independent of the income
group. Examples for the implementation of concertina reforms are Bangladesh, Botswana,
Cuba, India, Malaysia, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Island, and New Zealand. Radial reforms are
somewhat less common and more prevalent in LDCs and African LoM countries compared to
the remaining income groups (i.e. Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, Brazil, and Thailand).
Some countries implement tari reforms using a elements of both the concertina and radial
reform. For example, Egypt, China, Indonesia, and Vietnam apply the concertina reform to
lower initial levels, but after a certain threshold level they adapt a radial reform. The analysis
reveals another frequent pattern of reduction, I call it the cross-reform, i.e. when the abso-
lute magnitude of coecients of the absolute change increase, while the coecients of the
relative change decrease with the initial tari. For this type of tari reform, connecting the
β coecients for the absolute and the relative change, results in two lines that intersect. For
example the United States, Kenya and Costa Rica changed taris according to this pattern.
The cross-reform results in overall lower taris but—similar to the radial reform—the tari
structure remains unchanged.
1.4.3 Preferential Taris
Preferential taris are the one major exception to the core principle of non-discrimination of
the WTO. Any RTA violates the non-discrimination clause by denition as only the signing
parties enjoy more favorable market-access conditions, but all other trading partners are ex-
cluded. Four dierent types of RTAs can be distinguished: FTAs, CUs, PSAs, and special and
nonreciprocal arrangements. In this section, the substantially all trade criterion, the legal basis
of FTAs and CUs, will be discussed rst. Second, I will show how tari cuts are implemented
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across FTAs. Lastly, I will briey review nonreciprocal arrangements. I use Mario Larch’s Re-
gional Trade Agreements Database from Egger and Larch (2008) to distinguish between the
dierent types of trade agreements.34
Interpretation of the Substantially all Trade Criterion in Practice Article XXIV of the
GATT stipulates the rules for the formation of FTAs and CUs. More specically it states that
“duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (...) are eliminated on substantially all the
trade between the constituent territories” (GATT, Article XXIV: 8). However, the interpretation
of the substantially all trade criterion is not straightforward (Lydgate and Winters 2019). Table
1.5 gives an overview of how Article XXIV is interpreted in practice. Countries in an FTA levy
on average taris of 1.4%. 79% of the trade between country pairs is on average not subject
to any taris corresponding to 84% of all HS6-products. The shares are larger for industrial
than for agricultural products. For customs unions the average preferential tari is somewhat
lower and the shares of free trade and HS6-products with zero taris higher, respectively.
Summing up, many countries seem to interpret Article XXIV as basis for eliminating taris
on 80 to 90% of all trade within both FTAs and CUs.
Table 1.5: Preferences and the Substantially all Trade Criterion across Country Pairs for
Agreements Notied under Article XXIV
All North-North South-South North-South
all ind. agri. all ind. agri. all ind. agri. all ind. agri.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A) Pairs with FTA
Pref. Tari 1.4 0.8 4.3 1.6 0.1 10.7 0.6 0.4 1.7 1.5 1.0 3.8
Trade | t=0 78.9 80.3 71.6 93.9 98.0 70.0 90.4 91.5 84.1 75.2 76.1 69.9
HS-6 | t=0 84.1 86.1 74.2 92.1 97.0 68.2 88.8 89.6 85.1 82.2 84.0 73.3
B) Pairs with Customs Union
Pref. Tari 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.3 0.0 7.8
Trade | t=0 91.9 92.3 91.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 82.5 82.7 82.4 96.4 100.0 68.6
HS-6 | t=0 86.1 86.4 84.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 74.5 74.6 74.2 91.0 98.8 52.5
Note: The table shows the average preferential tari applied to trade between member countries, the average
trade that was not subject to any taris as a share of the total trade between the respective country pair, and the
average number of 6-digit products with a zero tari as a share of the total number of products of both countries.
In this analysis all high income countries are called “North”, all other countries (LoM countries and LDCs) are
called “South”.
In practice, the interpretation of the substantially all trade criterion is—again—characterized
by heterogeneity across countries. For FTAs between two high-income countries (North-
34 The advantage of Mario Larch’s database is that it uses the WTO’s legal denition to classify RTAs, i.e. whether
an agreement has been notied under the enabling clause or the Article XXIV. Thus, all FTAs and CUs are
notied under Article XXIV, while all PSAs in the database are notied under the enabling clause.
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North), taris on industrial products have been eliminated for almost all HS6-products. Whereas
for the agricultural sector only 70% of all trade is exempt from taris. When it comes to FTAs
between two LoM countries and/or LDCs (South-South), the coverage of the FTAs is much
more similar for industrial and agricultural products than for North-North pairs resulting in
90% of all trade to be tari free. Within FTAs between HICs and LoM countries or LDCs
(North-South), on the other hand, only 75% of all trade is tari free. Investigating each pair
of the North-South FTAs demonstrates that most of the FTAs with a share of free trade below
90% are relatively recent ones (cf. Figure A16) that most likely are not fully phased-in yet;
typically the South country is granted relatively long transition periods.
The elimination of taris within the dierent CUs varies across country pairs as well. The
only countries included in column (4) to (6) are the members of the European Union, for which
all trade is free. In the CU between the European Union and Turkey, which is the only CU
included in columns (10) to (12), all trade and almost all industrial HS6-products are duty free,
while many agricultural products are exempted. This results in large asymmetries between the
two sectors. The remaining CUs between South-South countries include Mercosur, Caricom
(15 Caribbean nations), various African CUs, the CU between the Gulf states, and the Eurasian
CU. Preferential taris are very low within these CUs indicating that goods, which are subject
to a preferential tari, can move freely. However, the share of duty-free trade is only 82% and
the average share of HS6-products with zero taris equals 74%. Thus, trade in these CUs is
less integrated than in the European context.
Phasing-In in FTAs According to Baier and Bergstrand (2007) “virtually every FTA is phased-
in, typically over 10 years” (p. 89–90). Phasing-in has potentially important implications for
the eects of FTAs. It might be the reason why the impact on trade ows takes so long to
fully unfold. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) were the rst to use lagged FTA terms to identify
the role of phasing-in on aggregated trade ows, which indeed yields positive and statistically
signicant eects on bilateral trade. Countries decide on a product-by-product basis whether
the respective tari is phased-in. Surprisingly, empirical evidence exploiting this variation is
scarce: to the best of my knowledge, Besedeš et al. (2019) are the only ones to explore this
matter so far. In the context of NAFTA, they show that phasing-in cannot explain the de-
layed reaction of trade. The lack of readily available data might be one reason for the scarce
empirical evidence on phasing-in.
In the new tari database I include detailed phasing-in schedules from the WTO’s RTA
database.35 Unfortunately, they are not available for all RTAs but only for 149 FTAs. The
35 In 2006 the General Council established a new transparency mechanism for all RTAs that is supposed to help
ensure that RTAs fulll the requirements of Article XXIV and V, respectively. As a result so-called “factual
presentations” have to be distributed among WTO members. One part of the factual presentation is the tar-
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Table 1.6: Average Share of Tari Lines with Final Preferential Tari (in %)
All North-North South-South North-South
all ind. agri. all ind. agri. all ind. agri. all ind. agri.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Entry into Force 75 74 76 87 89 73 74 73 78 73 73 74
EiF+5 84 84 84 94 95 84 83 82 85 83 84 82
EiF+10 95 95 93 98 99 94 96 96 95 94 94 91
EiF+15 100 100 99 100 100 99 99 100 98 100 100 99
Note: The table shows the share of tari lines with the nal preferential tari at dierent points of time, i.e. the
year of entry into force (EiF) and 5, 10, and 15 years after the year of implementation. Thus, the rst row equals
the probability of tari cuts being implemented immediately when the FTA enters into force. The data is only
available for 149 FTAs, thus the sample changes compared to the baseline.
subset includes mostly recent FTAs. Next, I analyze how frequently countries use phasing-in
and check for cross-country and sectoral heterogeneity.
Table 1.6 shows the average share of tari lines with the nal preferential tari (typically
zero) at dierent points in time: the rst row (Entry into Force, EiF) reports the average proba-
bility for an immediate tari cut, immediately after the FTA enters into force. The remaining
rows present the average shares of fully phased-in taris after 5, 10, and 15 years, respec-
tively. On average, countries cut taris immediately for 75% of all tari lines. 9% are being
phased-in within the rst ve years, 6% between the 5th and the 10th year. 15 years post-
EiF, all tari cuts are fully implemented. Phasing-in is less common in FTAs with two North
countries involved. However, agricultural products are more heavily protected by phasing-in
than industrial ones. Taris for North-North countries are almost completely implemented 10
years post-EiF. In the case of the remaining pairs, it takes longer. The relatively long phasing-
in periods for North-South pairs is mostly due to the LDCs/LoM countries that are granted
more time to adapt to the new tari regime. Figure A17 in the Appendix reports the average
probability for each importer in the sample.
With respect to agricultural and industrial products, the probability of phasing-in is similar.
However, within the two types of products, there is heterogeneity across sectors (cf. Fig-
ure 1.3). While for agricultural products (Anim-Food) the probability of phasing-in ranges
between 22 and 27%, for the industrial sectors, it is much more dispersed. It is lowest for min-
erals, chemical products, and optics and highest for footwear, textiles, and stones and glasses.
These broad trends also hold when allowing for heterogeneity across income groups (Figure
A18 in the Appendix). The sectoral pattern is similar to the pattern of MFN taris displayed in
i schedule that includes all phasing-in schemes (cf. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/trans_
mecha_e.htm for details). The tari schedules are mostly available for more recent FTAs.
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Note: The graph shows the probability of Phasing-In across sectors. See Table A4 for a full description
of the sectors. The sample is dierent from the one used in the main analysis because the underlying
information is not available for all FTAs but only for 149 FTAs.
Figure 1.1, indicating that phasing-in might be a dierent form of protectionism, i.e. countries
try to protect the respective sectors as long as possible.
Nonreciprocal Arrangements in Practice The missing reciprocity is what distinguishes
nonreciprocal arrangements from FTAs, CUs and PSAs: instead of bilateral tari concessions,
only one country, typically a high-income country, oers preferential access, while the other
country continues to impose MFN taris—the formal goal of nonreciprocal arrangements is to
foster economic growth in developing countries through trade (Ornelas 2016). Due to the com-
prehensive coverage in terms of beneciary countries and products, they are an essential part
of international trade policy. As of 2017, the WTO reports 22 importing countries granting
unilateral preferences.36 The General System of Preferences (GSP) is the most widely spread
arrangement. There are additional programs: for example, the United States oers preferen-
tial treatment through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the European
Union through the Everything-but-Arms scheme. Both of these programs focus on LDCs and
are more generous than the GSP. Ornelas (2016) oers an excellent overview of this special
type of trade agreement.
36 http://ptadb.wto.org/
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Table 1.7 reports the shares of trade covered under the nonreciprocal arrangements by the
importer granting the trade preferences. I distinguish the respective applied taris, i.e. MFN
tari of zero (tik = 0), preferential tari of zero (t∗ijk = 0), preferential tari greater than zero
(t∗ijk), and nonzero MFN taris are denoted by tik. At least three observations are striking:
rst, beneciaries either mostly export goods for which no MFN tari is imposed or they are
granted preferences. Especially for HICs, i.e. the countries listed rst in the Table, the share
that is imported under nonzero MFN taris is low. With the exception of the European Union
(row (3)) nonzero preferences are not very common among HICs, When it comes to LoM
countries oering nonreciprocal preferences, i.e. China, India, Russia, Turkey, the shares of
covered trade in this category are higher. Second, the preferences for LDCs are on average
more generous than for LoM countries, as columns (5) to (12) illustrate. One exception here
are the United States imposing nonzero MFN taris on 53% of exports by LDCs while this
share is a mere 6% for LoM countries.
Third, columns (13) to (16) highlight an interesting fact: some new member states of the Eu-
ropean Union (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia) are being granted preferences through nonreciprocal arrangements although
they joined the customs union. Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Russia and Kazakhstan do so.
The shares that fall under the nonreciprocal arrangements for these countries are small but it
illustrates an interesting point: the countries granting preferential treatment have high degree




















Table 1.7: Shares of Trade Covered under Nonreciprocal Arrangements (2017, in %)
All Least Developed Countries Low & Middle Income C’s New EU Members
t = 0 t∗ = 0 t∗ > 0 t > 0 t = 0 t∗ = 0 t∗ > 0 t > 0 t = 0 t∗ = 0 t∗ > 0 t > 0 t = 0 t∗ = 0 t∗ > 0 t > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
AUS 60 23 7 11 19 81 0 0 62 23 5 10 18 1 40 40
CAN 50 43 3 4 10 90 0 0 52 41 2 5
EUN 40 44 14 1 18 82 0 0 42 40 16 1
JPN 69 13 8 9 26 72 2 0 69 12 9 10 76 7 11 6
KOR 21 43 7 29 14 60 9 17 18 41 7 35
NZL 41 34 5 21 16 84 0 0 52 26 7 15 29 0 2 68
USA 33 59 1 7 10 35 2 53 31 62 2 6
ISL 99 1 0 0 98 1 0 0 99 1 0 0
NOR 83 10 3 4 29 71 0 0 84 8 3 5
CHN 35 55 4 6 72 23 2 3 25 68 3 4
IND 35 22 26 16 29 14 37 20 38 19 26 17
RUS 24 53 10 13 5 24 0 71 25 59 11 6 11 0 4 85
TUR 36 33 22 9 36 46 0 18 37 32 22 9
ARM 31 19 8 41 31 19 8 41
CHL 0 94 6 0 0 94 6 0
KAZ 26 19 5 50 4 19 0 77 27 20 6 48 1 0 1 98
MAR 0 98 1 1 0 31 1 68 0 99 1 0
MNE 50 50 0 0 50 50 0 0
THA 53 47 0 0 79 19 2 0 52 47 1 0
TJK 1 99 0 0 0 0 100 0 1 99 0 0
Note: The table shows the average preferential tari applied on trade between member countries, the average trade that was not subject to any taris as a share
of total trade between the respective country pair, and the average number of 6-digit products with a zero tari as a share of the total number of products of both




In this paper I presented a new global tari database covering taris at the 6-digit product
level for 197 importing countries and their trading partners for 30 years, namely 1988 to 2017.
It deals simultaneously with the two major issues, missing data and misreporting. By doing
so, the coverage almost doubles yielding a dataset of 5.7 billion taris. The improvement is
particularly relevant for least developed countries and developing countries (share of imputed
data equals 56% and 42%, respectively). With this novel dataset at hand, I tried to answer the
following questions: What are the persistent patterns in tari protectionism across countries
and sectors? How and by how much did taris change over the past 30 years? What role did
the WTO play? How much and when do preferential taris liberalize trade?
I nd a striking amount of heterogeneity across countries with respect to tari levels and
also changes in taris. These dierences across countries are even observable within the same
income group indicating that other factors like the countries’ production structures, political
ideology, protection for sale considerations or terms-of-trade objectives might play a role. In
this paper I completely abstract from these important factors determining the level of tari
protectionism around the world leaving it up to future research to test these well-known
concepts with the new tari data. The role of the WTO is very dierent across countries:
while multilateral trade negotiations determined applied MFN tari levels in some countries
it had no impact in others. The reason is the high amounts of water in the taris for many
countries. Therefore, future WTO negotiations have still very much room of improving the
conditions of trade by focusing on a relatively clear task: reducing the bound taris to applied
levels around the world.
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Chapter 2
Rules of Origin and the Protability of
Trade Deection
2.1 Introduction
Traditionally, trade economists are skeptical of free trade agreements (FTAs) because of their
preferential nature.1 FTAs grant advantages to some trade partners but withhold them from
others. In that way, they lead to harmful trade diversion. Amongst regional trade agreements,
customs unions (CUs) are usually preferred over FTAs, because the former create as much
trade as the latter but typically divert trade less (Krueger 1997). Moreover, CUs are less likely
to be stumbling blocks for further trade liberalization (Missios et al. 2016). Nonetheless, only
9% of all trade agreements signed since 1945 are CUs (Dür et al. 2014).
While CUs usually have a common external tari (at least for a subset of products), this is not
the case with FTAs, at least formally. For this reason, in contrast to CUs, FTAs require rules of
origin (RoOs) that dene under which conditions a good is said to originate from a member
country of the FTA so that it can benet from a preferential tari. Complying with these rules
causes costly red tape.2 Moreover, they can distort rms’ input sourcing (Conconi et al. 2018;
Krishna and Krueger 1995). They reduce preference utilization rates (PURs) to less than 100%,
sometimes substantially so (Keck and Lendle 2012). RoOs are, therefore, the unsavory sauce
to Bhagwati’s (1995) spaghetti bowl of bilateral trade agreements. According to advocates of
RoOs, without them each imported commodity would enter the FTA through the country with
the lowest tari. In the absence of transportation costs, this arbitrage activity, often referred
1 In this paper, we follow WTO denitions. Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are reciprocal preferential trade
agreements between two or more partners. They take the form of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs
unions (CUs). In contrast, preferential trade arrangements are unilateral i.e. non-reciprocal trade preferences.
2 See Anson et al. (2005), Cadot et al. (2006), Carrère and Melo (2006), and Estevadeordal (2000) for attempts
towards quantifying these costs.
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to as trade deection, would have the consequence that the FTA member with the lowest tari
de facto sets a common external tari for all FTA members.
Similarly, RoOs are also imposed on exporters from developing countries beneting from
unilateral tari preferences granted by rich countries under preference schemes like the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences (GSPs). By burdening poor countries with red tape, they have
the eect of counteracting the trade-creating eects; in some of the arrangements PURs are
as low as 66% (Keck and Lendle 2012).
Surprisingly, so far, no study has asked whether trade deection is actually realistic empiri-
cally. If it is not, the existence of hundreds of pages of text on RoOs in modern FTAs would be
indicative of rent seeking rather than necessary due to the inherent logic of a trade agreement
(which may be questioned per se on other grounds).
In this paper, we use a newly compiled data set of MFN (most favored nation) and prefer-
ential taris at the 6-digit level. We document a fact that, to the best of our knowledge, has
been overlooked so far: for most country pairs in FTAs, trade deection is unprotable. The
reason for this is that taris are generally low, countries in a common FTA tend to have sim-
ilar external tari levels, and when tari levels dier, deection is protable at most for one
country in the pair. When preferences are granted unilaterally by a rich country to a poor one,
trade deection is almost never protable by design: the poor countries maintain their (often
high) external taris erga omnes so that goods from third countries can rarely be protably
transshipped through them to the rich country or through the rich country to them.
The upshot is that FTAs or GSP arrangements should not require proof of origin by default,
except for those few products where dierences in external taris are larger than some thresh-
old level (determined by the additional transportation costs that would arise if rms attempt
to exploit tari dierences).
Concerns with RoOs and their side eects is wide-spread in the literature. It is a key in-
gredient in Bhagwati’s (1995) “Spaghetti Bowl” parable. In his words, RoOs are “inherently
arbitrary”. They make “the occupation of lobbyists who seek to protect by ddling with the
adoption of these rules and then with the estimates that underlie the application of these rules ...
immensely protable at our expense.” More generally, as also highlighted by R. Baldwin (2016),
with the spread of international production networks, it is increasingly problematic to operate
trade policy on the assumption that one can cleanly identify the nationality of a product. As a
consequence, FTAs are “tying up trade policy in knots and absurdities facilitating protectionist
capture ” (Bhagwati 1995).3
3 These concerns apply mostly to taris; however, they also apply to other provisions in FTAs which are meant




RoOs come in a multitude of forms. All regimes require that a product undergoes “substan-
tial transformation” in the originating country. This could be a minimum value added content
requirement, a change in tari classication, or a combination of these. For example, the text
of a modern trade agreement, the Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA), denes the following
RoOs for a food product falling under HS heading 19.01 (“Malt Extract”): “A change from any
other heading, provided that: (a) the net weight of non-originating material of heading 10.06 or
11.01 through 11.08 used in production does not exceed 20 per cent of the net weight of the prod-
uct, (b) the net weight of non-originating sugar used in production does not exceed 30 per cent of
the net weight of the product, (c) the net weight of non-originating material of Chapter 4 used
in production does not exceed 20 per cent of the net weight of the product, and (d) the net weight
of non-originating sugar and non-originating material of Chapter 4 used in production does not
exceed 40 per cent of the net weight of the product.” Needless to say, if countries are members
to dierent FTAs, they have to comply with potentially dierent and conicting RoOs.4
In the recent revision of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between
Canada, Mexico, and the United States, a lot of political capital was invested into tighten-
ing RoOs, in particular for autos. By requiring the minimum share of regional value added
to increase from 62.5% to 75%, the new agreement squeezes out third country input suppliers
with the objective to protect domestic suppliers.
The theoretical literature points to three reasons why RoOs lead to costs for businesses and
welfare losses. First, the detailed and highly complex product-by-product criteria make them
hard to meet. Exporters need to build up (legal) know-how to comply with the rules. Second,
exporters face dierent RoOs depending on the export-destination due to multiple FTAs with
little overlap in the design of the RoOs.5 Third, if exporters need to adjust their global supply
chains to meet RoOs requirements, trade patterns and investment ows are distorted (Krishna
and Krueger 1995; Krishna 2006). This can have extreme implications. In a simple model,
Deardor (2018) shows that, even when every country has an FTA with every other country,
due to RoOs, the level of welfare in such a situation can be lower than in the situation where
no FTA was present and only MFN taris apply.
The empirical evidence conrms the negative eects of complying with RoOs. The com-
pliance costs associated with meeting RoOs requirements range from 3-15% of nal product
prices depending on the method used to measure the restrictiveness of RoOs (Carrère and
Melo 2006; Anson et al. 2005; Estevadeordal 2000; Cadot et al. 2006). Andersson (2015), Bom-
barda and Gamberoni (2013), and Augier et al. (2005) use the liberalization of the EU’s RoOs
4 To be fair, there have been numerous attempts towards simplifying RoOs-regimes, e.g., by allowing for various
ways of cumulation. However, the general necessity of RoOs is rarely questioned by trade policy practitioners.
5 Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006) review the types of RoOs used around the world and nd signicant
heterogeneity with respect to the exact requirements as well as the level of restrictiveness.
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as a natural experiment and nd a positive eect on total trade. Constructing a new database
on NAFTA RoOs, Conconi et al. (2018) show that in the absence of RoOs, Mexican imports of
intermediates from third countries relative to NAFTA partners would have been 45% higher.
Further, rm-level evidence suggests heterogeneity across rms as mostly larger rms actu-
ally comply with the RoOs while smaller rms have diculties doing so (Demidova et al. 2012;
Cadot et al. 2014). Firm surveys show that RoOs hinder rms use of FTA preferences (Wig-
naraja et al. 2010; Suominen and Harris 2009). Also, preference utilization rates of less than
100% indicate high xed costs associated with RoOs (Keck and Lendle 2012).6
There is also a theoretical literature on the choice between FTAs and CUs. In FTAs, partic-
ipating countries do not have to delegate policy making authority to a common institution,
which should facilitate concluding the agreement. Facchini et al. (2013) provide arguments
why FTAs might yield higher welfare for the prospective member countries when voters
strategically choose a very protectionist representative to conduct the negotiations. Appel-
baum and Melatos (2012) model the conditions under which members in FTAs choose similar
external taris; a situation they describe as “camouaged” CUs. Lake and Yildiz (2016) also
endogenize the choice between FTAs and CUs and explain why CUs are only intra-regional
while FTAs are inter- and intra-regional.
Section 2.2 of the present paper presents the simple analytical conditions under which trade
deection is protable. This analysis guides our empirical analysis. Section 2.3 presents the
data. Besides tari data and information about trade agreements we also need bilateral trans-
portation costs. In this section, we construct pair-product specic transportation costs using
disaggregated data on cif/fob imports for the USA and use a simple econometric model to
provide out-of-sample predictions for all other product-pair combinations. We validate our
approach using data from New Zealand.
Section 2.4 uses the data to assess countries’ scope for trade deection, which is surpris-
ingly low. For countries in the same FTA, in 29% of all country-pair×product×third-country
combinations for the year 2014, countries set identical external taris. Trade deection means
taking advantage of arbitrage possibilities. Therefore, by denition trade deection could be
protable for one of the members of a pair, while for the other it cannot be protable; this is
the case for 38% of candidate cases. For 4% of all cases, external taris are dierent but the
preferential tari between ij is still high so that deection is not protable. So, in only 29%
of all cases, the tari situation could make trade deection protable if there were no trans-
portation costs. In 16% of all cases, the tari savings are smaller than additional transportation
costs. Hence, in sum, for fully 86% of all cases, in FTAs, trade deection is not protable.
6 For example, in the EU’s most advanced bilateral trade agreement in force (with Korea), ve years after entry
into force of the agreement, the preference utilization rate is 71% (European Commission 2017).
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In non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements (GSP), only in 7% of all cases are taris
such that trade deection could work in the absence of transportation costs. Factoring in
the latter, the fraction falls to a mere 2%. Note that these numbers are conservative because
we consider only transportation costs, disregarding other trade costs such as those related to
writing and enforcing contracts, exchange rate risk, management costs, and so on.
Our analysis suggests that, in a large number of cases, there is no economic rationale for
RoOs. Section 2.5 draws policy conclusions. The most important is that exporters should be
required to prove the origin of goods only when trade deection is a real possibility which is
quite often not the case. More specically, we suggest that, in new FTAs, negotiators should
agree on a full set of RoOs for all products, but that the requirement to prove origin be acti-
vated only if external taris of FTA members dier by some minimum amount. In the case
of non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements (GSP), RoOs should be activated only for
those products where the beneciary country undercuts the MFN taris of the preference
granting country. Our proposal could disentangle Bhagwati’s spaghetti bowl a bit. It would
create incentives for countries to align their external taris, thus emulating CUs. It could also
help dealing with the exit of countries from long established CUs, such as Britain’s or Turkey’s
potential exits from the EU’s customs union.
2.2 On the Protability and Scope of Trade Deection
2.2.1 The Protability of Arbitrage
Consider an importing country i = 1, ..., N, and an exporting country c = 1, ..., N. Denote
the ad valorem tari applicable on a good k = 1, ..., K in factor form by tick ≥ 1 (so that
(tick − 1) × 100% is the ad valorem tari in percent). When useful, we distinguish between
preferential taris t∗ick and MFN taris t̃ick = t̃ik for all c not subject to preferential taris.
Suppose countries i and j conclude a free trade agreement (FTA). They grant each other
preferential taris such that t∗ijk ≤ tick and t∗jik ≤ tjck for all third countries c. For now we
assume that countries i and j do not have an FTA with third countries c.
This constellation opens the possibility for trade deection if tick 6= tjck.7 Suppose tjck <
tick. Then, without further provisions, a good originating from country c could enter country
i through country j with the result that its tari protection against imports from country c
would be undercut as j’s taris are lower than its own and trade between i and j is tari-free.
To avoid such trade deection, for the granting of preferential treatment, all FTAs require a
7 The term trade deection is not uniquely dened in the literature. For example, besides its meaning in the FTA
literature, it is also used to describe a situation where a country’s use of an import restricting trade policy
distorts a foreign country’s exports to third markets (see, e.g., Bown and Crowley (2007)).
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proof of origin. Such a document testies that, to be eligible for tari-free trade from j to i,
the good actually originates from country j and not from some third country c.
Generally, whenever tick 6= tjck, in the absence of transportation costs, without RoOs, there
is scope for arbitrage leading to a situation where countries i and j de facto are in a customs
union, since products from c enter both countries at the common eective tari rate tck =
min {tick, tjck} .When tick = tjck, there is no scope for such an arbitrage activity. Nonetheless,
for tari-free intra-trade agreement transactions, exporters are legally required to document
that their products satisfy the RoOs.
Let there be a xed cost fk of respecting the RoOs for good k, either in the form of bu-
reaucratic eort or because the RoOs require a rm to deviate from an otherwise optimal
international sourcing policy.8 The tari applicable to a transaction between i and j will be
t̃ik instead of t∗ijk whenever the preference margin t̃ik − t∗ijk is low, fk is large and/or the
value of a transaction net of taris is small. For this reason, bureaucratic RoOs can explain
the empirical fact that not all rms within an trade agreement make use of preferential taris
but some apparently prefer to remain subject to the MFN tari. RoOs can therefore act as
de-facto trade barriers and diminish the value of trade agreements, in particular for smaller
rms. When they distort the sourcing decision of rms they also have direct implications
for third countries because they exacerbate the discrimination inherent in any preferential
trade agreement. Conconi et al. (2018) present an excellent recent empirical investigation of
NAFTA, which provides clear evidence of this point9
So, the question arises: when is trade deection protable and therefore a valid concern in an
FTA? Let τijk ≥ 1 denote the minimum iceberg transportation costs between i and j. Then, by
construction, τijk < τickτjck, where c 6= i, j is any third country. Also, for simplicity, assume
a market structure (perfect competition, or monopolistic competition with CES preferences)
such that consumers bear all trade costs. Then, the delivery price pick in country i of a good
k produced in country c will be pick = p0cktickτick where p0ck is the factory gate price of good
k. Similarly, its price in country j would be equal to pjck = p0cktjckτjck. Shipping that good
through j to i would lead to additional transportation costs. Transshipping the good from c




Now, let us assume that i and j have an FTA so that tijk = t∗ijk, but elsewhere MFN taris
apply, assuming for simplicity for now that country i and j do not have an FTA with country
8 RoOs may also aect variable costs by incentivizing rms to switch to more costly suppliers.
9 See Krishna and Krueger (1995) for a more detailed analysis of the hidden protectionism in RoOs.
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Clearly, a necessary condition is that t̃jk < t̃ik, i.e., country j must apply a lower MFN tari
to the good than country i, otherwise trade deection through j to i will never be protable.







i.e., the tari savings must be larger than the additional transportation costs (both in %) . If
both countries i and j had the same MFN taris, t̃ik = t̃jk, there are no tari savings, and the
above inequality would be immediately violated.10
So far, we have restricted our analysis to a world where the third country c does not have
an FTA with either of the two countries i and j. However, reality is more complicated. For
example while the United States and Mexico may have the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA, formerly NAFTA) in place, both Mexico and Canada have FTAs with the European
Union, too. When we also allow for FTAs with third countries c it is not enough to focus only
on MFN taris. Even though countries i and j might have the same MFN tari (t̃ik = t̃jk) it
could still be possible that country c and j have an FTA, leading to t̃ik > t∗jck. If this were the
case and proof of origin were not required, trade deection would be protable even though
the MFN taris are the same. Thus, ignoring the preferential taris will understate the real
potential for trade deection. Furthermore, because of phasing-in the taris between FTA
members might not always be zero, i.e. t∗ijk > 1. Therefore, the inequality that determines







where tick equals to the eectively applied tari that country i imposes against country c
for good k. This tari equals the MFN tari, unless an FTA is in eect, and then tijk is the
preferential tari that country i imposes against country j.
10 We do not allow for pricing to market. In this case, factory gate prices may be specic to the destination
market and poick 6= pojck. Writing poick = µickkck , where µick is a variable markup, equation (1) would
be µickkcktickτick > µjckkcktijkτijktjckτjck. A necessary condition for the inequalities discussed above is
µick ≥ µjck, i.e., the markup in the high-tari country i should not be smaller than the markup in the low-
tari country j. Empirically, at the country level, there is a negative correlation between average taris and
the price level (compare Table B1 in the Appendix), so that our assumption seems largely innocuous.
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Proof of origin is not only required in reciprocal FTAs but also in non-reciprocal preferential
trade arrangements such as GSPs, which is the most prominent example for these types of
arrangements.11 The missing reciprocity in GSPs is the main dierence between the two
types of trade agreements: instead of bilateral tari concessions, only one country, typically
a developed country, oers preferential access, while the other country keeps imposing MFN
taris. To determine the protability of trade deection and thus the economic justication of
RoOs the same reasoning as above applies, i.e. trade deection is only protable if Equation
2.2 is fullled. In our empirical analysis we will focus on both types of trade agreements, FTAs
and GSPs.
2.2.2 Measuring the Scope for Trade Deection
For our empirical analysis, we need a measure of the scope for trade deection in the absence
of RoOs. For this purpose, based on inequality (2.2), for every country pair ij relative to a third




0, Tick − T jick
}
, with Tick ≡ tickτick and T jick ≡ tijktjckτijkτjck (2.3)
where Tick and T jick measure transport-cost augmented taris on the direct route from country
c to i and on the indirect one, where the good is transshipped through country j (denoted
by the superscript). In expression (2.3), we allow taris between i and j and with the third
country c to be MFN or preferential.12 If ∆Tijk,c = 0, no protable arbitrage possibilities exist.
In absence of transportation costs, (2.3) simplies to
∆tijk,c = max{0, tick − tjick)}, with t
j
ick ≡ tijktjck, (2.4)
where the costs of servicing market i with a product from c through j, tjick, is the product of
country j′s tari on good k from c, tjck, and the tari that country i applies on good k from
country j, tijk. Note that tijk does not have to be necessarily equal to 1 as taris in FTAs
and GSPs are often being phased-in or remain larger than zero on certain products. In some
parts of our analysis, we work with this “simple” measure, because it characterizes a useful
necessary condition for the protability of trade deection.13
11 Our analysis is not restricted to the General System of Preferences (GSPs) but includes all sorts of non-
reciprocal preferential trade arrangements like GSP+, Everything but Arms or the African Growth and Op-
portunity Act. Whenever we write “GSPs” we mean the broader denition.
12 Note the slight abuse of notation as ∆Tijk,c is not a dierence in the conventional sense since we replace it
with zero whenever the dierence is negative and trade deection is not protable.
13 Moreover, the simple measure can be directly measured in the data, while the more general measure requires
the estimation of transportation costs.
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The goal of this paper is to measure the potential for trade deection in FTAs and GSPs.
Therefore, we are only interested in those cases where the preferential tari that country i
imposes against country j is less than i′s MFN tari since otherwise arbitrage is not possible.
We exclude all the cases where this is violated.
Although the measures of the scope for trade deection are very intuitive, calculation is sub-
ject to a major practical challenge. In our data, for the year 2014 we have 5, 729 country pairs
ij, on average 2, 640 products k, and 170 third countries c so that the number of observations
is equal to more than 2 billion per year. A meaningful analysis of data of that size runs into
severe computational issues.
We deal with this problem by focusing only on the 20 most important third countries c
that export product k to i.14 Although this baseline measure covers 98% of the trade for the
countries in the sample i.e. for which we have information on taris and transportation costs
and 86% of world trade, it might suer from selection bias. A third country’s exports to i
might be too low to qualify as one of the 20 most important exporters because of high import
taris tick. However, it is exactly in those cases that arbitrage is most likely to be protable
(see equation 2.2).
To eliminate this type of bias we dene the maximum potential for trade deection. Assume
that there are no transportation costs and that tijk = tjik = 1. Further, let tick > tjck. Then
it would pay to ship from c to j and from there to i. Next, let there be another third country
c′ for which tic′k = tjc′k so that there is no scope for trade deection with respect to that
country. However, one can imagine that rms from c′ ship their product to c rst, and from
there through j onwards to i. More generally, if the tari dierence between i and j were
maximum with respect to third country c, in the case of no taris (and other transportation
costs) between any c′ and c, all shipments from c′ would be protably directed through c. We
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}]
, (2.5)
and analogously ∆tmaxijk for ∆tijk,c.
This procedure selects the third party relation with the largest scope for trade deection,
independently of actual trade ows. This leads to overestimation because routing shipments
from any fourth country c′ to c and from there through i to j involves transportation costs
and possibly also taris, and this remains unaccounted for in ∆Tmaxijk . However, ∆Tmaxijk serves
as a conservative upper bound to our estimates of the scope for trade deection.
14 We consider the top 20 exporters mostly for computational reasons. Moreover, the median number of ex-
porters of a specic good to a certain destination is exactly equal to 20.
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As another alternative to deal with the dimensionality problem, we randomly draw 20 coun-
tries out of all third countries c. Finally, we also average over the third country dimension
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}
and analogously for the simple measure
(with transportation costs set to zero).15
2.3 Data
For our empirical analysis, we require data on (applied) product-level taris, MFN and prefer-
ential, for all country pairs. We also need information on transportation costs by product for
each country pair, and on RTAs. Since we have tari data until 2014 we will do our analysis
for this year.
2.3.1 Taris
One could think that tari data were easily available for all country pairs and products, at
least for recent years. However, this is not the case. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) state
“the grossly incomplete and inaccurate information on policy barriers available to researchers is
a scandal and a puzzle” (p. 693); with some minor qualications, this statement still applies
today. There is a lot of missing information, in particular for developing countries. Moreover,
rich countries also do not report yearly to the WTO or the United Nations (who maintain
tari data bases). Besides, there are many mistakes in ocial data.
To the best of our knowledge no comprehensive and cleaned tari data set on the product
level is publicly available for recent years.16 Therefore, to carry out our analysis, a massive
investment into data cleaning and imputation is needed. More specically, we need to impute
missing data, in particular when taris are phased in over time, complement the ocial data
with country-level information and with data from RTAs, to deal with measurement error
(see Appendix B.1 for details).
15 In the working paper version of this article, we used the averaging method as our baseline measure. However,
this procedure does not put enough weight on trade links where a preferential tari is applicable. When
looking at all 170 third countries c in our sample most countries have preferential access to very few markets,
and for the vast majority the MFN tari is imposed. Therefore we believe that focusing the analysis on the 20
most important third countries c is a better way to deal with the dimensionality problem and to measure the
potential for trade deection. However, the main results are not very sensitive to this modication.
16 Caliendo et al. (2015) have constructed a similar database which is, however, not publicly available yet. The
imputation algorithm is very similar to ours with the drawback that they only have information on approxi-
mately 100 FTAs and their phasing-in regimes (we account for about 500 FTAs). CEPII’s MacMap (Guimbard
et al. 2012) is another comparable database. However, it does not deal with missing data at all and the most




The second key variable entering equation (2.3) is a measure of transportation costs. As sur-
veyed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), across a large number of countries and goods,
transportation costs make up a trade cost equivalent of 21%, about half of which is attributable
to the direct freight costs and the other half to the time value of goods in transit. However, the
same survey also makes very clear that other border-related trade barriers are at least twice
as important as transportation costs, not to mention retail and wholesale distribution costs.
Thus, focusing on transportation costs underestimates the additional non-tari trade costs
that arise when trans-shipping a good through some third country.
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) propose industry or shipping rm information to be the
rst best source of data for transportation costs. However, such data are scarce. Alternatively
one can infer the costs of international transportation from detailed data on imports by using
the ratio of transaction values denoted in cif (cost, insurance, freight) terms relative to the
transaction values in fob (free on board) terms. In theory, this ratio should be identical to τijk
and satisfy τijk ≥ 1. Unfortunately, only few countries report disaggregated transaction data
in both cif and fob terms.17 We proceed as follows: rst, using US data, originally provided by
the US Census and cleaned and regularly updated by Peter Schott (Schott 2008), we measure
bilateral ad-valorem transportation costs between the US and all its trade partners for every
product k. The data include information on the import value in fob and cif terms at the
ten-digit HS level by exporter country and entry-port for the years 1989 until 2016. This
allows constructing a US specic measure of transportation costs at the 6-digit level for every
product-exporter combination. We want to minimize measurement error induced by outliers.
To do so, we add four years (two years before 2014 and two years after) and then calculate the
median for every exporter×product (6-digits) combination.
In a second step, we use the cif/fob ratios of the US to predict transportation costs for all
other product-pair combinations. We assume transportation costs to be a function of distance
Dij such that τ kij = αk (Dij)
δk with δk ∈ (0, 1) so that non-tari trade costs are an increasing,
strictly concave function of geographical distance.18
Thus, it is possible to estimate the parameters αk and δk for every product k for the US
using τ kUS,i and the bilateral distances between the US and its trading partners i, DUS,i ≥
1.19 Taking logs makes OLS a feasible estimator. The regression equation equals ln(τ kUS,i) =
17 Records of global trade data do not report cif and fob transactions at the sector-level; the Direction of Trade
Statistics of the IMF do so for aggregate trade, but the resulting cif/fob ratios take on very implausible values.
18 Assuming strictly concave transportation costs implies that stopping over in country j for customs reasons is
always more costly than shipping a good straight from c to i even if Dic = Dij +Djc.
19 Information on bilateral distances comes from CEPII.
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lnαk + δk ln(DUS,i) + uk. We regress the cif/fob ratios on the bilateral distance for every
product separately to allow for product-specic constants.20
Next, for every country-pair and for every product k we predict a measure of transportation
cost τ̂ kij = exp(α̂k + δ̂kln(Dij)). For 2014, this procedure provides us with transportation
costs for 3,853 products (out of the available 4,455 tari lines). Figure 2.1(a) shows the observed
values of the transportation costs for the US and the predicted values for every 2-digit product.
There is virtually no dierence between the two lines indicating a good in-sample prediction.21
The estimated transportation costs equal on average 6%, which squares very well the evidence
cited in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004).22
Figure 2.1: Predicting Transportation Costs
(a) In-Sample Prediction: USA (b) Out-of-Sample Prediction: New Zealand
Note: The graphs show the observed cif/fob ratios and the predicted values for the United States (a)
τ̂US,j = exp(ln(α̂) + δ̂ln(DUS,j)) and New Zealand (b) τ̂NZ,j = exp(ln(α̂) + δ̂ln(DNZ,j)). We
aggregate by taking the average over the two-digit products (listed on the x-axis of the graphs). The
data stem from the US Census, Statistics New Zealand and CEPII.
Besides for the US, cif/fob data are also available for New Zealand.23 We use these data to
check how well the prediction based on US data performs. Figure 2.1(b) shows the observed
and the predicted values for New Zealand. Overall, the t is reasonably good although the pre-
20 Following Hummels (2007), we have added the weight/value-ratios as an additional explanatory factor in the
transportation cost function ( τkij = αk (Dij)
δk (
w/vkij
)γk ). This approach increases the explanatory power of
the regressions slightly, but it lowers the number of estimated pair-product transportation costs signicantly
as weight/value-ratios are available only when countries actually trade.
21 Alternatively, we could estimate bilateral, product specic trade costs exploiting a structural gravity model of
bilateral trade using the methodology proposed by Jacks et al. (2008). We do not use this method because it
may very well overestimate trade costs by attributing any deviation from the gravity norm to frictions instead
of dierences in tastes. Thus, our focus on transportation costs represents a very conservative approach,
which generally stacks the cards in favor of trade deection and against our argument.
22 In Appendix B.2, we provide information on the distribution of estimated parameters α̂, δ̂ and their relation
as well as a histogram of estimated τ̂kij .




dicted values tend to be somewhat lower than the observed ones.24 Figure B3 in the Appendix
conrms this pattern when we plot the dierences between the predicted and the observed
transportation costs without aggregating up to 2-digit products.
2.3.3 Data on Trade Agreements
Trade deection is an issue only in FTAs and in the non-reciprocal trade arrangements (GSP),
but not in customs unions where all members have identical external taris by denition.
Therefore, we are only interested in country pairs that are in an FTA or a GSP. Although our
tari data can tell us about the existence of a preferential tari it remains unclear whether the
respective agreement is actually of interest. Therefore, we need detailed information about
the type of the agreement. Further we want to be able to dierentiate between unilateral trade
arrangements like the GSP—where RoOs are also relevant but that are of a very dierent type
than the bilateral FTAs.
In addition, all third-countries that belong to the same FTA as the pair ij should also be
excluded, since here no potential for trade deection exists. For example, in the case of Canada
and the United States we exclude Mexico from the set of third countries c.25 To do so, we need
information about the members of all FTAs.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Median FTA GSP ∆
∆tij (in %) 1.07 11.12 0.00 2.05 0.30 1.76***
∆Tij (in %) 0.51 11.34 0.00 1.05 0.09 0.96***
tij (in %) 0.85 4.41 0.00 1.12 0.63 0.49***
tic (in %) 3.30 12.94 0.00 5.15 1.85 3.30***
tjc (in %) 10.11 14.88 7.50 6.44 13.00 -6.56***
τij (in %) 6.25 3.62 5.69 6.07 6.38 -0.31***
τic (in %) 5.52 5.11 5.29 5.86 5.25 0.61***
τjc (in %) 6.34 3.50 5.77 6.30 6.37 -0.07***
Year of Entry into Force 1,994.10 15.40 2,001.00
GSP [0,1] 0.56 0.50 1.00
New Agreement [0,1] 0.16 0.37 0.00
Note: The number of observations equals 117,509,125. The tari data stem from WITS, the
trade costs are based on own calculations using data from Schott (2008) and CEPII, the year
of entry into force of the trade agreements is based on own research, while the information
on the presence of PTAs is from Dür et al. (2014) and Baier et al. (2014).
24 One potential explanation for this pattern is that the US is actually an outlier in that it pays much less for
transportation than other countries (Hummels 2007). Therefore, we expect the estimated transportation costs
to understate the observed ones, which—as explained above—will work against us.
25 We do so after determining the 20 most important third country exporters.
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Our analysis builds on the DESTA database provided by Dür et al. (2014).26 It comprises
over 600 regional trade agreements (FTAs and CUs) and the corresponding accessions and
withdrawals.27 In 2014, the probability of a country-pair having an FTA equals 40%, while it
equals 6% for having a CU.28 For the unilateral arrangements (GSP), we use Baier et al. (2014)
and update the data to 2014 ourselves. In our analysis we distinguish FTAs by their vintage.
All FTAs that entered into force after 2008 are considered to be new FTAs, all others belong
to the group of old ones. 16% of FTAs in the sample are thus classied as ‘new’ ones.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics. It shows that, for 2014 the average simple mea-
sure for the scope for trade deection between country pairs is 1.07%, the average of the
transportation-cost augmented measure is 0.51%. Comparing FTAs and GSPs we can see that
in GSPs the scope for trade deection is much lower than in FTAs. We will analyze this nding
in more detail below.
2.4 The Scope for Trade Deection
This section presents new evidence on the scope for trade deection across dierent country
pairs and heterogeneity across types of FTAs, regions, and industry sectors. We show cross-
sectional data at the 6 digit product-level for 2014.
2.4.1 Limited Potential for Trade Deection
To draw cumulative distribution functions (C.D.F.s), we refer to our measures (2.3) and (2.5).
We start by ignoring transportation costs; see Panel (a) of Figure 2.2 (solid line). In 2014, with-
out accounting for transportation costs, for 83% of all country-pair×product×third-country
combinations, trade deection cannot be protable. This number refers to the 20 most im-
portant exporting countries c, which cover almost all trade. Panel (b) allows for transporta-
tion costs and nds that for 93% of all cases trade deection cannot be protable. In 10%
(93%− 83% = 10%) of all cases, there is tari savings but it does not exceed the additionally
arising transportation costs.
Out of these 83%, in 18% trade deection is unprotable because country i and j impose
the same tari against the third-country c. In 63% of all cases trade deection is unprotable
26 We use the version of 27th of June 2016. https://www.designoftradeagreements.org/
27 The database keeps track of regional trade agreements that are superseded by more recent – and typically
more ambitious – versions, such as the Canada-US FTA (signed in 1998) by NAFTA (in 1994), or the Europe
Agreements of Middle and Eastern European countries by full EU membership.
28 One shortcoming of the DESTA data is that they do not include information on whether the agreement is still
in place. This problem is especially pronounced for CUs. Therefore, we cross-check the DESTA data with the
regional trade agreement dataset provided by Baier et al. (2014) and use their data to determine whether a CU
is in place.
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Figure 2.2: C.D.F.s of the Potentials for Trade Deection, 2014
(a) Simple Measures ∆tijk,c and ∆tmaxijk (b) τ -augmented Measures ∆Tijk,c and ∆Tmaxijk
(c) Import Weighted ∆tijk,c (d) Import Weighted ∆Tijk,c
(e) ∆tijk,c by Type of Trade Agreement (f) ∆Tijk,c by Type of Trade Agreement
Note: ∆tijk,c, ∆tmaxijk , ∆Tijk,c and ∆Tmaxijk are dened in Section 2.2.2. All graphs are truncated to
values ≤ 16. All results are based on our baseline sample with the 20 most important third countries
c that export product k to i. In Panel (c) and (d) we add the results for the full sample. In Panel (e)
and (f) we dierentiate between bilateral FTAs and GSPs.
because country j’s tari tjck is higher than country i’s tick. In the remaining 2% the pref-
erential tari that i grants j is not low enough to make trade deection protable, although
tick > tjck. This decomposition is summarized in Table 2.2, column (1).
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Table 2.2: Decomposing the Potential for Trade
Deection
all GSP FTA old new
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆T = 0 93 98 86 94 88
∆T > ∆t 10 6 16 9 17
∆t = 0 83 93 70 85 71
tic < tjc 63 82 38 66 44
tic = tjc 18 10 29 17 22
tic > tjc|tij >> 1 2 1 4 2 4
Note: The table decomposes the scope for trade deection into
the following cases: (i) the tari savings do not exceed the ad-
ditionally arising transportation costs (∆T > ∆t), (ii) the tar-
i that country i imposes is lower than the one of country j
(tic < tjc), (iii) the taris of i and j are equal (tic = tjc), and
(iv) the preferential tari that i grants j is not low enough to
make trade deection protable, although tic > tjc. The results
are based on our baseline sample with the 20 most important
third countries c that export product k to i. All numbers are in
% of country-pair×product×third-country combinations.
Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 2.2 show the cumulative share of imports as a function of the
two measures for the potential of trade deection. Besides the results for the baseline sample
i.e. restricting the number of third countries to the 20 most important exporting countries
c, we also show the import shares when including all exporting countries (dotted line). The
two lines are very close to each other indicating that results are unbiased when focusing
on the top 20 exporters instead of all exporting third countries c. In 2014, for 84% of global
imports no scope for trade deection between the trade partners exists; for 94% ∆tijk,c is
no more than 3%-points, and for 97% it amounts to at most 5%-points. When we account
for transportation costs, the pattern is even more pronounced: for 94% of world trade trade
deection is unprotable. So, the largest share of trade takes indeed place within country
pairs and products with very little scope for trade deection.
One drawback of our baseline measure is that we induce some selection bias by focusing
only on the potential for trade deection for only the 20 most important origin countries of
imports to country i and disregarding those ic relationships where taris are prohibitively
high which, in principle, increases incentives for arbitrage. We use ∆tmaxijk and ∆Tmaxijk dened
in Section 2.2.2 to address this issue. Over all third countries, the measure selects the one with
the largest scope for trade deection regardless of whether a third country c exports to i. We
calculate two versions of the measure: one that, over all third countries, picks the one with
the largest scope for trade deection independent of whether a third country c exports to i or
not; and another which disregards all third countries c that do not export to i.
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In the graph the curve in the middle corresponds to the trade-weighted measure, the lower
dashed line picks over all third countries the one with the largest scope for trade deection.
Necessarily, both lie below the 83% reported above. Very often, tari dierences are zero with
most third countries and non-zero for very few; the ∆tmaxijk picks exactly those cases. In 33%
of all cases, maximum tari dierences between two countries relative to any third country
are zero. It abstracts from any additional transportation costs or taris that might have to
be paid when transshipping through this third country c. ∆tmaxijk , therefore, is an extremely
conservative measure.
Accounting for transportation costs aects the maximum measure of trade deection ∆tmaxijk
much more than the baseline measure. As Panel (b) shows, the tari savings do not exceed
the additionally arising transportation costs in 16% of all cases for the ∆tmaxijk measure that
includes all third countries. This nding shows that in many cases where tari savings are rel-
atively large the additionally arising transportation costs make trade deection unprotable:
countries with high dierences in external taris also tend to be far apart geographically.
Even when using the extremely conservative measure ∆Tmaxijk , we nd that trade deection
is unprotable in half of all candidate cases. Therefore, we are condent that our baseline
results are not simply due to selection bias. More importantly, for all those trade ows that
can actually be observed, trade deection is almost never protable.
2.4.2 Heterogeneity in the Scope for Trade Deection
The evidence presented so far documents surprisingly little scope for trade deection. Now,
we want to explore heterogeneity across dierent dimensions. First, we categorize the types
of FTAs into dierent groups; second, we check for dierences across dierent regions; and
third, we show dierences across sectors.
Making use of the enabling clause of GATT (Article XVIII) members of the WTO can oer
non-reciprocal preferential access to developing countries. Typically the latter keep their MFN
taris against the developed countries in place to protect their domestic industries against for-
eign import competition. The main goal of these programs is to foster export-led growth. In
1971 the rst program - the General System of Preferences (GSP) - was established. Since
then many variants of the program have entered into force. Prominent examples are the “Ev-
erything but Arms (EBA)” through which the European Union grants least developed coun-
tries tari-free access for almost all products, and the “African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA)”, which is the United States’ counterpart.
Many critics of the unilateral trade arrangements agree that strict RoOs hinder developing
countries from using the preferences and thus decrease the gains from the unilateral trade
arrangements (Ornelas 2016). Indeed, in 2014 the preference utilization rates for using the
EU’s GSP arrangements were extremely low for Iraq (3%), Somalia (5%), Liberia (12%) and
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Sierra Leone (16%).29 For 88% of all Liberian exports the exporting rms decided against ling
the necessary paperwork to be granted the preferential tari and instead were willing to pay
the higher MFN tari. But is there actually any substantial danger of trade deection in those
unilateral preferential trade agreements?
We calculate the cumulative distribution functions (C.D.F.s) of measures of the potential for
trade deection for dierent trade policy environments such that P (∆tijk,c ≤ c|typeij = 1)
and P (∆Tijk,c ≤ c|typeij = 1), with typeij indicating a bilateral FTA or a GSP arrangement.
Figures 2.2 (e) and (f) present the ndings for ∆tijk,c and the transport cost augmented ∆Tijk,c
for 2014. The scope for trade deection is very low for pairs with a unilateral trade agreement:
in 93% of all cases trade deection is not protable; when accounting for transportation costs
this number increases to 98%.
The reason for this result is straightforward: Typically, country i is a developed country
with lower overall levels of taris, while country j is a developing country with high taris.
Therefore, the necessary condition for protable trade deection tjck ≤ tick is violated in most
cases, making arbitrage unprotable. Table 2.1 reports the average tari levels conditional on
the type of trade agreement and makes this point explicit. In FTAs, external taris are on
average relatively similar (5% and 6%); this is dierent in non-reciprocal preferential trade
arrangements (GSPs) (2% and 13%). In fact, the developed countries have much lower taris
towards third countries than the preference-receiving developing countries. As columns (2)
and (3) in Table 2.2 show, the share of identical taris for pairs in a bilateral agreement equals
29% and is much higher than for pairs with a unilateral agreement (10%). Also, only in 1%
of all cases, the preferential taris tij are not low enough to make trade deection protable.
So, the main reason for unprotable arbitrage in unilateral trade agreements is simply the
violation of the necessary condition tjck < tick.
Furthermore, we can dierentiate FTAs and GSPs with respect to their vintage. Whenever
an agreement entered into force from 2009 onwards it is considered to be ‘new’. For the simple
measure of the scope for trade deection we nd that for country pairs with an old agreement
the protability of trade deection is less than for those with a new agreement. The same is
true when we account for transportation costs. Now, for pairs with an old agreement, trade
deection is not protable in 94% of all cases and for pairs with a new one it is unprotable
in 88% of all cases. There are at least two explanations for this pattern. First, many of the
GSPs have entered into force before 2009. As explained above those type of agreements tend
to have a lower scope for trade deection and therefore drive down the overall scope for trade
deection for older agreements. Second, more recent deals seem to have more ambitious tari
cuts, making trade deection more protable.
29 We calculate these numbers based on data provided by Eurostat through ComExt. The data can be accessed
using the following link: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/.
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Figure 2.3: Heterogeneity in the Potentials for Trade Deection across dierent Trade
Agreements, 2014
(a) ∆tijk,c by Vintage of Trade Agreement (b) ∆Tijk,c by Vintage of Trade Agreement
Note: ∆tijk,c and ∆Tijk,c are dened in Section 2.2.2. All graphs are truncated to values ≤ 16. The
results are based on our baseline sample with the 20 most important third countries c that export
product k to i. All trade agreements that entered into force after 2008 are considered to be “new”
agreements.
Next, we check for heterogeneity across regions and across products. Table 2.3 shows con-
ditional cumulative probabilities for the simple measure ∆tijk,c and the transportation cost
augmented measure ∆Tijk,c. A number of interesting facts stand out. First, North-South coun-
try pairs have signicantly less scope for trade deection than other pairs, with North-North
pairs having somewhat lower scope for trade deection than South-South pairs; see Panel (a)
of Table 2.3. In North-South pairs, ∆tijk,c is in 87% zero; accounting for transportation costs,
in 96% of all cases there is no scope for trade deection. That number falls to 83%-85% of
cases in pairs containing only Northern or only Southern countries. These facts are mostly a
reection of unilateral trade agreements.
Second, transportation costs reduce the protability of trade deection for North-North
pairs much more than in pairs involving the South. While for the north pairs addition-
ally arising transportation costs exceed the tari savings in 23% of the cases, for the other
pairs this number ranges only between 9%− 15%. The Australia-Canada FTA, the Australia-
New Zealand FTA, the Australia-US FTA, USCMA, Canada-EFTA are a few examples of FTAs
between north pairs. Third, the dierence in the scope for trade deection between old
and new FTAs is largest for South-South countries and it is also prevalent when using the
transportation-cost augmented measure.
Figure 2.4 explores heterogeneity across 21 product sectors for the year of 2014. It shows the
bottom and top 5% percentiles of our deection measures and the means by sector. Then we
plot the means within each section. Both, for the simple measure ∆tijk,c and for the transport
cost augmented measure ∆Tijk,c, we observe that the potential for trade deection varies
quite substantially across sectors. The products with the largest scope for trade deection
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Table 2.3: Heterogeneity across Regions and Types of RTAs (2014)
Simple Measure ∆tijk,c τ -Weighted Measure ∆Tijk,c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
c̄ : 0 3 6 9 12 max 0 3 6 9 12 max
(a)Regions
North-North 62 76 91 95 97 100 85 93 96 98 99 100
North-South 87 93 97 98 99 100 96 98 99 99 99 100
South-South 68 76 87 91 94 100 83 89 93 95 97 100
(b)North-North
Unilateral . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bilateral 62 76 91 95 97 100 85 93 96 98 99 100
Old-FTA 60 76 93 97 99 100 86 94 97 99 99 100
New-FTA 67 77 86 92 94 100 83 89 93 95 97 100
(c)North-South
Unilateral 93 97 99 100 100 100 99 99 100 100 100 100
Bilateral 75 85 93 96 97 100 90 95 97 98 99 100
Old-FTA 89 94 97 98 99 100 96 98 99 99 99 100
New-FTA 77 87 95 98 99 100 92 96 98 99 99 100
(d)South-South
Unilateral 84 91 96 98 99 100 95 98 99 99 100 100
Bilateral 63 72 85 89 93 100 80 86 91 94 96 100
Old-FTA 71 78 88 92 95 100 85 90 93 95 97 100
New-FTA 57 68 84 89 94 100 78 86 91 94 96 100
Note: The table shows the shares of tari lines (in %-points) whose measures for trade deection lie
below a certain threshold c. In the dierent panels, we focus on heterogeneity across regions and types
of RTAs and show data on the simple measure ∆tijk,c in column (1)-(6), and when accounting for trans-
portation costs ∆Tijk,c in column (7)-(12). Panel (a) shows the distribution of the measures for potential
trade deection for North-North, North-South, and South-South country pairs. We use the UN denition
to determine the development status of a country. Developed countries (North) are Australia, Canada,
the member countries of EFTA and the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, and the US. All others
belong to the group of developing countries (South). In Panels (b)-(d) we look at the dierent regional
and RTA types simultaneously. We use data for 2014. The results are based on our baseline sample with
the 20 most important third countries c that export product k to i.
belong to the agricultural sector, pulp and paper, and the sector of works of art. In contrast,
for mineral products, wood products, machinery and electrical equipment, and optics ∆tijk,c
never exceeds 5%-points. Accounting for transportation-costs does not change the general
picture.
2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Bound taris. To exclude the possibility that countries with “water in the tari”, i.e. higher
bound MFN taris than applied MFN taris, might later change the applied taris and make
trade deection protable, when it was not under the taris in our data, we have conducted the
analysis described above using bound MFN rates. The picture remains broadly the same. In
79% of all cases, there is no scope for trade deection even if transportation costs are ignored;
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Figure 2.4: Heterogeneity across Sectors, 2014
(a) Simple Measure for Trade Deection ∆tijk,c (b) τ -Weighted Measure for Trade Deection ∆Tijk,c
Note: Sectors: 1 Live Animals (01-05); 2 Vegetable Products (06-14); 3 Fats and Oils (15); 4 Food, Bev.
& Tobacco (16-27); 5 Mineral Products (25-27); 6 Chemicals (28-38); 7 Plastics (39-40); 8 Leather Goods
(41-43); 9 Wood Products (44-46); 10 Pulp and Paper (47-49); 11 Textile and App. (50-63); 12 Footwear
(64-67); 13 Stone and Glass (68-70); 14 Jewelery (71); 15 Base Metals (72-83); 16 Mach. & Elec. Eq. (84-
85); 17 Transportation Eq. (87-89); 18 Optics (90-92); 19 Arms & Ammun. (93); 20 Misc. Manufactured
Articles (94-96); 21 Works of Art. (97-98). ∆tijk and ∆Tijk are dened in Section 2.2.2. We show data
for 2014. The results are based on our baseline sample with the 20 most important third countries c
that export product k to i.
when the latter are accounted for, the share of product×country pairs where trade deection
is conceivable, shrinks even further; see Figure 2.5. Hence, our analysis and conclusions do
not depend on the use of applied taris.
Figure 2.5: C.D.F.s of Measures of Scope for Trade Deection: Bound MFN Taris
(a) Simple Measure for Trade Deection ∆tBijk (b) τ−Weighted Measure for Trade Deection ∆TBijk
Note: ∆tBijk and ∆TBijk are dened as the baseline measures (see Section 2.2.2) but instead of the
applied tari we use the bound MFN tari that country i imposes for product k. The results are based
on our baseline sample with the 20 most important third countries c that export product k to i and
the data are for 2014.
60
2.4. THE SCOPE FOR TRADE DEFLECTION
Alternativemeasures for transportation costs. We have based our estimation of product-
level transportation costs on US data and on a very simple econometric model to predict values
for other country pairs. Instead of using predicted values, one could simply use the observed
US cif/fob ratios, or use data from another country (New Zealand) to proxy transportation cost
for our sample. One could also assume that transportation costs are additive rather than mul-
tiplicative. Further, instead of using OLS we estimate coecients using the Poisson-Pseudo-
Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) estimator. Finally, we assume symmetric transportation costs,
τick = τjck.
Figure 2.6 shows that our main results are not sensitive to the construction of transporta-
tion costs. Proxying transportation costs around the world using observed US values slightly
increases the scope for trade deection, because the US exhibits relatively low transporta-
tion costs compared to the rest of the world leading to lower transportation costs than in our
baseline.
Due to New Zealand’s peculiarities - especially in terms of its size and remoteness - export-
ing might be systematically more expensive than to other countries, leading to upwards biased
transportation costs. Figure B2 in the Appendix shows the in-sample and out-of-sample t
when using imports for New Zealand. If an upwards bias were present, we would expect the
predicted values to be higher than the observed ones. Indeed, for the US τ̂ijk are always higher
than the actual ones. Assuming concave transportation costs, i. e. the direct transportation
costs are always less than when cross-hauling, overstated transportation costs would lead
us to underestimate the potential for trade deection which, in our context, could lead to
wrong conclusions. However, as Panel(c) shows, results do not change much, when using
New Zealand data. We prefer using the US data for another practical reason: The US is a
much larger importer than New Zealand and imports many more products. Therefore, we
can extract many more product-specic transportation costs from these data than from the
New Zealand’s. Moving to additive transportation costs, symmetric transportation costs as
well as using PPML leaves the scope for trade deection roughly the same as when we use
our preferred measure.
Selection Bias. As discussed in Section 2.4.1 the baseline measure for the scope for trade
deection might suer from selection bias. Focusing on those third countries c that are the
most important exporters to country imight focus on those links that have low levels of taris
and therefore by construction less scope for trade deection. Using the most conservative
measures for the protability of trade deection ∆tmaxijk,c and ∆Tmaxijk,c we can show that trade
deection is not even protable in these extreme cases. Another way of checking whether
selection biases our results is to draw third countries randomly rather than choosing them
conditional on their exports to i. Figure 2.7 shows that the baseline results do not change
drastically when 20 random third countries are drawn. The scope for trade deection increases
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Figure 2.6: C.D.F.s of Measures of Scope for Trade Deection: Alternative Proxies for
Transportation Costs, 2014
(a) Baseline (b) US-cif/fob Ratios
(c) New Zealand Import Data (d) additive TCs
(e) PPML-Estimator (f) Symmetric TCs
Note: ∆Tijk,c is dened in Section 2.2.2. Panel (a) shows the baseline way of constructing the trans-
portation costs, in Panel (b) we use the import data of New Zealand in order to predict the transporta-
tion costs. Panel (c) uses the observed US cif/fob-ratios as a proxy for all other product-pair combina-
tions and in Panel (d) we assume additive instead of iceberg transportation costs. Panel (e) uses the
Poisson-pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator instead of OLS and in Panel (f) we assume
that the transportation costs between i and c and j and c respectively are the same (τick = τick).
The data are for 2014. The results are based on our baseline sample with the 20 most important third
countries c that export product k to i.
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a bit (from 17%(= 100− 83) in the baseline to 28%) but the general picture remains the same.
Taking these pieces of evidence together we are quite condent that our results are not biased
due to selection.
Figure 2.7: C.D.F.s of Measures of Scope for Trade Deection: Alternatives of Dealing with
the Third-Country Dimension
(a) 20 Randomly drawn Third Countries c ∆tRandijk,c (b) 20 Randomly drawn Third Countries c ∆TRandijk,c
(c) Averaging over the Third Countries ∆tavrijk (d) Averaging over the Third Countries ∆T avrijk
Note: ∆tRandijk,c and ∆TRandijk,c are dened as the baseline measures (see Section 2.2.2) but instead of
restricting the number of third countries c by only keeping the 20 most-important exporters we now
draw 20 third countries randomly. In Panel (c) and (d) we show ∆tavrijk and ∆T avrijk , which are dened
in Section 2.2.2. Additionally, we show in ∆tMFNijk and ∆TMFNijk , which are dened exactly as the
baseline measures (see Section 2.2.2) but instead of the applied tari we use the applied MFN tari
that country i imposes for product k.
Averaging overThirdCountryDimension. Finally, to deal with the dimensionality prob-
lem we can also average over the third country dimension, i.e. ∆T avrijk = 1N−2
∑
c 6=i,j ∆tijk,c,
and for ∆tavrijk analogously. Figure 2.7 Panels (c) and (d) show the C.D.F.s of this measure of the
scope for trade deection. A couple of interesting facts stand out: First, the overall picture re-
mains the same. Also when using this variant of the measure for trade deection, it is in most
of the cases unprotable. Second, the share of product-pair combinations for which ∆tavgijk
and ∆T avgijk are equal to zero corresponds to the one of ∆tmaxijk and ∆Tmaxijk that we introduced
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in section 2.2.2, 33% for the simple measure and 49% for the transportation cost augmented
measure, respectively. However, with increasing scope for trade deection the average scope
for trade deection converges to the measure of trade deection when using MFN taris, the
dashed line in the graph. The explanation for this pattern is straightforward: The number
of RTAs is relatively low compared to the number of pairs where the MFN tari is still ap-
plicable. Therefore, when averaging over all third countries c, those few preferential taris
have very little weight, resulting in a measure that is similar to the one when only using MFN
taris. The disadvantage is that one could understate the real potential for trade deection
as preferential taris might make trade deection protable. Our baseline measure does not
have this bias and is therefore superior.
Aggregation Bias. We conduct our analysis on the 6-digit level. However, taris are often
dened at a much ner level, i.e. the 8-, 10- or even 12-digit level. At such a disaggregated
level, data coverage is very low, and nomenclature is not harmonized so that we cannot com-
pare across countries. Nevertheless, it could be possible that, although on the 6-digit level
countries’ potential for trade deection is very limited, this is not true for the more disaggre-
gated products within 6-digit categories. The original tari data provided by the IDB report
the standard deviation of taris within 6-digit product categories. Scope for greater trade
deection than we estimate only exists when the standard deviation of taris within 6-digit
product categories is larger than zero in a country-pair ij. In 2014 this is only the case in
1.36% of the product-pair combinations, indicating that aggregation bias most likely does not
bias our results.
2.5 Policy Conclusion
Economists have long been skeptical of free trade agreements (FTAs) and have preferred cus-
toms unions (CUs). Rules of origin (RoOs) make sure that members of FTAs can in eect set
independent trade policies with respect to third parties. Otherwise, in the absence of trans-
portation costs, due to trade deection, the member with the lowest external tari would
de-facto determine the common one. The problem is that RoOs involve burdensome red tape
and that they distort supply chains.
Our empirical exercise shows that, in practice, the scope for trade deection is generally low
in FTAs. The reason is that countries set relatively similar external taris, and taris are low
on average. Where taris against third parties dier, transportation costs further reduce the
protability of trade deection. Trade deection is almost never protable in non-reciprocal
preferential trade arrangements (GSPs) where high MFN taris and a lack of ambitious FTAs
of beneciary countries mute arbitrage possibilities.
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Across all country pairs in regional trade agreements (FTAs or GSPs), according to our esti-
mates, trade deection is protable only in 7% of country-pair×product×third-country com-
binations considered. That share is 2% in GSPs and 14% in FTAs. Within FTAs, dierences in
external taris allow for protable trade deection in 30% of all cases, but in more than half of
these candidate congurations trade costs are too high to make arbitrage deals worthwhile.
In ‘new’ trade agreements, the likelihood for protable trade deection is somewhat larger
than in ‘old’ ones, reecting more ambitious tari cuts in more recent deals. Interestingly,
North-South FTAs are less prone to trade deection than North-North ones as higher geo-
graphical distance drives up transportation costs in the former constellation. In North-South
non-reciprocal agreements, trade deection is worthwhile only in 1% of all cases considered,
while in South-South GSPs that share is ve times as high.
These ndings are robust to alternative ways of dealing with the third-country dimension
and to denitions of transportation costs. They are unlikely to be driven by aggregation bias,
and they are not driven by our specic sample. It follows that RoOs can rarely be justied by
the objective of avoiding trade deection.
Nonetheless, even in modern trade agreements such as the EU-Canada agreement (CETA)
hundreds of pages are devoted to dening complicated RoOs. Exporters regularly complain
about their complexity and the cost of compliance. They are cited as the most important rea-
son why preference utilization rates are often below 100% (Keck and Lendle 2012). Moreover,
RoOs distort input choices. Hence, to some extent, the fact that all FTAs unconditionally
require proof of origin to grant preferential access is a sign of a protectionist bias in FTAs.
Our analysis suggests a fundamental re-thinking of the use of RoOs in FTAs and GSPs, as
one could substantially relax the requirements to prove the origin of goods in many trade
agreements without risking any trade deection. More specically, we suggest that, in new
FTAs, negotiators should agree on a full set of simple RoOs for all products, but that the re-
quirement to prove origin should be activated only if external taris of FTA members dier by
some minimum amount. This threshold could be product-specic in order to reect dierent
transportation costs and actual taris should be periodically evaluated against it, since ap-
plied taris may change over time. In GSPs, RoOs should be activated only for those products
where the beneciary country undercuts the MFN taris of the preference granting country.
In this paper, we have focused on the role of RoOs in the context of preferential taris.
However, RoOs also matter in determining whether a product is subject to a bilateral mutual
recognition agreement. Complex rules could lead to rms not using such provisions, thus
wasting resources. In contrast to the case of taris, with product standards, whether RoOs
are in fact necessary is not easily checked.
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Clearly, besides the eciency gains stressed in this paper, relaxing the requirement to prove
origin would have distributional eects.30 First, RoOs make sure that goods shipped from a
third country through one FTA party to the other generate tari revenue in both FTA mem-
bers. Without RoOs, such transactions generate income only for the FTA member through
whom the product rst enters, the nal destination country loses out. To deal with such con-
gurations some tari sharing agreement would be needed. Second, when one FTA member
aligns a higher tari downwards to its partner’s level, so that RoOs are no longer applica-
ble according to our proposal, it deprives the partner of tari income. In our context, this is
welcome from a global eciency point of view, but such a move has obvious distributional
consequences. Finally, RoOs can eectively sustain market segmentation by increasing trans-
action costs. Thus, abolishing them typically lowers producer surplus while consumer surplus
can rise (but need not if the producer stops serving the market).
Also, it should be noted that, in complex bargaining situations, RoOs could actually be nec-
essary to facilitate tari concessions in the rst place, since they may help deal with conicts
of interest between nal and intermediate input producers within countries. We leave it to
future research to develop a better understanding of the political economy of RoOs.
While we do not want to appear naive as to the real-world chances of seeing our proposal
through, making the proof of origin conditional on actual tari dierences would go some
way toward disentangling Bhagwati’s spaghetti bowl. It could also help dealing with the exit
of countries from long established CUs, such as Britain’s from the EU.
30 We thank James Lake and Maurizio Zanardi for pointing this out to us.
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Chapter 3
On the Eects of Nonreciprocal Trade
Arrangements on Firms: Evidence from
Peru
3.1 Introduction
The GATT/WTO agreements contain special and dierential treatment for developing coun-
tries. It gives developing countries the right to deviate from the dening principle of the
GATT/WTO, i.e., no discrimination across trading partners—the so-called most-favored-nation
(MFN) principle. Nonreciprocal trade arrangements are one cornerstone of the special and dif-
ferential treatment of developing countries. Under these arrangements high income countries
grant developing countries preferential market access conditional on them implementing re-
forms like complying with international labor standards or enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights. The main idea of these trade arrangements is to use trade for aid: lower trade costs
increase trade, which helps to alleviate poverty in developing countries and creates jobs.
Nonreciprocal trade arrangements have had a longstanding tradition in the world’s trading
system with the General System of Preferences (GSPs) being implemented in 1971. Since then,
many other programs like Everything but Arms (EBA) or the African Growth and Opportu-
nity Act (AGOA) have become eective.1 Virtually all high income countries have at least
one nonreciprocal trade arrangement. Many dierentiate by income and oer least devel-
1 See Ornelas (2016) for an excellent overview of special and dierential treatment for developing countries in
general, and its history in particular.
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oped countries (LDCs) more generous preferences. Recently some developing countries (for
example China, India and Russia) also started to oer preferential market access to LDCs.2
So far, it is still unclear if the nonreciprocal trade preferences have in fact a trade promoting
eect and if so, along which margins they operate. The literature nds conicting evidence
depending on the specic trade arrangement, the level of aggregation, and the period of ob-
servation. Furthermore, it is dicult to nd causal eects because the products that become
eligible for preferences might be chosen endogenously. Donor countries can choose the set
of products, eligible for preferential treatment. Hence, the probability of a product becoming
eligible for nonreciprocal preferences might correlate with the comparative advantage of the
beneciary country for the respective good. Lastly, so far, no evidence exists on how receiving
nonreciprocal preferences aect rms’ export-performance.
This paper studies how the expansion of the Andean Trade Preference Act in 2002—a pro-
gram that improves access to the American market for rms from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador
and Peru— aected Peruvian rm-level exports to the United States. I use nonreciprocal pref-
erences granted by the United States to sub-Saharan countries under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA), as an instrument for the set of eligible products in the Peruvian
context to address endogeneity. Then, I make use of the disaggregated nature of the export
data to account for omitted variables by employing a triple dierence-in-dierences approach.
I compare the export growth of the same rm to the same destination across products. Hence
products eligible for preferences and those that are not. One objective of nonreciprocal ar-
rangements is to generate positive spillover eects: by facilitating trade to the donor country,
rms can learn important skills that they can then use to also serve other markets. I explicitly
account for third country eects to identify such a mechanism.
I nd that rms increase exports of eligible products to the United States relative to ineligible
products on average by 25%. However, this increase goes in line with a strong trade diversion
eect, i.e. a shift of exports away from third countries towards the United States resulting in a
net increase of 5%. Most interestingly the results on the intensive margin are almost entirely
driven by exporters that rearrange export destinations after facing ercer competition in the
European Union due to the eastern enlargement. The extensive margin is not driven by this
event. While an increase in the probability of exporting eligible products relative to ineligible
products can be observed for the United States, nonreciprocal preferences do not aect the
probability of exporting to third countries. The results hold when controlling for the phasing-
out of the Multiber Arrangement.
2 A complete list of all nonreciprocal trade arrangements currently in place can be retrieved through the WTO’s
Preferential Trade Arrangements database: http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaList.aspx.
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I also contribute to the literature on rules of origin (RoOs). Nonreciprocal arrangements
require RoOs that dene under which conditions a good is said to originate from the bene-
cary country so that it can benet from the preferential tari.3 Compliance with these rules
is costly. The costs of RoOs can be categorized into direct costs reducing exports from Peru
to the U.S. and indirect costs that aect trade ows of third countries to Peru. Direct costs
result from red tape, for example, the fee exporters have to pay for the certicate of origin or
building up legal know-how. Instead, indirect costs arise due to changes in the global supply
chains to comply with the RoOs. The Peruvian context allows to test if the latter played a role
for the eects of nonreciprocal trade preferences: rms with a pre-sourcing structure that is
compliant with the rules of origin of the Andean Trade Preference Act should benet more
than those that have to readjust supply chains. I do not nd evidence that sourcing matters.
This nding is relevant because it helps us to better understand the nature of the costs of
RoOs.
The existing empirical literature on the eect of nonreciprocal preferences on exports is
inconclusive. Its results depend crucially on the level of aggregation, the sample denition, the
empirical method and the concrete nonreciprocal arrangements that is being analyzed. Rose
(2004) was the rst to “accidentally” estimate the eect of nonreciprocal preferences under
the GSP on trade ows: his work tries to shed light on the the eect of the WTO on trade but
he includes a control for GSP-status and nds that it raises trade by over 100%. Subramanian
and Wei (2007), X. Liu (2009), Chang and Lee (2011), and Tomz et al. (2007) conrm this result.
In contrast, Herz and Wagner (2011) nd a positive short-run eect of GSP on exports that
turns negative in the long-run. None of these papers properly control—simultaneously—for
multilateral resistance and time-invariant country-pair heterogeneity, which is crucial for the
identication of causal eects as we know from the structural gravity literature (Head and
Mayer 2014; Piermartini and Yotov 2016).
Both Eicher and Henn (2011) and Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) use state-of-the-art methods from
the gravity literature and control for multilateral resistance and time-invariant country-pair
heterogeneity by including importer-time, exporter-time and pair xed eects. However, their
results are still ambiguous: Eicher and Henn (2011) nd signicantly negative eects, while
Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) nd signicantly positive results.
Why are the results at the aggregated level so unstable? First, aggregation leads to down-
ward biased results because nonreciprocal agreements usually exclude products. Second, the
measure of the availability of nonreciprocal arrangements is very noisy (see Ornelas and Ritel
(2019) for a discussion of the issues concerning the data). Third, heterogeneity in the treat-
ment eect plays a major role: Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) are the rst to estimate the eect of
3 In fact, RoOs also apply to free trade agreements.
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all nonreciprocal trade arrangements separately—not just the GSP-eect as previous work
has done—and nd large heterogeneity across arrangements. While the average treatment
eect is positive, they nd for some arrangements large and signicantly negative eects.
Ornelas and Ritel (2019) show even more nuanced results: nonreciprocal trade arrangements
have strong eects on the exports of beneciaries when they are members of the WTO and
very poor. Not-so-poor beneciaries also expand foreign sales, but only if they are not WTO
members, for all others, the average export eects of nonreciprocal trade arrangements are
mute.
There is a still relatively small literature that estimates the trade eects of specic nonrecip-
rocal trade preferences using product-level bilateral trade data. Frazer and Van Biesebroeck
(2010) and Fernandes et al. (2019) study the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and
nd positive eects. Thelle et al. (2015) and Gnutzmann and Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan (2017)
conrm these results for European nonreciprocal trade arrangements, Hakobyan (2017, 2020)
for the U.S. GSP program. Typically, these studies exploit the richness of their data and employ
a triple dierence-in-dierences (DiD) to identify eects: they compare export growth across
products (eligible vs. ineligible products, rst dierence), across destinations (nonreciprocal
preferences applicable or not, second dierence), and over time (pre vs. post period, third
dierence). Using these ner level of aggregation and the more sophisticated identication
strategy seems to yield stable and positive eects.
However, the literature so far has focused on the large programs of the European Union
and the United States. From Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) we know that there is large heterogeneity
across programs making it far from obvious that the above mentioned positive eects also
translate to other settings. Although the triple DiD accounts for many unobservables, it does
not address endogeneity of nonreciprocal trade preferences. Hence, it does not account for
the fact that donor countries choose the set of products that becomes eligible for preferen-
tial treatment potentially correlating with omitted variables. Therefore, it is hard to claim
causality.
To the best of my knowledge, there is only one other paper that looks at nonreciprocal pref-
erences on rm outcomes. Albornoz et al. (2020) study the American GSP exploiting a par-
tial suspension of Argentina’s preferences starting in 1997. As they look at a suspension of
preferences, other eects than just removing the preferential market access like trade policy
uncertainty might play a big role. Thus, my ndings contribute to the literature of nonre-
ciprocal arrangements on rms’ export behavior. Further, I contribute methodologically by
combining an IV with a triple dierence-in-dierences approach to isolate a causal eect. The
instrument, I propose, could be used in other settings, too. I am also the rst to show that com-
petition eects might be important for the eectiveness of nonreciprocal preferences. Lastly,
I am the rst to analyze the eects of the Andean Trade and Preference Act.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I rst give some background information
on the Andean Trade and Preference Act, the nonreciprocal arrangement used for identica-
tion, and I briey present the data. Section 3.3 discusses the empirical strategy. The main
results including robustness checks, and heterogeneity analyses are presented in Section 3.4.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Background and the Data
This section focuses on the trade policy environment that Peruvian rms face when export-
ing to the United States. First, I review the United States’ trade policy vis-à-vis Peru with a
particular focus on the Andean Trade Preference Act, the nonreciprocal trade arrangement
under which Peru and three other Andean countries were granted preferential access from
the early 1990’s onwards. Then I will present the data used in the analysis.
3.2.1 The Andean Trade Preference Act
Peruvian rms have had preferential access to the U.S. market for a long time. Authorized by
the Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) came into eect on
January 1, 1976 and granted preferential duty-free treatment for over 3,500 products to Peru
as well as a wide range of other designated beneciary countries (USITC 2019). The program
was designed to promote economic growth in the developing world through facilitating trade.
In addition, the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), concluded at the end of 1991 under the
George H. W. Bush administration, authorizes the President to grant unilateral preferential
trade benets to Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru for eligible products. The President
proclaimed preferential duty treatment for Bolivia and Colombia on July 2, 1992, for Ecuador
on April 13, 1993, and for Peru on August 11, 1993.
All of the four ATPA beneciaries are also GSP beneciaries and many products can enter the
United States duty free under either program. The main advantage of the ATPA compared to
the GSP is a broader product coverage and more lenient rules of origin (Okun et al. 2004). Rules
of origin (RoOs) determine the national origin of a product: only when an exporter can prove
that the bulk of the production took place domestically the good can enter under the respective
trade agreement. Both programs require 35% of the product value to be sourced domestically.
However they dier substantially in the denition of “domestically”: while under GSP the
inputs have to be entirely from the beneciary countries, under ATPA also inputs from all four
ATPA countries, the United States and 24 Caribbean countries qualify.4According to Okun et
al. (2004), the more lenient RoOs led to a shift away from using GSP to using ATPA.
4 The Caribbean countries are Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British, Virgin Islands, Costa
Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
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The ATPA was part of the U.S. administration’s war on drugs: its objective was to foster
economic development in the Andean countries outside the drug business. Similar to other
nonreciprocal trade arrangements, in the ATPA the beneciary status is conditional on taking
measures to comply with internationally recognized worker rights and to provide eective
protection of intellectual property rights. In addition, beneciary countries have to meet the
criteria for U.S. narcotics cooperation certication in order to be eligible for ATPA preferences.
Bolivia’s removal from the agreement in 2008 due to failure to cooperate in counternarcotics
eorts illustrates that the U.S. administration took the main objectives seriously: the ATPA
was implemented to help to reduce drug protection and tracking using trade liberalization
as a tool.
Table 3.1: Timeline of U.S. Trade Policy vis-à-vis Peru
Jan 1976 • GSP comes into eect, Peru is a beneciary country
Dec 1991 • ATPA enacted (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru)
Aug 1993 • ATPA enters into force for Peru
Dec 2001 • ATPA expires
Jan-July 2002 • ATPA not in eect→MFN duties
Aug-Oct 2002 • ATPA temporarily renewed
Nov 2002 • ATPDEA is implemented (more than 600 additional productsare now eligible)
November 2008 • Bolivia is suspended for failure to cooperate with the US oncounternarcotics eorts
Feb 2009 • US-Peru TPA enters into force
May 2012 • US-Colombia TPA enters into force
June 2013 • Ecuador unilaterally renounces ATPDEA preferences
The original ATPA expired after ten years in December 2001 and was not in eect thereafter
until July 2002. The suspension of the preferences was very much unexpected as the extension
of the ATPA program had already passed the House of Representatives early December but
the U.S. Senate did not vote to pass the bill. During the months of suspension exporters had to
pay MFN duties. Duties paid on such articles were eligible for refund after the ATPA became
operative again; however, the relatively long time period imposed serious cash ow burdens
for some rms resulting in lower exports. U.S. imports from ATPA countries decreased by 13%
during January and July 2002 compared to the same period of the previous year, stressing the
importance of the preferential access to the US market for exporters from the ATPA countries.
During August and October 2002 the original ATPA was back in place resulting in a quick
recovery of the export volumes of ATPA countries.
Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St Vincent and Grenadines,
and Trinidad and Tobago.
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On October 31, 2002, the program was renewed as the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug
Eradication Act (ATPDEA). The new program expanded the number of eligible tari lines by
more than 600 products. Figure 3.1 shows how the newly eligible products are distributed
across sections. The number of eligible products varies quite a lot across sections. While al-
most half of all treated products belong to the section Textile & Apparel, none or very few be-
long to the sectors Arms & Ammunition, Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles, Stone & Glass,
Transportation and Jewelery. Other sections with numerous treated products are Footwear
and Chemicals with 78 and 54 treated products respectively. The remaining sections range
somewhat in between.













































Note: The gure shows the number of products that became newly eligible with the amendment of
the ATPA in 2002 across dierent sections. Details on the sources can be found in the main text.
Although it was known that the United States planned to extend the product scope in the AT-
PDEA with respect to its preceding nonreciprocal preference program, it was unclear which
exact products would be included. Furthermore, resistance in the U.S. Senate made it uncer-
tain if the planned extension of the preferences to include also textiles would actually take
place. Hence, from the perspective of an Peruvian exporter it was far from obvious if and
which products would become eligible for preferences. To evaluate how nonreciprocal trade
agreements aect rms, I leverage the change in the ATPA in November 2002 when more than
600 products became newly eligible. Following the approach by Frazer and Van Biesebroeck
(2010), I compare these to products that were already eligible for preferential treatment before,
either under GSP or the original ATPA.
What happened after the period of uncertainty of 2002? The ATPDEA was signed for ve
years and got renewed multiple times. However, the Andean countries successfully pushed
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for a more permanent solution: in spring 2004 the United States initiated free trade agreement
negotiations with Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, with Bolivia participating as an observer. For
Peru and Colombia the ATPDEA preferences were replaced by free trade agreements (FTAs),
which were implemented in 2009 and 2012, respectively. In July 2013 Ecuador unilaterally
renounced ATPDEA trade preferences and in July of the same year the President’s authority
to provide duty-free treatment under ATPDEA expired. As already mentioned above, Bolivia
got suspended in 2008, thus currently the ATPDEA is not in eect anymore (cf. Williamson
et al. (2016) for a detailed time line of the events).
3.2.2 Data
To evaluate how nonreciprocal trade agreements aect rms I use two data sets: information
about the eligibility for nonreciprocal preferences and customs data for Peruvian rms.
Peruvian exporters faced three dierent tari regimes: GSP, ATPA/ATPDEA, and MFN.
There are three distinct groups or products: i) no preferential tari applies, i.e. the prod-
uct is subject to MFN taris for the whole period of observation, ii) eligible for preferential
treatment under GSP or ATPA preferences, duty-free access for the whole period of observa-
tion, and iii) only eligible for ATPDEA, i.e. preferential status changes. I dene groups such
that eligibility under ATPA and ATPDEA is mutually exclusive because ATPDEA comprises
only those products that become eligible in 2002.5
The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) provides information on taris on the 8-
digit level for all trade relationships of the United States for chapters 1 to 97 of the HTS.6 Using
this database I identify which 8-digit products are eligible for GSP and ATPA. Furthermore,
approximately 250 8-digit products that became eligible for nonreciprocal preferences under
ATPDEA can also be found in these yearly tari lists.
For ATPDEA the provisions for textiles and some other sensitive goods like tuna are speci-
ed under chapter 98, subchapter XXI. This subchapter indicates other chapter 1 to 97 8-digit
products that are eligible when the exporter complies with stricter rules of origin that are
outlined in this subchapter. To gure out which 8-digit products become eligible for ATPDEA
due to these special provisions I use tari preference utilization rates. They stem from US-
import data originally provided by the US Census and cleaned by Schott (2008). Whenever the
preference utilization rate for a 8-digit product is greater than zero, the product is considered
5 This is technically not correct: in November 2002 the ATPA was amended and entered as ATPDEA into force.
Thus, all products, also those that were already eligible before 2002, are in fact eligible under ATPDEA, not





to become eligible for nonreciprocal preferences under the ATPDEA. Together with the 250
products from the USITC tari lists, I end up with 663 ATPDEA products.
I combine this information with Peruvian customs data from the national customs oce
(SUNAT). The data have the usual features of customs trade data in that it is possible to create
ows of exports by product and destination for all Peruvian exporters. To combine the infor-
mation on tari preferences with export data, I have to aggregate up to the HS6-digit level;
this is the most disaggregated product-level that is comparable across countries. I follow the
method developed by Pierce and Schott (2012) to concorde the dierent product nomencla-
tures consistently over time. The sample period includes the years 1997 to 2007.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
This section describes the empirical strategy used to identify the eect of nonreciprocal trade
policy on rm-level outcomes. The main identication challenge is to deal with a potentially
endogenous change in trade policy: the choice of products that became eligible for preferential
treatment under ATPDEA might have not have been exogenous to Peruvian rms. It might
have been driven by certain economic developments, i.e., the United States chose exactly
those products for which Peru has a comparative advantage or disadvantage. Blanchard and
Matschke (2015) show that in the United States, nonreciprocal trade preferences are inuenced
in part by multinational rms and their FDI decisions: when a multinational owns export-
oriented aliates abroad, the U.S. government has an incentive to improve the market for
imports from those foreign aliates, for the simple reason that greater market access means
higher rates of return to the government’s MFN constituents resulting in lower taris. Also
political economy motives could pose a threat to identication if Peruvian rms lobby in the
U.S. for preferential market access.
I address this problem with an instrumental variable (IV) approach exploiting the following
institutional detail in U.S. trade policy: since October 2000 the African Growth and Oppor-
tunity Act (AGOA) allows almost all goods produced in AGOA-eligible countries to enter the
U.S. market duty-free. This nonreciprocal trade arrangement has a special focus on textiles,
too. Similarly to ATPA, they are activated through chapter 98 and special RoOs apply. In fact,
AGOA serves as a blueprint for the textile preferences granted to the Andean countries start-
ing in 2002, making it a relevant instrument. The political process to install AGOA started in
1996, years before the ATPA expired (Africa Policy Information Center 1997).7 Although the
choice of eligible products under AGOA is potentially endogenous with respect to sub-Saharan
African countries, as the same arguments apply that are listed above, due to the timing and
7 The African Growth and Opportunity Act was introduced in 1996 by Representatives Crane, Rangel and Mc-
Dermott (Africa Policy Information Center 1997).
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also scope—it was about sub-Saharan African countries, not Andean—they are orthogonal to
Peruvian rms and their economic development.
To identify the list of products that became eligible for nonreciprocal preferences under
AGOA, I use again the USITC tari lists and cross-check it with the information on the eligible
products available through the ocial AGOA website.8
One might still be worried that the choice of eligible products correlates with the compar-
ative advantage of the U.S. If the United States’ comparative advantage is dierent between
sub-Saharan countries and Andean countries, the IV should account for it. However, if the
U.S. choose predominantly products in labor intensive sectors where both sub-Saharan coun-
tries and Andean countries might have a comparative advantage, then the IV would be bi-
ased. Following Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010), I address these concerns with a triple
dierence-in-dierences (DiD) strategy while making use of the rm-level data: I compare
export outcomes within the same rm-destination-product variety between treated and un-
treated products (rst dierence) for exports to the United States and the rest of the world
(RoW) (second dierence) before and after the change in the ATPA was in eect (third dier-
ence). Furthermore, the triple DiD controls for omitted variables like rm characteristics (for
example management skills) and heterogeneity in demand and supply shocks. I estimate the
following model:
xfjkt =βRoW (Tk × Postt) + βUS (Tk × Postt × USj) +
α1MFAkt + α2 (MFAkt × USd) + λfjk + µjt + εfjkt,
(3.1)
where xfikt is either the log of rm f ′s exports in USD of a given product k to destination
d (intensive margin, denoted as ln (xfjkt)) or the probability P (Xijkt) that an exporting rm
enters a product-destination market (extensive margin) in year t, for all ATPDEA products
Tk is one and zero otherwise, Postt equals one from 2002 onwards and zero otherwise, and
USd is a dummy taking value one if the destination is the United States. λfjk and µjt are
rm-destination-product and destination-time xed eects, aiming to capture all the time in-
variant heterogeneity in the supply of rms’ exports (the former) and all changes in demand
(the latter). Errors are clustered on the rm-level. As in Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) I
compare products that were already eligible for nonreciprocal preferences to those that be-
came eligible under ATPDEA. Thus, I exclude products that were subject to MFN duties for
the whole period.
8 The website can be accessed here https://agoa.info/about-agoa/products.html.
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Furthermore, I control for changes in the Multiber Arrangement (MFA). The MFA and
its successor, the Agreement of Textile and Clothing, regulated the exports of clothing and
textile products from developing countries to the Untied States, European Union, Canada,
and Turkey (Khandelwal et al. 2013). Within the scope of the Uruguay Round, it was agreed
to phase out the quotas over four phases, namely in 1995, 1998, 2002, and 2005 with the biggest
bulk being liberalized in 2005 (Brambilla et al. 2010). Hence, the MFA removed bilateral non-
tari-barriers. As Brambilla et al. (2010) show, China was particularly constrained under the
regime and as quotas lifted, China’s exports grew disproportionately.
This has also important implications for Peruvian exporters as the end of the MFA might
lower trade costs and at the same time increase competition in the U.S. market. As the two
eects go in opposite directions it is unclear how not accounting for the MFA biases the eect
of nonreciprocal preferences. The MFA quotas vary over time and most likely aect rms
exporting the ATPDEA products more. These are mostly textile products as well. Hence, it
is an omitted variable that I need to control for; MFAkt does so by indicating in which year
the MFA lifted the quota for the respective product. I also allow for potential heterogeneity
across destinations (MFAk×USd). The product-level information on the removal of the MFA
is taken from Brambilla et al. (2010).
By dierentiating between destinations, I allow rms to be aected dierently by the non-
reciprocal preferences, conditional on their export-destination. By doing so, I can identify
potential spillover eects. Why does this matter? One of the goals of nonreciprocal trade
preferences is to help rms in developing countries learn how to export and hence to facil-
itate exports to other destinations. Furthermore, the ATPA’s main objective was to foster
economic development in the Andean countries outside the drug business to help with the
U.S. administration’s war on drugs. Therefore, the goal is trade creation, not trade diversion.
Thus, to evaluate the eectiveness of the ATPDEA preferences I have to net out the third
country eects estimated by βRoW . A positive and signicant βUS coecient tells that the
rm-product exports grew more to the US relatively to third countries. But only a positive
net eect, i.e. βRoW + βUS means that rms exports actually grew due to the nonreciprocal
preferences.
Equation 3.1 gives the second stage of the IV, with Tk ×Postt and Tk ×Postt×USd being
treated as endogenous. As described above, I model the rst stage as
Tk × Postt =γ0 (AGOAk × Postt) + γ1 (AGOAk × Postt × USd) +
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Tk × Postt × USd =γ0 (AGOAk × Postt) + γ1 (AGOAk × Postt × USd) +
δ1MFAkt + δ2 (MFAkt × USd) + λfjk + µjt + ufjkt,
(3.3)
with USd being a dummy variable that equals one if the export goes to the United States.
AGOAk equals one if the product became eligible for nonreciprocal preferences under AGOA
and zero otherwise. All controls from the second stage are also included in the rst stage.
3.4 The Eects of Nonreciprocal Preferences on Firm Ex-
ports
In this section, I use the methodology described above, to analyze how exporting rms re-
act to receiving nonreciprocal trade preferences through ATPDEA. The results describe the
eects on the intensive as well as the extensive margin. The intensive margin, denoted as
ln(xijkt), corresponds to rm exports in USD of a given product to a given destination that
are positive in both the pre- and post-period. The extensive margin, P (Xijkt), corresponds to
the probability that an exporting rm enters or exits a product-destination market assuming
that rms potentially could export all products that they have ever exported in the period of
observation to all markets that they have at least once exported to.9
3.4.1 Baseline Results
For the IV-approach to work, the instrument needs to be relevant and fulll the exclusion
restriction. The results of the rst stage, which is dened in Equations 3.2 and 3.3, shows that
the AGOA product list is a valid instrument for the ATPDEA product list (cf. Table C2 in the
Appendix). As expected, the AGOA-interaction terms have a positive eect on Tk × Postt
and Tk × Postt × USd.
Table 3.2 reports the estimation results of Equation 3.1. Columns (1) and (3) are the most par-
simonious specications accounting for rm-destination-product and year-destination xed
eects, but not for changes in the MFA, which are included in columns (2) and (4). As col-
umn (1) shows, when not accounting for the MFA, nonreciprocal preferences increase rms
exports to the United States by 30.6% relatively to third countries. However, at the same time
the trade diversion eect measured by βRoW , the coecient of the interaction term Tk×Postt,
9 For example if rm 1 has exported product k1 to the United States (d1) and Germany (d2), k2 to China (d3) and
k3 to the United States d1 and China d2, I would assume that it could export all three products ki, i = 1, 2, 3
to all three destinations d.
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is highly signicant and negative, indicating a net eect of the nonreciprocal preferences of
9.4%.
The nonreciprocal preferences also have an eect on the extensive margin of trade: the
probability of a rm to start exporting product k to the U.S. relatively to the rest of the world
increases due to the ATPDEA preferences by 2.7% (column (4)). The average probability of ex-
porting equals 1.6% for the whole sample. Therefore, this eect can be interpreted as relatively
large. Exports to the rest of the world remain virtually unchanged with a precisely measured
zero coecient. Advocates of nonreciprocal trade arrangements often put the learning-by-
exporting hypothesis forward. By granting rms in developing countries preferential market
access those rms acquire new knowledge about how to export and then start to also serve
other markets. In the Peruvian context, the results do not support this argument as no positive
spillover eects can be found.
Next, I discuss if changes in the MFA drive the results. Columns (2) and (5) only account
for changes in MFA, columns (3) and (6) interact the MFA variables with the dummy variable
for ATPDEA eligibility. For both the intensive and the extensive margin, βRoW is very robust
to accounting for the MFA. βUS decreases slightly, but the standard errors are wide across
the dierent specications, suggesting that the coecients of interests are not statistically
signicant from each other. Hence, the positive net eect of the nonreciprocal preferences on
the export performance is not driven by the MFA eect. Table C1 in the Appendix shows that
almost all of the change in export values is driven by changes in quantity and not in prices,
which are measured as unit values.
The remainder of the table reports the coecients when using the OLS-estimator instead of
2SLS. Interestingly, the coecients are very similar: while βUS is slightly downward-biased
when not accounting for potential endogeneity in the treatment variable, βRoW does not vary.
For the extensive margin (column (4) and (8)) both coecients are somewhat smaller when us-
ing the OLS-estimator. The small downward bias indicates that the United States deliberately
chose products Peru is particularly good at. This result goes in line with the “trade-for-aid”
character of nonreciprocal arrangements. If the main objective is to help Peruvian rms to
increase exports, it makes sense to choose products where Peru has a comparative advantage.
The downward bias could also be due to lobbying of Peruvian rms in the U.S. or the presence






















Table 3.2: Baseline Results
IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ln(x) ln(x) ln(x) P(X) P(X) P(X) ln(x) ln(x) ln(x) P(X) P(X) P(X)
T × Post -0.212∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.074) (0.070) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.055) (0.051) (0.054) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
T × Post × US 0.306∗∗ 0.248∗ 0.260∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.137) (0.133) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.104) (0.100) (0.102) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
MFA -0.022 0.120∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.023 0.126∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.068) (0.001) (0.001) (0.046) (0.067) (0.001) (0.001)
MFA × US 0.102 0.091 0.009∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.108 0.086 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.154) (0.003) (0.003) (0.079) (0.152) (0.003) (0.003)
T ×MFA × Post -0.174∗∗ 0.001 -0.197∗∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.079) (0.001) (0.076) (0.001)
T ×MFA × Post × US 0.026 -0.008∗∗ 0.047 -0.001
(0.169) (0.004) (0.163) (0.003)
N 201,043 201,043 201,043 20,609,798 20,609,798 20,609,798 201,043 201,043 201,043 20,609,798 20,609,798 20,609,798
F-Statistic 403.6 369.7 449.3 8,352.2 5,510.1 5,957.5 . . . . . .
Note: The table shows the the results of estimating equation 3.1. Columns (1) to (4) report the IV results, the remainder of the table shows the results for OLS. I use the list of products eligible for
AGOA preferences as an instrument. The dependent variable equals either the log value in USD (ln(x)) or the probability of exporting P (X)). The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is shown in the table.
All regressions include rm-product-destination and destination-year xed eects. Errors are clustered by rms. ***/**/* indicate signicance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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The very similar results suggest that the bias due to an endogenous choice of the eligible
products is small. Thus, as argued above, receiving the ATPDEA preferences is indeed an
exogenous event, at least from the perspective of the Peruvian rm, resulting in exogenous
variation that can be used for the empirical analyses. Due to the slight dierences between
OLS and 2SLS, I will use the OLS approach for the remainder of this analysis and include
the two MFA variables, hence, column (2) and (5) are the baseline specication. The 2SLS
results can be found in the Appendix. The IV-analysis leads to another interesting observation:
AGOA is a valid instrument for ATPDEA. This insight could be helpful in other contexts where
OLS results yield biased results.
3.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection I will perform a sensitivity analysis to check whether the positive eects of
nonreciprocal trade eects are robust, Table 3.3 reports the results.
Placebo Test First, I run a placebo test to make sure the baseline results are not driven by
some pre-trends. I make use of the long panel data and change the period of observation to
1994 to 1997, i.e. one year after the original version of the ATPA came into force and four years
before it was amended. In this period the treatment variable should not have any eect. If the
results are not driven by pre-trends the coecients should be insignicant. I treat 1996 and
1997 as the placebo-post period and run the same regression as in the baseline specication.
Indeed, columns (3) and (4) report insignicant coecients, diminishing concerns about pre-
trends biasing the baseline results.
Demand Shock The positive eect of nonreciprocal preferences on Peruvian exporters
could be driven by a US-specic change in demand for ATPDEA eligible products. To check
for this, I use rm-level data from Uruguay, which is available through the World Bank’s Ex-
porter Dynamics Database (Fernandes et al. 2016).10 Unfortunately the time coverage is not
ideal, as the World Bank data for Uruguay only starts in 2001. Nevertheless, it is a useful
check: if results were driven by a change in U.S. demand, then this should also be visible for
the shorter time period. As columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.3 show, also Uruguayan exporters
reduce exports of treated products in the post-period. However, Uruguayan rms cannot al-
leviate this eect by increasing exports to the United States. Hence, the positive eect of the
nonreciprocal preferences is not driven by a sudden increase of American demand for the
ATPDEA products.
10 The data can be downloaded here https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/
exporter-dynamics-database.
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Exclusion of the Year 2002 Third, I exclude the year 2002, which was characterized by
turmoil: the original ATPA was not in eect until August, and the ATPDEA preferences were
only introduced in November 2002, so relatively late in the year. Therefore, it is not surprising
that excluding 2002 leads to a higher net eect of nonreciprocal preferences on exports: for
much of 2002 rms exported relatively more to third countries than to the U.S. (see columns
(7) and (8)).
Firm-Trends Next, I control for rm-trends by including a rm xed eect that can vary
in the pre- and post-period. While the coecient for the U.S. exports, βUS , remains relatively
stable, the coecient measuring exports to third countries almost halves. The eects for the
extensive margin almost vanish. However, one has to keep in mind that the model is highly
saturated and therefore only very little variation is left that can be used to identify any eect.
By including rm-trends the model might become too demanding.
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union Lastly, I want to check if the eastern en-
largement of the European Union in 2004, when ten new member states (NMS) joined, might
bias the baseline results. Why should this matter? With the accession to the European Union
the ten NMS immediately inherited all regional trade agreements that the European Union had
in place, including inter alia the GSP program, through which Peru had preferential access to
the European market. Thus, when the NMS joined the European Union, Peru suddenly gained
preferential access to their markets, too, potentially biasing the baseline results. In columns
(11) and (12) I include the triple interaction term Tk×Postt×NMSd to net out a potentially
diverging eect for the exports to the NMS in the post-period. The coecient βNMS enters the
results signicantly and is highly negative. This indicates that Peruvian exports for treated
products to the NMS plummeted relatively to the rest of the world (minus the United States)
in the post-period. This could be due to the increased competition in the NMS-markets from
the remaining members of the European Union that now had duty free access to these mar-
kets. However, the coecients measuring the eects of the ATPDEA preferences on Peruvian





















Table 3.3: Robustness Checks—OLS
Baseline Placebo URY Firms no 2002 Firm-Trends New EU-Members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ln(x) P(X) ln(x) P(X) ln(x) P(X) ln(x) P(X) ln(x) P(X) ln(x) P(X)
T × Post -0.191∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.094 -0.000 -0.269∗∗ -0.009 -0.217∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.122∗ 0.000 -0.190∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.001) (0.061) (0.000) (0.124) (0.007) (0.063) (0.001) (0.069) (0.001) (0.051) (0.001)
T × Post × US 0.228∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.001 -0.140 0.001 0.317∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.003) (0.134) (0.002) (0.206) (0.010) (0.115) (0.003) (0.115) (0.003) (0.100) (0.003)
MFA -0.023 0.005∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.047 0.001 -0.008 0.005∗∗∗ -0.007 0.005∗∗∗ -0.024 0.005∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.001) (0.093) (0.002) (0.068) (0.004) (0.046) (0.001) (0.045) (0.001) (0.046) (0.001)
MFA × US 0.108 0.013∗∗∗ 0.322 -0.009 0.014 -0.032∗∗∗ 0.020 0.012∗∗∗ 0.100 0.012∗∗∗ 0.108 0.013∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.003) (0.344) (0.005) (0.159) (0.010) (0.077) (0.003) (0.078) (0.003) (0.079) (0.003)
T × Post × NMS -1.022∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.001)
N 201,043 20,609,798 28,795 7,494,472 40,775 1,550,948 178,838 18,736,180 200,290 20,609,798 201,043 20,609,798
Note: The table shows various robustness test. See main text for details. The dependent variable equals either the log value in USD (ln(x)) or the probability of exporting P (X)). All
regressions include rm-product-destination and destination-year xed eects. Errors are clustered by rms. ***/**/* indicate signicance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Changes in GSP Eligibility The control group consists of products that are eligible for
ATPA preferences and/or GSP preferences. Similar to the ATPA also the GSP is regularly up for
renewal potentially inducing trade policy uncertainty or even the suspension of the program.
If this were the case, the baseline results could be driven by a dip in the control group, which
would be driven entirely by those products that are only eligible for GSP preferences. None
of the exporters in the sample export products that are only eligible for GSP preferences.
Therefore, this potential source of bias is not an issue.
Overall, the results are robust to the various sensitivity checks indicating that the reported
eects are not due to spurious correlation. All of the checks also hold when using 2SLS (see
Table C3 in the Appendix).
3.4.3 Heterogeneity
Next, I report results of a heterogeneity analysis. First, I try to shed some light on the impor-
tance of RoOs and pre-existing sourcing patterns. Second, I check if the eects are dierent
for rms that were exposed to a sudden increase of competition in a third market, namely the
European Union.
Sourcing and Rules of Origin RoOs matter for nonreciprocal trade preferences: only ex-
porters that comply with them are granted preferential access. Existing evidence on RoOs
shows that they reduce trade within a free trade agreement and reduce imports from third
countries (Andersson 2015; Augier et al. 2005; Bombarda and Gamberoni 2013; Conconi et
al. 2018). Costs of RoOs arise through two channels. First, rms have to bare direct costs for
example because they have to pay for the certicate of origin and need to accumulate legal
knowledge to comply with the rules. Second, rms might alter global value chains by reduc-
ing inputs from suppliers that are outside of the trade agreement in order to comply with the
rules. So far, there is no evidence that helps us to understand which one of the two channels
matters more in a rm’s choice to export.
The Peruvian context makes it possible to distinguish between the two mechanisms through
which costs of RoOs arise: if global value chains matter rms with a sourcing structure com-
pliant to the rules prior the nonreciprocal preferences became available should react stronger
to the preferential market access than those with a dierent sourcing structure. Furthermore,
one can formally test if the claim of the 9th U.S. report of the ATPA is true that more lenient
RoOs with respect to sourcing requirements were actually the reason why Peruvian rms
preferred to use ATPA preferences instead of GSP (Okun et al. 2004).
To identify such heterogeneities across rms, ideally, I would have information on the pro-
duction function of each rm and its global value chains for each product separately. Such
detailed information is unfortunately not available. However, I have access to rm-level im-
84
3.4. THE EFFECTS OF NONRECIPROCAL PREFERENCES ON FIRM EXPORTS
port data that can be matched to the exports. As described in Section 3.2, in the ATPDEA (and
in its predecessor ATPA, too) the RoOs require that only inputs from the Andean countries,
the U.S. or 24 Caribbean countries (RoOs-eligible countries) are used for production. Using
the information on imports I calculate for every rm in the pre-period the share of imports
that has been imported from RoOs-eligible countries relative to total imports (the share is
denoted as (CBERA+ANDEAN +US)M −Exposuref ). Then, I interact the share with
the Tk × Postt and Tk × Postt × USd and instrument it with the AGOA product-list.
Columns (5) to (8) of Table 3.4 show that the baseline results do not substantially change
when accounting for rms’ import patterns. For the intensive margin the import exposure
measures enter the regression insignicantly with very large standard errors indicating that
importing mostly from RoOs-eligible countries before the ATPDEA did not have a positive
eect on exports.11
The results suggest that rms with RoOs compliant sourcing did not prot more from the
nonreciprocal preferences than those with a dierent sourcing structure indicating that the
global value chain channel did not play a major role for the ATPDEA preferences. This is
merely an observation and I do not try to give an answer on why the global value chain chan-
nel does not respond. It might be driven by the fact that the ATPDEA products were products
that mostly use domestic inputs, which are not picked up by the import exposure measure.
Furthermore, the import exposure measure might pick up some other rm characteristic that
drives the results and is more important than the RoOs channel. Lastly, the measure is rel-
atively crude and serves only as a rough approximation of the rm’s global value chains.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that in the context of Peru and for this specic nonre-
ciprocal trade arrangement costs of RoOs induced by non-compliant sourcing patterns do not
seem to matter.
Increased Competition in a Third Market The eastern enlargement of the European
Union in 2004 changed the landscape of trade policy quite a bit: in 2004 ten eastern European
countries joined the European Union resulting in free trade between the former EU15-states
and the new member states (NMS). Furthermore, the NMS adopted all existing trade agree-
ments. For third countries, like Peru, the eastern enlargement leads to trade diversion, i.e.
exports to the European Union decrease. I look at trade ows within rm-product-destination
and compare combinations with an ATPDEA product to those without. Thus, as long as the
eastern enlargement shock does not aect ATPDEA products dierently from non-ATPDEA
products, the DiD accounts for this type of omitted variables.
11 The results do not change substantially when I alter the denition of RoOs-eligible countries. In Table C5 the
RoOs-eligible countries are rst dened as only the United States, second the United States and the Andean
countries other than Peru (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia), and lastly when also the Caribbean countries are
added (cf. Appendix).
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Let me quickly review for which types of products the eastern enlargement reduced trade
costs between the NMS and the former EU15-states: in the early 1990’s the European Union
signed free trade agreements with all the NMS eliminating taris on all industrial products.
Thus, in 1997, the rst year included in the analysis described above, these tari cuts were
already in place and therefore, accounted for by the DiD. In 2004, taris were only cut on
agricultural products, not a sector for which Andean countries were granted nonreciprocal
preferences to the U.S. market under ATPDEA making an omitted variable bias unlikely. In
addition to tari cuts also reforms that took place in the NMS prior accession reduced trade
costs between the NMS and the former EU15-states yielding—again—lower exports from Peru
to the European Union. As these reforms are not product-specic the destination-time xed
eects control for them.
Although the empirical strategy should account for the eastern enlargement eect, rms
that are more strongly aected by the shock might react dierently to receiving nonrecipro-
cal preferences as they are exposed to increased competition in a third market. I check for
heterogeneity along these lines by interacting the two variables of interest Tk × Postt and
Tk×Postt×USd with rm-specic exposure to the European market. EU15−X−Exposuref
equals the share of all exports in the pre-period that a rm sold to the EU15-states and can
range between 0 and 1. The results are displayed in columns (1)-(4) of Table 3.4.12
The baseline results for the intensive margin are entirely driven by those rms with high
exposure to the European market. Firms that experience high competition due to high ex-
posure to the European Union reorganize their portfolio towards ATPDEA products and the
U.S. market taking advantage of the nonreciprocal preferences. For the remaining rms the
nonreciprocal trade preferences did not have any eect on exports. Instead, the probabil-
ity of exporting is not aected by these competition eects indicating that some rms start
exporting the ATPDEA products to the United States due to the nonreciprocal preferences.
This insight puts the baseline results into perspective. Only the interplay of increased com-
petition in a third market and nonreciprocal preferences in the U.S. led to the large and positive
eects on the intensive margin. Hence, it is questionable if nonreciprocal preferences alone
would have had the same trade promoting eect for rms that exported already in the past.
However, the stable eects on the extensive margin suggest that the cost reduction induced
by the nonreciprocal preferences was enough to make it protable for rms to start exporting
the eligible products to the U.S.























Export Exposure to EU15 Market Share of Imports from the U.S.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(x) ln(x) P(X) P(X) ln(x) ln(x) P(X) P(X)
T × Post -0.187∗∗∗ -0.073 0.000 0.004∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗ 0.001 -0.000
(0.051) (0.071) (0.001) (0.001) (0.063) (0.086) (0.001) (0.002)
T × Post × US 0.227∗∗ 0.077 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.124) (0.005) (0.006) (0.126) (0.188) (0.006) (0.009)
MFA -0.037 -0.036 0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.006 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.053) (0.052) (0.001) (0.001) (0.065) (0.066) (0.001) (0.001)
MFA × US 0.114 0.113 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.011 0.009∗ 0.009∗
(0.087) (0.087) (0.004) (0.004) (0.111) (0.110) (0.005) (0.005)
EU15 X-Exposure × T × Post -0.331∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.004)
EU15 X-Exposure × T × Post × US 0.498∗ 0.010
(0.296) (0.013)
EU15 X-Exposure × Post 0.010 -0.004∗∗
(0.121) (0.002)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × T × Post -0.176 0.002
(0.247) (0.004)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × T × Post × US -0.159 -0.035
(0.382) (0.024)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × Post 0.024 -0.005∗∗
(0.109) (0.002)
N 166,100 166,100 14,572,712 14,572,712 131,268 131,268 13,131,184 13,131,184
Note: The table shows the results of estimating equation 3.1. Columns (1) to (4) dierentiates by exposure to the European Union, the remainder of the table shows how dierences
in sourcing aects the results. I use the list of products eligible for AGOA preferences as an instrument. The dependent variable equals either the log value in USD (ln(x)) or the





This paper examines how nonreciprocal trade preferences aect Peruvian rm-level exports
in the context of the expansion of the Andean Trade Preference Act in 2002. It is the rst pa-
per that addresses endogeneity of extending nonreciprocal preferences with an instrumental
variable approach and at the same time controls for omitted variables using a triple dierence-
in-dierences. I nd that rms increase exports of eligible products to the United States rel-
ative to ineligible products on average by 25%. However, this increase goes in line with a
strong trade diversion eect, i.e. a shift of exports away from third countries towards the
United States resulting in a net increase of 5%. The eect is solely driven by rms experi-
encing a negative competition shock in a third market. It seems like the combination of the
two is necessary to nd a positive eect of nonreciprocal preferences on the intensive mar-
gin. Also the extensive margin is aected by the nonreciprocal arrangement: the probability
to export increases by 2%. The average probability of exporting equals 1.6% for the whole
sample. Therefore, this eect can be interpreted as relatively large.
I cannot nd any positive spillover eects. Furthermore, I show that rms with a sourcing
structure that is compliant with the RoOs of ATPA did not benet more from the nonrecip-
rocal preferences. Therefore, the costs arising due to global value chains are negligible in
the Peruvian context, probably because most of the inputs are produced domestically. This
nding is relevant because it helps us to better understand the nature of the costs of RoOs.
To what extent can the results be transferred to other setups? First, in the Peruvian context
the extent of the reduction in taris was relatively small compared to other nonreciprocal
arrangements. Tari changes that can be used for identication are only applicable for ap-
proximately 200 HS6-products. When tari reductions are applicable for more products, the
eects might turn out to be larger. Second, uncertainty about how long the preferences were
in fact granted might have actually risen due to the temporary suspension of the program in
2001/02. This might have caused rms to not use the preferences in the rst place. Both of
these eects most likely attenuate the results, so it might be possible that in other settings
with larger tari cuts and less uncertainty the eects of nonreciprocal trade arrangements
would be more pronounced.
It would be interesting to see if the interaction between increased competition in markets of
third countries and nonreciprocal preferences also drives results in other set-ups. For example,
the positive and large eects reported by Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) could also be
driven by this channel as in their study the timing lines up with the eastern enlargement
of the European Union, too. They do not account for rm-level exposure to the European
market. Lastly, further research should analyze if the ATPA led to job growth, higher wages




Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data Cleaning
Table A1 summarizes the steps taken to solve all the issues described in the main text, i.e. miss-
ing data, mistakes and oddities in the original Data, multiple preferential taris, aggregation
bias, dierent product nomenclatures, non-WTO members, and non-ad valorem taris.
Download Data and Minor Steps First I download the raw data from WITS and perform
minor cleaning steps as adding country codes and converting the 6-digit products into the
rst HS nomenclature, HS88/92. By doing so, I make sure that the taris can be compared
over time and across countries. These steps are done separately for the dierent types of
taris (bounds, MFN and preferential). I only keep the relevant information i.e. importer,
for the preferential taris exporter, year, product, tari (only the ad valorem component and
including the ad valorem equivalent). CTS is the only source for the bound taris, for the
MFN taris I use information from TRAINS and IDB, and for the preferential taris I only
use TRAINS. Because of the immense amount of measurement error in the IDB data for the
preferential taris (compare main text), I have decided against using them as they would do
more harm than good. Whenever more than one preferential scheme applies (i.e. FTA and
nonreciprocal preferences through SDT), I always assume the lowest preferential tari to be
eectively in place.
To solve the problem of non-ad valorem taris and their conversion into AVEs ideally I would
have the original terms of the taris (for example 1.22 USD/kg) and unit values to convert the
non-ad valorem taris by myself. Unfortunately WITS does not provide this type of informa-
tion, therefore I cannot do much other than using the available AVEs on WITS trusting in the
UNCTAD method. However, the database contains a variable that equals one whenever WITS
tells that the tari is an AVE. Thus, researchers can decide themselves whether to include the
AVEs in the analysis.
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Table A1: Overview Data Cleaning Procedure
Bounds MFN Taris Preferential Tari
(1)
download (CTS) and






IDB) and clean data (add
iso codes, concord to
HS88/92); data format:
importer, product




clean data (add iso codes,
concord to HS88/92,
only keep lowest tari);
data format: importer,
exporter, product
(HS88/92), tari (only ad
valorem), tari
(including AVEs)
(2) Only CTS Combine TRAINS andIDB Only TRAINS
(3) n/a add national sources (EUand US)
add national sources (EU
and US), add information
of phasing-in schedules
for 149 FTAs






(6) combine Bounds, MFN and Preferential taris; data format: importer, exporter,
product (HS88/92), eectively applied tari (only ad valorem), eectively ap-
plied tari (including AVEs)
(7) add information about WTO membership and indicator whether there are mul-
tiple tari lines within 6-digit product
Note: The table sums up the dierent steps that were taken to clean up the WITS tari data.
Additional Information Next, I add as much additional information as possible. For both,
MFN and preferential taris, I add data from national sources for the European Union and the
United States provided by the World Bank (Forero-Rojas et al. 2018), for preferential taris I
further have the phasing-in schedules of 149 FTAs. This information is from the WTO’s RTA
database.1
Cross-Validation of Preferential Taris To cross-validate the preferential taris I need
panel data on all RTAs —FTAs, CUs and nonreciprocal preferences granted under the SDT—
1 rtais.wto.org/.
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in place, for all countries and years in the sample. For reciprocal trade agreements (i.e. FTAs
and CUs) I use Dür et al. (2014), who have the most comprehensive database comprising over
600 agreements and the corresponding accessions and withdrawals. For the nonreciprocal
arrangements I use the Database on Economic Integration Agreements, put together by Scott
Baier and Jerey Bergstrand.2 Furthermore, I add information from the WTO’s list of prefer-
ential trade agreements3 and researched myself the schemes provided by the European Union
and the United States. I keep preferential taris only if my list of agreements indicates that
preferential market access is granted. Otherwise I will assume that the MFN tari is applica-
ble.
Interpolation of Missing Data Next I interpolate the missing data. I do so in the fol-
lowing way: rather than replacing missing taris by linearly interpolating observations, I set
them equal to the nearest preceding observation. This procedure accounts for the fact that
countries are more likely to update schedules after a signicant tari change. If there is no
preceding observation, missing taris are set equal to the nearest succeeding observation.
For preferential taris interpolating is signicantly harder because FTAs are often phased in.
Thus, adding the exact phasing-in schedules provided by the WTO’s RTA database is crucial,
as it improves the data quality signicantly. Nevertheless, there are still cases where I have to
deal with missing data. For a precise interpolation, I use detailed information for more than
500 FTAs.4 I know whether phasing-in is allowed and the nal year when all changes have to
be implemented. Whenever phasing-in is allowed and the nal year of implementation has
not been reached yet, I allow for linear interpolation, otherwise I use the procedure described
above.
Table A2 illustrates how the algorithm works when interpolating the missing taris. It
shows a ctional pattern of missing observations and the resulting imputed tari. In Example
1 the algorithm uses the preceding observations for the interpolation of all the missing obser-
vations, so for 1997 the tari of the year 1996 is used, for 2000 to 2002 the tari corresponds to
the tari that was reported in 1999 and in 2004/2005 the tari from 2003 is used. In Example 2
the same is true for the years 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005. However, for the years 1996-1999 no
preceding observation can be found in the original data. In this case the tari from the year
2000, i.e. the nearest succeeding observation, is used for the previous years.
When an RTA has no phasing-in, the procedure just described for the MFN tari is also
applicable for the preferential tari with a slight complication: the interpolation algorithm
2 Available at https://kellogg.nd.edu/nsf-kellogg-institute-data-base-economic-integration-agreements and
rst used in Baier et al. (2014).
3 Available at http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaList.aspx
4 The data is provided by DESTA (Dür et al. 2014). I use the version of March 2018.
91
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
has to account for the entry into force date of the RTA. Before the RTA enters into force,
the MFN tari is used for the interpolation and afterwards the preferential tari. Table A2,
Example 3 illustrates this. The preferential tari is only used until 2001, the year when the
RTA enters into force. Before I use the MFN tari for the interpolation.
When phasing-in is possible there are two ways to go. The WTO-RTA database provides
information about the particular phasing-in schedule for 149 RTAs. In these cases no fur-
ther interpolation is necessary, I just use the additional information, since in the WTO-RTA
database no observations are missing (see Example 4 in Table A2). Unfortunately the WTO-
RTA database does not have the tari schedules for all RTAs that allow for phasing-in.
DESTA (Dür et al. 2014) has information on the nal year when all the tari cuts have to
be implemented. For example, NAFTA entered into force in 1994 and all tari cuts had to be
implemented by 2008. In this case, DESTA tells that the nal year of implementation is 2008.
So, we know for which RTAs phasing-in is possible and when the last tari cuts have to be
implemented. Typically phasing-in means that for certain products the taris are gradually
reduced, for example every ve years a tari cut of 2%-points. I approximate this by linearly
interpolating the missing taris for the years after the RTA has entered into force but before
the phasing-in has been fully implemented.
Now two possibilities emerge. Either the nal year of implementation is within the period
of observation or in the future. In Table A2, Example 5 I show a case where the phasing-in has
already been fully implemented, in this ctional case in the year 2004. Therefore, I linearly
interpolate the preferential taris for the years 2001 to 2004 and use the tari 2006 for the year
2005. When the full implementation has not yet been reached (compare Example 6 where the
implementation date is set to 2020), the linear interpolation is done for the whole period of
observation.
Last Steps Lastly, I combine all dierent tari types, and add indicator variables to identify
non-WTO members and whether there are any sublines within the 6-digit product. I end
up with a database of the following structure: importer–exporter–product–year–eectively
applied tari.
A.2 Forms of Taris
Dierent forms of non-ad valorem taris: Specic taris are computed on the physical quan-
tity of the good being imported, for example 1.22 EUR/kg. A combination of ad valorem and
specic taris are called compound taris (i.e. 1.22 EUR/kg + 8%). Mixed taris are expressed
as either a specic or an ad valorem rate, depending on which generates the most (or some-
times the least) revenue. For example, duties may be either 1.22 EUR/kg or 8%, which ever
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Table A2: Examples for Interpolation
MFN Taris:
Example 1 Example 2
Year Original t Imputed t Year Original t Imputed t
1996 10 10 1996 . 5
1997 . 10 1997 . 5
1998 5 5 1998 . 5
1999 5 5 1999 . 5
2000 . 5 2000 5 5
2001 . 5 2001 . 5
2002 . 5 2002 . 5
2003 2 2 2003 2 2
2004 . 2 2004 . 2
2005 . 2 2005 . 2
Preferential Taris:
Example 3: no Phasing-In Example 4: Phasing-In, WTO info
Year Original t Entry Phasing-In Imputed t Year Original t Entry WTO-Info Imputed t
1996 10 2001 0 10 1996 10 2001 . 10
1997 . 2001 0 10 1997 . 2001 . 10
1998 5 2001 0 5 1998 5 2001 . 5
1999 5 2001 0 5 1999 5 2001 . 5
2000 . 2001 0 mfn-2000 2000 . 2001 . 5
2001 . 2001 0 0 2001 . 2001 2 2
2002 . 2001 0 0 2002 . 2001 2 2
2003 0 2001 0 0 2003 . 2001 2 2
2004 . 2001 0 0 2004 . 2001 1 1
2005 0 2001 0 0 2005 . 2001 1 1
2006 . 2001 0 0 2006 . 2001 0 0
Example 5: Phasing-In, DESTA info Example 6: Phasing-In, DESTA info
Year Original t Entry Phasing-In Imputed t Year Original t Entry Phasing-In Imputed t
1996 15 2000 2004 15 1996 15 2001 2020 10
1997 . 2000 2004 15 1997 . 2001 2020 10
1998 15 2000 2004 15 1998 15 2001 2020 5
1999 15 2000 2004 15 1999 15 2001 2020 5
2000 . 2000 2004 12.5 2000 . 2001 2020 12.5
2001 10 2000 2004 10 2001 10 2001 2020 10
2002 2000 2004 7.5 2002 2001 2020 7.5
2003 5 2000 2004 5 2003 5 2001 2020 5
2004 2000 2004 0 2004 2001 2020 5
2005 2000 2004 0 2005 2001 2020 5
2006 0 2000 2004 0 2006 5 2001 2020 5
Note: The table illustrates the interpolation algorithm. The black font describes how the original looks like, the red font tells the tari
supposed by the algorithm. The examples illustrate dierent cases in the pattern of missing observations that have to be dealt with.
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is higher. Then there are technical taris that depend on certain product characteristics for
example duties might be 8% for butter with fat content between 9-40%. Tari rate quotas are
made up of a low tari rate on the initial imports (the within-quota quantity) and a very high
tari rate on imports entering above the initial amount (outside-quota quantity). Figure A1
summarizes the dierent forms.
The rst three forms of non-ad valorem taris can be converted into ad valorem equivalents
(AVEs) by dividing the specic element of the tari by the value of the product per unit. To
obtain a percentage value, the result needs to be multiplied by 100.5 It is rather dicult or
even impossible to calculate AVEs for the remaining non-ad valorem taris (compare Bouët
et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion).






Compound 1.22 USD/kg + 8%
Mixed either 1.22 USD/kg or 8%
Technical 8% on butter with fat content between 9-40%
Quota within/outside quota quantity
Note: The gure shows the dierent forms of taris.
Converting Non-Ad Valorem taris into Ad Valorem Equivalents Regardless of the
type of tari—bound, MFN or preferential—it can take two forms. Ad valorem taris are the
most common ones. Here the customs duty is calculated as a percentage of the value of the
product (for example 8%). The non-ad valorem taris can take on ve dierent forms (specic
taris, compound taris, mixed taris, technical taris and tari rate quotas, see Section A.2
of the Appendix for more details). 1.22 USD/kg or 1.22 USD/kg + 8% are examples for these
types of taris.
It is possible to convert non-ad valorem taris into ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) by divid-
ing the non-ad valorem element of the tari by the value of the product per unit.6 While the
5 There are several problems when choosing the unit value. See Bouët et al. (2008) for a discussion and ways of
solving the issues.
6 For technical taris and tari rate quotas it is rather dicult to do the conversion, see Bouët et al. (2008) for
a more detailed discussion.
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WTO does not report AVEs, TRAINS estimates AVEs.7 Since AVEs are a function of unit val-
ues, they are much more volatile than ad valorem taris; they change whenever the price of a
good changes, which does not have to be necessarily related to trade policy changes but could
be for example because of in-/deation or shifts in demand. In my database a dummy variable
is included indicating AVEs, therefore, users can decide themselves whether to include them
or if sensitivity analyses are necessary. Countries might report AVEs instead of the non-ad
valorem taris to the institutions collecting data, for example the European Union does so.
In these cases it is unfortunately impossible to tell the type a tari, i.e. non-ad valorem or
ad valorem and therefore elimination of these cases of AVEs is impossible. To deal with this
issue, I assume that all taris higher than 100% are “non-ad valorem taris in disguise” and
there is a dummy variable in the database agging these cases.
Although the transformation of non-ad valorem taris is challenging, it does not matter
for many countries: in 2017 the WTO reports only 14 countries with non-ad valorem taris
for at least 5% of their tari lines (WTO 2018).8 Switzerland is an exception, with almost all
taris being non-ad valorem. I proxy Swiss taris with the average taris of all other EFTA
members.9
A.3 The Eectively Applied Tari in IDB
Countries do not only report taris sporadically but even when they report, it does not neces-
sarily mean that they report both, MFN and preferential taris. To confuse the trade economist
even more, some countries do not report all, but only some preferential taris i.e. only the
unilateral schemes or only certain FTAs. Such irregularities are present in TRAINS and in
IDB. One would think that these types of missing observations were simply that in the data:
missing. This is true for TRAINS. However, one tari type available through IDB, which is
called “the eectively applied tari or AHS”, has a rather odd feature: whenever a preferential
scheme is missing, instead of a missing observation the corresponding MFN tari is stored in
the database.
Figure A2 makes the consequences of this fact clear. The solid line shows the simple mean
of the eectively applied tari Mexico has against the US (Panel (a)) and Germany (Panel (b))
7 TRAINS estimates the unit values using HS 6-digit import statistics of all OECD countries. This produces
unique unit values for each product common to all importing countries and all types of rates. This procedure
is called the “UNCTAD method”.
8 The 14 countries (ordered by their shares) with non-ad valorem taris for at least 5% of their tari lines are
Switzerland (75%) , Thailand (10%), Belarus (9%), Kyrgyz Republic (9%), Russia (9%), Armenia (9%), United
States of America (8%), Zimbabwe (8%), Kazakhstan(8%), Colombia (7%), Lebanese Republic (6%), Norway
(6%), Ecuador (6%), and European Union (5%).
9 I also account for the changes in EFTA i.e. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom left EFTA to join the European Union.
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over time when using the original data that WITS provides.10 The light gray line is Mexico’s
MFN tari. Mexico reported taris for the rst time in 1991 and from 1995 onwards each
year. Mexico has an FTA with both countries in place: NAFTA entered into force in 1994 and
the EU-Mexico FTA in 2000, respectively. Both FTAs eliminate almost all taris on goods.
Therefore, one would expect the eectively applied tari to be equal to the MFN tari in the
years before the FTAs enter into force and to zero afterwards. This is not the case.
Figure A2: Example of Measurement Error in WITS
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Effectively Applied Tariff MFN
Note: The graph shows the simple average of the eectively applied tari (in WITS this tari type
is called “AHS”) that Mexico imposes on imports from the United States (Panel (a)) and Germany
(Panel(b)) using the original data from WITS. NAFTA, the FTA between Mexico, Canada and the
United States, entered into force in 1994. The FTA between the EU and Mexico entered into force in
2000.
As the solid line in Panel (a) indicates, WITS correctly reports the eectively applied tari
Mexico imposes against the United States to be equal to the MFN tari in 1991. In 1995, the
next year Mexico reports taris, the eectively applied tari is signicantly lower than the
MFN tari but not zero yet. As phasing-in was still going on it makes perfectly sense that
the eectively applied tari is not all the way down to zero. However, in 1996 instead of
decreasing further or at least staying at the same level, the tari jumps up again to the level of
the MFN tari. It stays at the high level for two years, only to jump down again in 1999. This
jumping-pattern persists for the whole period of observation. In Panel (b) the same pattern
can be observed for the tari Mexico has on German exports.
Additionally, the issue on missing data described above can be observed in the plot: even
though the EU-Mexico FTA has entered into force in 2000, the rst time Mexico reports prefer-
10 The data for the US can be downloaded here https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProle/en/Country/MEX/
StartYear/1990/EndYear/2017/TradeFlow/Import/Partner/USA/Indicator/AHS-SMPL-AVRG and for Germany
here https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProle/en/Country/MEX/StartYear/1990/EndYear/2017/TradeFlow/
Import/Partner/DEU/Indicator/AHS-SMPL-AVRG. See Figure A5 in the Appendix for the original plots from
the website.
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ential taris for Germany (or more correctly the EU as Germany does not have its own trade
policy) was only in 2003. When comparing the two plots it becomes apparent that Mexico
has not simply missed to report all preferential taris but instead in 2002 it reported in fact
preferential taris for the United States but not for Germany, making it almost impossible to
correctly interpret the eectively applied tari reported by WITS. These “oddities” are not
only true for Mexico but for a broad set of countries.
Using data on the eectively applied tari provided by IDB through WITS would lead to an
entirely wrong assumption: instead of preferential taris one would mistakenly suppose the
MFN level to be the correct one. Therefore, I will refrain from using this data altogether for
the preferential taris and instead entirely rely on TRAINS. To be clear, for MFN taris IDB
will be used to supplement TRAINS, but for the preferential taris only the latter can be used
as the eectively applied tari by IDB exhibits too much measurement error.
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A.4 Additional Material
Figure A3: Pattern of Reporting
(a) Share of Reporting Countries by Year (in %)
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Note: In Panel (a) the total number of reporting countries is 197, the total number of high income
Countries 43 and of low income countries it equals 143. In Panel (b) the total number of available
years equals 30. Panels (c)-(f) show the share of reported preferential taris. This number equals
the number of reported bilateral preferential taris divided by the number of years the pair should
have a preferential tari because the RTA or SDT is in force. The importing or reporting country is
displayed on the two y-axes, the exporters are on the two x-axes.
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Table A3: Summary Statistics
ISO3 GATT/WTO Nr. of Obs. Share of Imputed Nr. of Products 1st av. Year
A) Least Developed Countries
AFG 2016 28,406,345 81% 4,855 2004
AGO 1994 28,889,121 58% 4,945 2002
BDI 1965 28,971,405 57% 4,967 2002
BEN 1963 28,925,427 47% 4,953 2001
BFA 1963 29,163,733 44% 5,018 1993
BGD 1972 29,163,733 37% 5,018 1989
BTN — 28,889,121 81% 4,945 1996
CAF 1963 29,163,733 43% 5,018 1995
COD 1997 28,593,101 75% 4,887 2003
COM — 28,593,101 74% 4,887 2008
DJI 1994 29,163,733 72% 5,018 1998
ERI — 28,805,211 94% 4,930 2002
ETH — 29,160,001 69% 5,017 1995
GIN 1994 29,163,733 75% 5,018 1998
GMB 1965 29,163,733 74% 5,018 2003
GNB 1994 28,925,427 54% 4,953 2001
GNQ — 29,163,733 84% 5,018 1998
HTI 1950 28,889,121 62% 4,945 2001
KHM 2004 28,889,121 62% 4,945 2001
LAO 2013 29,152,100 65% 5,016 2000
LBR 2016 27,048,050 86% 4,603 2010
LSO 1988 28,925,427 53% 4,953 2001
MDG 1963 29,163,733 33% 5,018 1995
MLI 1993 29,163,733 31% 5,018 1995
MMR 1948 28,889,121 43% 4,945 1996
MOZ 1992 29,163,733 48% 5,018 1994
MRT 1963 28,889,121 70% 4,945 2001
MWI 1964 29,163,733 48% 5,018 1994
NER 1963 28,925,427 47% 4,953 2001
NPL 2004 29,163,733 40% 5,018 1993
RWA 1966 29,163,733 51% 5,018 1993
SDN — 29,163,733 72% 5,018 1996
Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
ISO3 GATT/WTO Nr. of Obs. Share of Imputed Nr. of Products 1st av. Year
SEN 1963 28,925,427 47% 4,953 2001
SLB 1994 29,163,733 69% 5,018 1995
SLE 1961 28,553,263 84% 4,880 2004
STP — 27,237,225 87% 4,636 2013
TCD 1963 29,163,733 48% 5,018 1995
TGO 1964 29,163,733 33% 5,018 1996
TLS — 27,301,065 80% 4,647 2011
TUV — 27,322,064 93% 4,653 2010
TZA 1961 29,163,733 48% 5,018 1993
UGA 1962 29,160,001 45% 5,017 1994
VUT 2012 28,915,017 62% 4,951 2002
WSM 2012 27,301,065 77% 4,647 2011
YEM 2014 28,925,427 72% 4,953 2000
ZMB 1982 29,163,733 46% 5,018 1993
B) LoM Africa
BWA 1987 28,925,427 50% 4,953 2001
CIV 1963 29,163,733 44% 5,018 1993
CMR 1963 29,163,733 49% 5,018 1994
COG 1963 29,159,911 47% 5,017 1994
CPV 2008 28,889,121 64% 4,945 2004
DZA — 29,163,733 54% 5,018 1993
EGY 1970 29,163,733 40% 5,018 1995
GAB 1963 29,163,733 46% 5,018 1995
GHA 1957 29,163,733 53% 5,018 1993
KEN 1964 29,163,733 45% 5,018 1994
LBY — 29,160,031 90% 5,017 1996
MAR 1987 29,163,733 34% 5,018 1993
MUS 1970 29,163,733 32% 5,018 1995
MYT — 27,301,065 77% 4,647 2007
NAM 1992 28,925,427 50% 4,953 2001
NGA 1960 29,163,733 26% 5,018 1988
SWZ 1993 28,925,427 50% 4,953 2001
SYC 2015 29,163,733 74% 5,018 2000
TUN 1990 29,163,733 39% 5,018 1990
Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
ISO3 GATT/WTO Nr. of Obs. Share of Imputed Nr. of Products 1st av. Year
ZAF 1948 29,163,733 20% 5,018 1988
ZWE 1948 29,163,733 56% 5,018 1996
C) LoM Americas
ABW — 27,242,963 80% 4,637 2011
AIA — 27,139,194 81% 4,619 2012
ARG 1967 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1992
ATG 1987 28,994,676 40% 4,972 1996
BHS — 28,889,121 70% 4,945 1999
BLZ 1983 28,978,986 49% 4,972 1996
BMU — 28,915,287 59% 4,951 2001
BOL 1990 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1993
BRA 1948 29,163,733 9% 5,018 1989
BRB 1967 29,037,823 60% 4,983 1996
CHL 1949 29,163,733 26% 5,018 1992
COL 1981 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1991
CRI 1990 29,163,733 33% 5,018 1995
CUB 1948 29,163,733 29% 5,018 1993
CYM — 27,785,543 93% 4,748 2016
DMA 1993 28,994,676 46% 4,972 1996
DOM 1950 29,156,209 35% 5,016 1996
ECU 1996 29,163,733 23% 5,018 1993
GRD 1994 29,030,389 55% 4,981 1996
GTM 1991 29,163,733 37% 5,018 1995
GUY 1966 28,994,676 50% 4,972 1996
HND 1994 29,163,733 35% 5,018 1995
JAM 1963 29,060,185 51% 4,989 1996
KNA 1994 29,033,226 47% 4,982 1996
LCA 1993 29,035,051 53% 4,982 1996
MEX 1986 29,163,733 32% 5,018 1991
MSR — 27,895,894 81% 4,766 1996
NIC 1950 29,163,733 28% 5,018 1995
PAN 1997 29,163,733 41% 5,018 1997
PER 1951 29,152,387 35% 5,015 1993
PRY 1994 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1991
Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
ISO3 GATT/WTO Nr. of Obs. Share of Imputed Nr. of Products 1st av. Year
SLV 1991 29,163,733 31% 5,018 1995
SPM — 26,923,107 90% 4,581 2015
SUR 1978 28,960,012 75% 4,968 1996
TTO 1962 29,163,733 49% 5,018 1991
URY 1953 29,163,733 28% 5,018 1992
VCT 1993 29,033,256 55% 4,982 1996
VEN 1990 29,163,733 28% 5,018 1992
D) LoM Asia
ARE 1994 28,650,467 60% 4,899 2003
ARM 2003 28,925,427 50% 4,953 1996
AZE — 28,889,121 69% 4,945 2002
BHR 1993 29,163,733 42% 5,018 1999
BRN 1993 29,160,031 30% 5,017 1992
CHN 2001 29,163,733 23% 5,018 1992
COK — 27,301,065 80% 4,647 2010
FJI 1993 28,597,965 60% 4,890 2003
GEO 2000 28,889,121 44% 4,945 1994
IDN 1950 29,163,733 19% 5,018 1989
IND 1948 29,163,733 38% 5,018 1990
IRN — 28,883,744 81% 4,944 2000
JOR 2000 28,925,427 47% 4,953 2000
KAZ 2015 29,163,733 67% 5,018 1996
KGZ 1998 29,160,031 48% 5,017 1995
KWT 1963 29,100,326 51% 5,002 2002
LBN — 28,919,697 63% 4,952 1999
LKA 1948 29,163,733 37% 5,018 1990
MDV 1983 28,925,427 47% 4,953 2000
MNG 1997 29,020,082 36% 4,979 1996
MYS 1957 29,163,733 28% 5,018 1988
NRU — 26,666,296 93% 4,537 2016
OMN 2000 29,163,733 47% 5,018 1992
PAK 1948 29,163,733 32% 5,018 1995
PHL 1979 29,163,733 8% 5,018 1988
PLW — 28,593,101 74% 4,887 2005
Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
ISO3 GATT/WTO Nr. of Obs. Share of Imputed Nr. of Products 1st av. Year
PNG 1994 28,889,121 49% 4,945 1997
PSE — 27,094,399 84% 4,613 2013
PYF — 28,593,101 72% 4,887 2008
QAT 1994 29,163,733 51% 5,018 2002
SAU 2005 29,160,031 42% 5,017 1994
SYR — 28,860,358 88% 4,940 2002
THA 1982 29,163,733 38% 5,018 1989
TJK 2013 28,883,744 70% 4,944 2002
TKM — 28,883,744 93% 4,944 1998
TON 2007 27,301,065 68% 4,647 2007
TUR 1951 29,163,733 38% 5,018 1993
UZB — 28,889,121 75% 4,945 2001
VNM 2007 29,163,733 44% 5,018 1994
WLF — 26,882,524 90% 4,574 2015
E) LoM Europe
ALB 2000 28,925,427 39% 4,953 1997
BIH — 28,925,427 60% 4,953 2001
BLR — 29,163,733 55% 5,018 1996
MDA 2001 29,163,733 43% 5,018 1996
MKD 2003 28,925,427 52% 4,953 2001
MNE 2012 27,391,431 64% 4,665 2007
RUS 2012 29,163,733 49% 5,018 1993
SRB — 28,925,427 63% 4,953 2001
UKR 2008 29,163,733 54% 5,018 1995
F) High Income Countries
AUT 1951 28,712,191 35% 4,940 1990
BEL 1948 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
BGR 1996 28,981,537 49% 4,970 1997
CYP 1963 29,017,251 42% 4,979 1996
CZE 1993 29,163,733 51% 5,018 1992
DEU 1951 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
DNK 1950 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
ESP 1963 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
ISO3 GATT/WTO Nr. of Obs. Share of Imputed Nr. of Products 1st av. Year
EST 1999 29,163,733 36% 5,018 1995
FIN 1950 29,147,430 33% 5,015 1988
FRA 1948 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
GBR 1948 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
GRC 1950 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
HRV 2000 28,936,206 50% 4,957 2001
HUN 1973 29,163,733 44% 5,018 1991
IRL 1967 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
ITA 1950 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
LTU 2001 29,163,733 50% 5,018 1995
LUX 1948 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
LVA 1999 29,163,733 44% 5,018 1996
MLT 1964 29,014,138 41% 4,978 1996
NLD 1948 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
POL 1967 29,163,733 35% 5,018 1991
PRT 1962 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1988
ROU 1971 29,163,733 57% 5,018 1991
SVK 1993 28,994,922 46% 4,974 1998
SVN 1994 29,017,251 53% 4,979 1999
SWE 1950 29,098,808 34% 5,007 1988
AUS 1948 29,163,733 34% 5,018 1991
CAN 1948 29,163,733 40% 5,018 1989
CHE 1966 29,163,733 31% 5,018 1990
HKG 1986 29,163,733 27% 5,018 1988
ISL 1968 29,163,733 32% 5,018 1993
ISR 1962 29,158,003 43% 5,017 1993
JPN 1955 29,158,003 31% 5,017 1988
KOR 1967 29,163,733 36% 5,018 1988
LIE 1995 27,157,339 84% 4,624 2011
MAC 1991 28,925,427 29% 4,953 1996
NOR 1948 29,163,733 67% 5,018 1988
NZL 1948 29,158,003 42% 5,017 1992
SGP 1973 29,163,733 26% 5,018 1989
TWN 2002 29,163,733 23% 5,018 1989
Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
ISO3 GATT/WTO Nr. of Obs. Share of Imputed Nr. of Products 1st av. Year
USA 1948 29,163,733 21% 5,018 1989
Note: The table shows the year of accession to the GATT or the WTO, respectively, the total num-
ber of observations in the new data, the share of imputed data, the number of products and the rst
available year for each country included in the sample. The summary statistics sum over all avail-
able years, i.e. 1988 to 2017. The total number of all observations equals 5,692,605,390 out of which
2,805,297,527 are imputed (49%).
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Note: The gure reports the share of misreported preferential taris, i.e. the number of preferential
taris that got falsely reported despite no RTA is in force.
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Figure A5: AHS Simple Average Mexico-United States
(a) Eectively Applied Tari Mexico-United States (b) Eectively Applied Tari Mexico-Germany
Note: The graph shows the simple average of the eectively applied tari (in WITS this tari type
is called AHS) that Mexico imposes on imports from the United States (Panel (a)) and Germany
(Panel(b)) using the original data that can be downloaded from WITS. NAFTA, the FTA between
Mexico, Canada and the United States, entered into force in 1994. The FTA between the EU and
Mexico entered into force in 2000. Mexico did not report taris for the years 1990 and 1992 to 1994.
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Figure A6: Heterogeneity in the Share of Same Taris
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Note: The graph shows the share of same taris across countries and within dierent levels of ag-
gregation. I distinguish between dierent levels of aggregation (HS-4, HS-2, section, and all products,
i.e. the importing country). The red label on the y-axis equals the average share of same taris within
HS4-importer for the respective country group and the blue label equals the average share of same
taris within HS2-importer.
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Figure A7: Distribution of Unique Taris and Most Frequently used Tari across Countries

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(d) LoM Countries: Asia
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Note: The graph shows the number of unique taris a countries has in place. The countries on
the x-axis are ordered by the number of total unique taris, i.e. the further on the right the more
unique taris. Whenever two countries have the same total number of unique taris the countries
are ordered alphabetically. Furthermore, the graph shows the three most frequently used taris by
country. The total number of unique MFN taris is in parentheses behind the country-code on x-axis.
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Figure A8: Distribution of Unique Taris and Most Frequently used Tari across Countries
(Positive Imports)
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(b) LoM Countries: Africa
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(d) LoM Countries: Asia
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Note: The graph shows the number of unique taris a countries has in place excluding HS6-products
that are not imported.The countries on the x-axis are ordered by the number of total unique taris, i.e.
the further on the right the more unique taris. Whenever two countries have the same total number
of unique taris the countries are ordered alphabetically. Furthermore, the graph shows the three
most frequently used taris by country. The total number of unique MFN taris is in parentheses
behind the country-code on x-axis.
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Table A4: Description of Sections
Numeric Abbreviation Description
1 ANIM Live Animals
2 VEGE Vegetable Products
3 FATS Fats & Oils
4 FOOD Food, Bev. & Tobacco




9 WOOD Wood Products
10 PAPER Pulp & Paper
11 TEXT Textile & App.
12 FOOT Footwear
13 STON Stone & Glass
14 JEW Jewelery
15 META Base Metals
16 MACH Mach. & Elec. Equipment
17 TRAN Transportation Rq.
18 OPT Optics
19 ARMS Arms & Ammun.
20 MISC Miscall. Manufactured Articles
21 ART Works of Art
Note: The table lists all sections, their abbreviations and full descrip-
tions.
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Table A5: Change in MFN Taris across Income Groups (Agricultural Products)
∆T 10 = t1 − t0 B = 1 if t̃ik < t
before
ik
∆T 1788 ∆T 1705 ∆T 0594 ∆T 9488 P(B) P(B) ∆T 1788 |B = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LDCs -2.45∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ -6.26∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -7.69∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.34) (0.44) (0.33) (0.00) (0.01) (0.90)
LoM Africa -8.16∗∗∗ -1.33∗∗∗ -8.18∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -11.22∗∗∗
(0.59) (0.48) (0.56) (0.32) (0.00) (0.01) (0.95)
LoM Americas -0.12 3.89∗∗∗ -4.26∗∗∗ 0.25 -0.55∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -6.31∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.30) (0.43) (0.33) (0.00) (0.01) (0.88)
LoM Asia -5.90∗∗∗ 3.63∗∗∗ -8.73∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -9.96∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.45) (0.59) (0.37) (0.00) (0.01) (0.97)
LoM Europe -0.88∗ 3.05∗∗∗ -6.13∗∗∗ 2.20∗∗∗ 0.00 0.15∗∗∗ -4.79∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.34) (0.50) (0.35) (.) (0.01) (0.96)
HICs (Ref. Group) -2.22∗∗∗ -4.42∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 4.44∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.25) (0.42) (0.32) (0.00) (0.01) (0.87)
Observations 112,092 112,092 112,092 112,092 86,615 25,477 82,825
joined WTO < 1995 > 1995 all
Note: The table shows the regression output of yik =
∑6
G=1 βGI
G + uik . In columns (1) to (4) the dependent
variable yik equals the absolute change in the MFN tari ∆T 10 for dierent time intervals. In column (5) and (6)
the dependent variable is the probability of having a binding bound tari P(B), in column (7) it is the change in
MFN taris between 1988 and 2017 for products with a binding bound tari. See the main text for the denition
of B. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate signicance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Figure A9: Changes in the Average Applied MFN Tari (1988 – 2017, in %-points)































5 10 15 20














8 9 10 11 12 13
2017













5 10 15 20
2017
Decrease more than 5%-points
Change 1988-1994 Change 1994-2005
Change 2005-2017 45° Line




















8 10 12 14 16 18










8 9 10 11 12
2017












0 5 10 15 20
2017
Decrease more than 5%-points
Change 1988-1994 Change 1994-2005
Change 2005-2017 45° Line
Note: In this graph I compare the simple average in 2017 with the MFN tari of the rst
year of available data. Whenever a country is below/above the 45-degree line the simple
average decreased/increased in 2017 with respect to the rst available year. Furthermore,
I show when most of the change took place. The country-codes of countries that joined
the WTO after 1995 are in gray.
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Figure A9: Changes in the Average Applied MFN Tari (1988 – 2017, in %-points) -continued
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Note: In this graph I compare the simple average in 2017 with the MFN tari of the rst
year of available data. Whenever a country is below/above the 45-degree line the simple
average decreased/increased in 2017 with respect to the rst available year. Furthermore,
I show when most of the change took place. The country-codes of countries that joined
the WTO after 1995 are in gray.
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Figure A9: Changes in the Average Applied MFN Tari (1988 – 2017, in %-points) -continued
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Note: In this graph I compare the simple average in 2017 with the MFN tari of the rst
year of available data. Whenever a country is below/above the 45-degree line the simple
average decreased/increased in 2017 with respect to the rst available year. Furthermore,
I show when most of the change took place. The country-codes of countries that joined
the WTO after 1995 are in gray.
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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i + uik . The left axis reports the coecients when using the
absolute dierence, the right axis shows the relative dierence (see main text for a formal
denition of the two dependent variables).
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Note: The graph shows the two interpretations of the substantially-all-trade criterion, namely the
pairwise share of zero trade and tari lines with zero taris for all North-South country pairs.
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Note: The graph shows the two interpretations of the substantially-all-trade criterion, namely the
pairwise share of zero trade and tari lines with zero taris for all North-South country pairs.
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Figure A17: Phasing-In across Countries


































































(c) LoM Countries: Americas
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Note: The graph shows the probability of Phasing-In across all countries. The sample is dierent
from the one used in the main analysis because this information is not available for all FTAs but
instead only 149. The countries on the x-axis are sorted by descending order.
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Figure A18: Probability of Phasing-In across Sectors by Income Groups
























































































Mean 95% Confidence Interval
























































































Mean 95% Confidence Interval

























































































Mean 95% Confidence Interval



























































































Mean 95% Confidence Interval

























































































Mean 95% Confidence Interval



























































































Mean 95% Confidence Interval
Note: The graph shows the probability of Phasing-In across all countries. The sample is dierent
from the one used in the main analysis because this information is not available for all FTAs but











Table A6: Unilateral Trade Liberalizations used in the Literature
Country Description of Trade Liberalization Included in Tari Database? Example
Argentina
Argentina started to reduce its MFN
tari in October 1988, by October 1991
most of the cuts were in place
no — 1992 is the rst time taris have
been reported Bustos (2011)
Brazil Brazil implemented large tari cuts from1990 to 1995
yes — taris are annually reported from
1989 onwards
Bustos (2011), Kovak (2013),
Menezes-Filho and Muendler
(2011), and Dix-Carneiro and
Kovak (2017)
Chile
from 1974-1979 taris were reduced to
10%, during crisis years in 1982 to 1984
the tari was increased again to 35%,
only to be reduced from 1985 (20%)
onwards. It equaled 15% in 1988 and in
1991 11%
no — most of the trade liberalization
happened before 1988 and because Chile
starts to report MFN taris only in 1992
even the last cut from 1988 to 1991 is not
observable in the data
Corbo (1997), Pavcnik (2002),
L. Liu (1993), and Tybout
et al. (1991)
Costa Rica starting in 1986, Costa Rica reducedtaris until mid 1990’s
no — taris are not reported for the
years 1988-1994. By the rst reported
year, most of the liberalization has
already took place
Arkolakis et al. (2008)
Cote
d’Ivoire
trade reform with tari cuts by on
average 30% was implemented in 1985
and extended in 1986 and early 1987
no — tari reductions have been already
implemented before tari database
starts in 1988
Harrison (1994)
India taris decreased drastically from 1991(80%) to 1997 (37%)
partially — taris are reported in 1990,
1992 and from 1996-2017. Therefore, the
large cuts can only be observed partially
Topalova (2010), Topalova and
Khandelwal (2011), and De
Loecker et al. (2016)
Indonesia
Indonesia committed to reduce all
bound taris to 40% or less over a
ten-year period starting 1995, also
applied taris were decreased
yes — taris are reported annually from
1995 onwards, even some observations
for the years before the WTO accession
(1989, 1990 and 1993)
Amiti and Konings (2007)
Turkey
The 1984 import program signicantly
reduced both tari and non-tari
barriers (immediate cuts)
no — 1992 is the rst time taris have
been reported, i.e. after implementation
of trade liberalization
Levinsohn (1993)
Note: The table gives an overview of the unilateral trade liberalizations in developing countries used in the literature. Neither the list of trade liberalizations is
exhaustive nor of the references.
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B.1 Tari Data
Using the World Bank’s World Integrated System (WITS) software, which pools data from
the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, we combine all publicly available in-
formation on MFN taris and preferential taris.1 The data have information for more than
150 countries on the 6-digit product level of the common HS system with some of the data
dating back to 1988.2 Whenever more than one preferential scheme applies (i.e. a bilateral
FTA or GSP), we always assume the lowest preferential tari to be eectively in place. We
complement this data with taris from the USITC and the European Commission (TARIC),
which have been cleaned by Forero-Rojas et al. (2018).
Unfortunately, the WITS data need substantial cleaning and completing. Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2004) state “the grossly incomplete and inaccurate information on policy barriers
available to researchers is a scandal and a puzzle” (p. 693). Almost 15 years after writing these
words, the situation is still not much better. Most countries do not report taris every year: for
example in 1996 out of 126 WTO-members only 49% reported taris. Even more troublesome,
the set of countries that report only sporadically is not random but rather consists mostly of
developing countries. As taris tend to be systematically dierent between developing and
developed countries, the non-random pattern of missing data could bias results.
So far, there is no consensus in the literature how to tackle the problem. We deal with
the missing data in the following way: rather than replacing missing MFN taris by linearly
interpolating observations, we set them equal to the nearest preceding observation. This pro-
1 In case of specic taris, the sources report ad valorem equivalents.
2 Taris are typically dened at the 8-digit level. We use 6-digits because this is the most disaggregated level
where product classications are harmonized across countries; beyond 6-digits every country has its own
product classication. Moreover, taris at such disaggregated levels are not available for a broad range of
countries. We will provide sensitivity analysis related to the level of aggregation.
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cedure accounts for the WTO logic of notication, when countries report only policy changes.
If there is no preceding observation, missing MFN taris are set equal to the nearest succeed-
ing observation. As the MFN tari only applies when a country is a member of the WTO,
inferring taris without inducing large margins of error is only possible for countries that are
WTO members. Thus, whenever the exporting or importing country is not a WTO-member
we do not interpolate any data. For preferential taris interpolating is signicantly harder
because FTAs are often phased-in. For a precise interpolation, we use detailed information
for more than 500 FTAs.3
Due to revisions of the Harmonized System in 1996, 2002, 2007 and 2012 the product-
identiers are not uniform across countries and over time in the original data. Thus, to impute
the data it is necessary to convert all products into one revision. Furthermore, not all coun-
tries report in the same revision, especially developing countries often keep using the older
revision, developed countries typically switch once the newer one is available. For any cross-
country analysis the product codes need to be transformed into consistent ones across all
reporting countries. We use the methodology developed by Pierce and Schott (2012) to create
consistent six digit product classication changes over time. We end up with 4,455 product
codes.
B.2 Estimation of Transportation Costs
In this section, we give some background information on the estimation of transportation
costs. We assume transportation costs to be a function of distance Dij such that τ kij =
αk (Dij)δ
k
with δk ∈ (0, 1). Thus, it is possible to estimate the parameters αk and δk for every
product k for the US using τ kUS,c and the bilateral distances between the US and its trading
partners i,DUS,i. Information on bilateral distances comes from CEPII. Taking logs makes OLS
a feasible estimator. The regression equation equals ln(τ kUS,i) = ln(αk) + δkln(DUS,i) + uk.
We regress the cif/fob ratios on the bilateral distance for every product separately to allow
for product-specic constants. One can interpret the estimated coecients as follows: α̂k is
the product-specic component that does not vary across pairs, δ̂k represents the component
that is pair-specic. For example, perishable freight like vegetables will be more sensitive to
the pair-specic bilateral distance than other goods.
Figure B1 Panel (a) shows the distribution of α̂k, while Panel (b) focuses on the distribution
of δ̂k, with k = 1, ..., 3853. We group the coecients by sections. The gures show the
range of the values (excluding the top and bottom 10%) and the mean for 2014. There is large
3 The data is provided by DESTA (Dür et al. 2014). Note that the WITS data sometimes reports MFN taris
when preferential taris should be reported and vice-versa. Our data imputation algorithm accounts for these
peculiarities.
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variation within as well as across sections. For example, while α̂k and δ̂k are relatively wide
spread in sections 1, 2, 3, 5, and 12 , the opposite is true for sections 4, 14, 18, 19, and 21. α̂k
equals on average 1.05 and has a standard deviation of 0.86. The mean of δ̂k is 0.01 and the
standard deviation equals 0.04.
For τ̂ijkd to be sensible, i.e. τ̂ijkd ≥ 1, it must hold that α̂k < 1 ⇐⇒ δ̂k > 0 and α̂k >
1⇐⇒ δ̂k < 0. The economic interpretation is straightforward: whenever the product-specic
(bilateral) component of transportation costs essentially does not matter, the transportation
costs are entirely determined by bilateral (product-specic) characteristics. Therefore, if we
had many α̂k − δ̂k combinations where these conditions are violated, we would end up with
many unreasonable τ̂ijkd’s. Panel (c) shows the relationship between α̂k and δ̂k for 2014. A
clear negative correlation between the two coecients is apparent (ρ = −0.96). Further, there
is not a single case where the pair of coecients lies in the “critical” quadrant, i.e. with δ̂k < 0
and α̂k < 1. Panel (d) shows the distribution of the estimated transportation costs for 2014.
The values concentrate around 1.06, with most of the values laying below 1.25.
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Figure B1: Descriptive Facts about the Estimated Transportation Costs (2014)
(a) Distribution of α̂k (b) Distribution of δ̂k
(c) Relationship between α̂k and δ̂k - 2014
(d) Distribution of estimated Transportation Costs τ̂
(2014)
Note: Panel (a) and (b) show the distribution of the α̂k and δ̂k . The two coecients result from
estimating the following equation ln(τkUS,i) = ln(αk) + δkln(DUS,i) + uk , ∀k. Panel (c) shows the
relationship between the two coecients of interest. Panel (d) shows the estimated transportation
costs for every product-pair combination. All data is for 2014.
B.3 List of Countries in the Sample
The following 129 countries i are in the sample Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croa-
tia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ja-
maica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (the Republic of), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (the former Yugoslav
Republic of), Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova,
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
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Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan (Province
of China), Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
The following 156 countries j are in the sample Albania, Angola, Antigua and Bar-
buda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Be-
lize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo (the Democratic Republic of the), Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechia, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Ko-
rea (the Republic of), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Republic of), Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova (the Republic of),
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan (Province of China), Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay,
Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
The following 171 countries c are in the sample Albania, Algeria, Angola, Anguilla,
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Co-
moros, Congo (the Democratic Republic of the), Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechia, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
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El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ger-
many, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (the Republic of), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (the former
Yugoslav Republic of), Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian
Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan (Province of China), Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbek-
istan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
137
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.4 Additional Material
Figure B2: Predicting Transportation Costs using Import Data from New Zealand
(a) In-Sample Prediction: New Zealand (b) Out-of-Sample Prediction: USA
Note: The graphs shows the observed cif/fob ratios and the predicted values for New Zealand (a)
τ̂NZ,j = exp(ln(α̂) + δ̂ln(DNZ,j)) and the United States (b) τ̂US,j = exp(ln(α̂) + δ̂ln(DUS,j)). We
aggregate by taking the arithmetic average over the two-digit products. The data stem from the US
Census, Statistics New Zealand and CEPII.
Figure B3: Dierence between Predicted and Observed Transportation Costs using Import
Data from the United States
(a) In-Sample Prediction: USA (b) Out-of-Sample Prediction: New Zealand
Note: The graphs show the dierence between the predicted and observed transportation costs for
the United States (a) DUS = τ̂US,j − τUSj and New Zealand (b) DNZ = τ̂NZ,j − τNZj . The data











Table B1: Correlation between Prices and Taris
Price Exports Price Imports Tari (simple) Tari (weighted) MFN (simple) Pref. (simple) MFN (weighted) Pref. (weighted)
Price Exports 1
Price Imports 0.0235 1
Tari (simple) −0.233∗∗ −0.108 1
Tari (weighted) −0.235∗∗ −0.148 0.833∗∗∗ 1
MFN (simple) −0.176∗ −0.1000 0.983∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 1
Pref. (simple) −0.0493 0.00296 0.217∗ 0.186∗ 0.186∗ 1
MFN (weighted) −0.226∗∗ −0.218∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.924∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.199∗ 1
Pref. (weighted) −0.0433 0.120 0.182∗ 0.0976 0.186∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.164 1
Note: The table shows correlations between tari levels and relative prices of exports and imports, respectively. The data for the prices stem from Feenstra et al. (2015). For the taris
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Table C1: Baseline Results—Quantity and Unit Values
IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(q) ln(q) ln(p) ln(p) ln(q) ln(q) ln(p) ln(p)
T × Post -0.221∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ 0.009 0.015 -0.203∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ 0.004 0.007
(0.075) (0.075) (0.035) (0.033) (0.053) (0.052) (0.024) (0.023)
T × Post × US 0.236∗ 0.208 0.071 0.041 0.237∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.030 0.007
(0.136) (0.136) (0.055) (0.054) (0.104) (0.101) (0.039) (0.038)
MFA -0.012 -0.009 -0.016 -0.007
(0.044) (0.020) (0.044) (0.021)
MFA × US 0.049 0.053∗ 0.045 0.063∗∗
(0.078) (0.028) (0.077) (0.028)
N 201,042 201,042 201,042 201,042 201,042 201,042 201,042 201,042
F-Statistic 403.7 369.7 403.7 369.7 . . . .
Note: The table shows the results of estimating equation 3.1. Columns (1) to (4) report the OLS results, the remainder of
the table shows the results for the IV-approach. I use the list of products eligible for AGOA preferences as an instrument.






Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is shown in the table. All regressions include rm-product-destination and destination-year
xed eects. Standard errors are clustered by rms. ***/**/* indicate signicance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table C2: First Stage
(1) (2)
T × Post T × Post × US
AGOA × Post 0.645∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.024) (0.000)
AGOA × Post × US 0.095∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.014)
MFA × Post 0.008 -0.000
(0.010) (0.000)
MFA × Post × US 0.019∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006)
N 201,043 201,043
Note: This table reports the estimation of the rst stage as
dened in Equation 3.2. AGOA is a dummy variable indi-
cating if the product becomes eligible for preferential treat-
ment through the nonreciprocal program AGOA through
which the United States oer preferential market access to
least developed African countries. All regressions include
rm-product-destination and destination-year xed eects.
Standard errors are clustered by rms. ***/**/* indicate sig-











Table C3: Robustness Checks—2SLS
Baseline Placebo URY Firms no 2002 Firm-Trends New EU-Members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ln(x) P(X) ln(x) P(X) ln(x) P(X) ln(x) P(X) ln(x) P(X) ln(x) P(X)
T × Post -0.198∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.086 -0.001∗ -0.321 -0.006 -0.271∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.179 0.000 -0.197∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.001) (0.093) (0.001) (0.210) (0.011) (0.091) (0.001) (0.169) (0.001) (0.074) (0.001)
T × Post × US 0.248∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.103 -0.003 0.115 -0.005 0.363∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.292∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.247∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.004) (0.176) (0.003) (0.430) (0.016) (0.166) (0.005) (0.163) (0.004) (0.137) (0.004)
MFA -0.022 0.005∗∗∗ -0.496∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.052 0.001 0.008 0.005∗∗∗ -0.024 0.005∗∗∗ -0.022 0.005∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.001) (0.095) (0.002) (0.069) (0.004) (0.046) (0.001) (0.045) (0.001) (0.046) (0.001)
MFA × US 0.102 0.009∗∗∗ 0.347 -0.009∗ -0.018 -0.031∗∗∗ 0.007 0.004 0.092 0.009∗∗∗ 0.103 0.009∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.003) (0.347) (0.005) (0.164) (0.010) (0.079) (0.003) (0.078) (0.003) (0.079) (0.003)
T × Post × NMS -1.015∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.001)
N 201,043 20,609,798 28,795 7,494,472 40,775 1,550,948 178,838 18,736,180 200,290 20,609,798 201,043 20,609,798
F-Statistic 369.7 5,510.1 268.0 8,636.3 25.6 132.4 276.7 4,604.0 79.0 1,522.2 369.2 5,378.9
Note: The table shows various robustness test. See main text for details. The dependent variable equals either the log value in USD (ln(x)) or the probability of exporting P (X)).
The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is shown in the table. All regressions include rm-product-destination and destination-year xed eects. Errors are clustered by rms. ***/**/* indicate












Export Exposure to EU15 Market Share of Imports from the U.S.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(x) ln(x) P(X) P(X) ln(x) ln(x) P(X) P(X)
T × Post -0.189∗∗ -0.054 0.002 0.005∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.177 0.002 0.001
(0.074) (0.100) (0.001) (0.002) (0.091) (0.122) (0.001) (0.002)
T × Post × US 0.245∗ 0.055 0.039∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗ 0.425∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.165) (0.007) (0.009) (0.172) (0.217) (0.009) (0.012)
MFA -0.037 -0.037 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.054) (0.053) (0.001) (0.001) (0.067) (0.067) (0.001) (0.001)
MFA × US 0.109 0.109 0.005 0.005 -0.031 -0.032 0.001 0.001
(0.087) (0.087) (0.004) (0.004) (0.111) (0.111) (0.005) (0.005)
EU15 X-Exposure × T × Post -0.378∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.201) (0.005)
EU15 X-Exposure × T × Post × US 0.633∗ 0.012
(0.362) (0.016)
EU15 X-Exposure × Post 0.014 -0.004∗∗
(0.133) (0.002)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × T × Post -0.277 0.001
(0.330) (0.006)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × T × Post × US 0.038 -0.050∗
(0.473) (0.030)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × Post 0.031 -0.004∗∗
(0.121) (0.002)
N 166,100 166,100 14,572,712 14,572,712 131,268 131,268 13,131,184 13,131,184
F-Statistic 359.4 102.2 2,020.5 1,010.0 173.1 61.7 1,138.4 555.0
Note: The table shows the results of estimating equation 3.1. Columns (1) to (4) dierentiates by exposure to the European Union, the remainder of the table shows how
dierences in sourcing aects the results. I use the list of products eligible for AGOA preferences as an instrument. The dependent variable equals either the log value in USD
(ln(x)) or the probability of exporting P (X)). The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is shown in the table. All regressions include rm-product-destination and destination-year xed











Table C5: Heterogeneity across the Sourcing Structure—OLS
ln(x) P(X)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
T × Post -0.217∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗ -0.170∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.063) (0.076) (0.085) (0.086) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
T × Post × US 0.327∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗ 0.407∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.169) (0.184) (0.188) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
MFA -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MFA × US -0.005 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 0.009∗ 0.009∗ 0.009∗ 0.009∗
(0.111) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
US M-Exposure × T × Post 0.219 0.002
(0.239) (0.004)
US M-Exposure × T × Post × US -0.542 -0.047∗
(0.377) (0.027)
US M-Exposure × Post -0.028 -0.004∗
(0.114) (0.002)
Andean + US M-Exposure × T × Post -0.174 0.001
(0.247) (0.004)
Andean + US M-Exposure × T× Post × US -0.178 -0.036
(0.379) (0.024)
Andean + US M-Exposure × Post 0.019 -0.005∗∗
(0.109) (0.002)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × T × Post -0.176 0.002
(0.247) (0.004)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × T × Post × US -0.159 -0.035
(0.382) (0.024)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × Post 0.024 -0.005∗∗
(0.109) (0.002)
N 131,268 131,268 131,268 131,268 13,131,184 13,131,184 13,131,184 13,131,184
Note: The table shows the results of estimating equation 3.1 and includes dierent measures for import exposure by rms. I use the list of products eligible for AGOA preferences
as an instrument. The dependent variable equals either the log value in USD (ln(x)) or the probability of exporting P (X)). All regressions include rm-product-destination and











Table C6: Heterogeneity across the Sourcing Structure—2SLS
ln(x) P(X)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
T × Post -0.246∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗ -0.180 -0.177 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.091) (0.113) (0.120) (0.122) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
T × Post × US 0.411∗∗ 0.479∗∗ 0.423∗∗ 0.425∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.209) (0.213) (0.217) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
MFA 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MFA × US -0.031 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
US M-Exposure × T × Post 0.160 -0.000
(0.302) (0.006)
US M-Exposure × T × Post × US -0.288 -0.066∗
(0.457) (0.034)
US M-Exposure × Post -0.040 -0.003
(0.129) (0.002)
Andean + US M-Exposure × T × Post -0.275 0.000
(0.330) (0.006)
Andean + US M-Exposure × T× Post × US 0.044 -0.051∗
(0.471) (0.030)
Andean + US M-Exposure × Post 0.023 -0.004∗∗
(0.122) (0.002)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × T × Post -0.277 0.001
(0.330) (0.006)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × T × Post × US 0.038 -0.050∗
(0.473) (0.030)
CBERA + Andean + US M-Exposure × Post 0.031 -0.004∗∗
(0.121) (0.002)
N 131,268 131,268 131,268 131,268 13,131,184 13,131,184 13,131,184 13,131,184
F-Statistic 173.1 84.1 57.5 61.7 1,138.4 556.4 550.9 555.0
Note: The table shows the results of estimating equation 3.1 and includes dierent measures for import exposure by rms. I use the list of products eligible for AGOA preferences
as an instrument. The dependent variable equals either the log value in USD (ln(x)) or the probability of exporting P (X)). The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is shown in the table.
All regressions include rm-product-destination and destination-year xed eects. Standard errors are clustered by rms. ***/**/* indicate signicance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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